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Abstract 
 
This thesis uses econometric methods to examine the effects of historical events and 
developments on aspects of economic and social development. Its objective is two-fold:  
The thesis examines causes and effects of different historical events using econometric 
methods and newly constructed and newly available data sets. By studying these 
historical events, broader theoretical questions are addressed that are relevant and have 
implications for today.  
The first chapter studies the economic effects of the Little Ice Age, a climatic period 
that brought markedly colder conditions to large parts of Europe. The theoretical 
interest of this study lies in the question whether gradual temperature changes affect 
economic growth in the long-run, despite people’s efforts to adapt. This question is 
highly relevant in the current debate on the economic effects of climate change. Results 
show that the effect of temperature varies across climate zones, that temperature 
affected economic growth through its effect on agricultural productivity and that cities 
that were especially dependent on agriculture were especially affected. 
The second chapter examines the role of adverse climatic conditions on political 
protest. In particular, it assesses the role of adverse climate on the eve of the French 
Revolution on peasant uprisings in 1789. Historians have argued that crop failure in 
1788 and cold weather in the winter of 1788/89 led to peasant revolts in various parts of 
France. I construct a cross section data set with information on temperature in 1788 and 
1789 and on the precise location of peasant revolts. Results show that adverse climatic 
conditions significantly affected peasant uprisings. 
The third chapter examines the role of different Catholic missionary orders in colonial 
Mexico on long term educational outcomes. I construct a data set of the location of 
1000 historical mission stations. I use OLS and instrumental variables estimation to 
show that only Mendicant mission stations have affected educational attainment while 
all orders affected conversion.  
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Preface 
 
This thesis examines econonometrically causes and effects of historical events. The 
purpose of this approach is two-fold: First, this thesis contributes to historical research, 
in particular by using econometric methods to analyse newly available or newly 
constructed data. Thereby, the thesis sheds new light on historical debates. At the same 
time, by studying historical events, each chapter also addresses theoretical questions 
that have important implications for today.  
In the first chapter, I study the effects of climatic change during the Little Ice Age on 
economic growth in Early Modern Europe. Historians have provided anecdotal 
evidence that relatively cold temperature during the Little Ice Age had a negative effect 
on the economy (e.g Fagan, 2000; Behringer 2010). This is the first study to provide 
econometric evidence on the economic effects of the Little Ice Age studying all of 
Europe. It thereby contributes to research in climate history and to research on the 
economic growth experience of Early Modern Europe. At the same time, this chapter 
also addresses a broader theoretical question by providing econometric evidence on the 
economic effects of long-term climate change, when climate change spans several 
centuries and people have time to adapt. This question is highly relevant in the current 
debate on climate change and to date empirical evidence is scarce. The question of 
which rate of adaptation can be realistically assumed  in current climate models is 
especially urgent. This chapter provides evidence that the effect of climate change is 
highly context-specific. Better access to trade, for example, decreases vulnerability to 
climate change.  
The second chapter of this thesis examines the relationship between negative weather 
shocks and political uprisings. This question is examined by studying negative weather 
shocks in the year preceding the French Revolution on the probability of peasant 
uprisings. As in the previous chapter, this chapter identifies economic characteristics 
that make it more likely that adverse negative weather shocks are followed by political 
uprising, especially an economy’s dependency on agriculture. Again, this question is 
highly relevant in the current debate on the effects of climate change. Climatologists 
predict that the current climate change will be accompanied by more frequent extreme 
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weather events. At the same time, this study contributes to the well-known hypothesis 
that the drought summer of 1788 and the harsh winter of 1788/89 had a direct effect on 
peasant uprisings by causing food insecurity. I use newly available paleoclimatological 
data to shed new light on this question. This chapter is also the first econometric test of 
this hypothesis. The econometric approach allows to establish causality between 
temperatures and uprisings by exploiting variation in weather within France and 
variation in the outbreaks of peasant uprising across France and variation in their 
timing. As in the previous chapter, this chapter examines a historical research question 
while at the same time contributing to our understanding of the theoretical relationship 
between weather shocks and uprisings. 
The third chapter studies the long-term effects of missionaries in colonial Mexico on 
educational and cultural outcome variables. It contributes to the strand of literature on 
the long-term effects of missionaries by refining the definition of missionaries that has 
been used in previous studies and by introducing instrumental variable estimation 
addressing the notorious identification problem that stems from the endogenous 
location of mission stations. At the same time, this chapter contributes to our 
knowledge on the long-term transmission of cultural values. By studying different 
missionary order separately, it shows that only those orders with corresponding values 
had lasting effects on educational outcomes. 
To sum up, the current thesis contributes to our knowledge on historical events and 
shows that lessons can be drawn that are relevant and useful for today. It is crucial, in 
this respect, to take into account the political, economic, and social circumstances that 
differ considerable from circumstances today. To address this concern, it is useful to  
use within-sample comparison as a basis for extrapolation. Furthermore, it is 
indispensible to carefully discuss whether the underlying theoretical mechanisms are 
likely to be at work today. 
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1. The Long Term Effects of Climatic 
Change on Economic Growth: Evidence 
from the Little Ice Age, 1500 – 1750 
 
1.1. Introduction 
Obtaining a realistic estimate of the long term effect of global warming on economic 
growth is crucial for identifying efficient policy responses. One strand of literature, e.g. 
the influential Stern Review (Stern, 2007) estimates the economic cost of climate 
change based on Integrated Assessment Models. They specify and quantify an array of 
mechanisms through which climatic change may affect national income. This approach 
has received considerable public attention and has informed important policy choices. 
A criticism of this approach is that the complex relationships between climate and the 
economy are extremely challenging to capture in its entirety (Dell et al., 2012: 67). 
Results depend on a large number of assumptions whose validity is very difficult to 
test. One source of uncertainty is the degree of adaptation that could realistically be 
assumed (Stern, 2007: 149).   
Another strand of literature explores empirically the effects of year-to-year fluctuations 
in temperature on economic outcomes (Dell et al., 2012; Burgess et al., 2011; 
Deschenes and Greenstone, 2007, 2012). Yet, the authors point out that the effects of 
short-term temperature fluctuations are likely to be different than the effects of long-
term temperature change because the empirical framework does not include the 
possibly important role of adaptation. 
In this chapter, I assess the effects of long term gradual temperature change on 
economic growth in the past. In particular, I assess the effects of the Little Ice Age on 
economic growth in Europe between 1500 and 1750. The Little Ice Age was a climatic 
period between the High Middle Ages and the onset of the Industrial Revolution that 
brought markedly colder climate to Early Modern Europe (Fagan, 2000). Temperature 
in Europe fell by 0.5 to 1 degrees centigrade, changes that were not uniform across 
space or time (Aguado et al., 2007: 483). “[The] seemingly small decrease in mean 
temperature [during the Little Ice Age] had a considerable effect on living conditions 
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throughout Europe [...] shortened growing seasons led to reductions in agricultural 
productivity [...],” (Aguado et al., 2007: 483). Famines became more frequent 
(Behringer, 2005: 226). 
To assess the long term effect of temperature change on economic growth I construct a 
panel data set for over 2000 European cities. These data measure annual temperature 
between 1500 and 1750 and city size data for several points in time. The temperature 
data for each city come from a large temperature reconstruction effort that was 
undertaken by climatologists (Luterbacher et al., 2004). The data set contains gridded 
‘temperature maps’ for each year since 1500 that cover all of Europe. Each grid cell 
measures ca. 50 by 50 kilometres which allows for a precise measurement of climatic 
change at the local level. The temperature data are reconstructed using directly 
measured temperature for later years, temperature indices from historical records as 
well as proxy temperature reconstructions from ice cores and tree ring series 
(Luterbacher et al., 2004: 1500). As a proxy for economic growth I use data on 
historical city sizes for over 2,000 European cities that are obtained from Bairoch 
(1988) and data on country-level urbanisation that are defined based on work by 
McEvedy and Jones (1978) and Bairoch (1988). 
The main analysis investigates the effect of temperature on city size and on 
urbanisation proxies for economic growth. To control for other factors that may have 
affected long-run economic growth I control for city fixed effects and country times 
year fixed effects. City fixed effects control for each city’s time invariant 
characteristics, such as geographic characteristics or persistent cultural traits. 
While it is safe to assume that temperature changes are exogenous to economic growth, 
they are not necessarily randomly distributed across space. Likewise, city growth and 
urbanisation in Early Modern Europe has been unevenly distributed across space with 
especially strong growth in Northwestern Europe (e.g. Broadberry, 2013; van Zanden, 
2009; Koot, 2013). If temperature changes were correlated with a third factor that also 
affects city size estimation results would be biased. I address this concern by directly 
controlling for a host of geographic and historical control variables. All geographic and 
historical control variables are interacted with a full set of time indicator variables to 
allow for flexible effects over time. I control for soil suitability for potato and wheat 
cultivation. As vegetation varies with elevation and terrain conditions such as 
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ruggedness (Benniston et al. 1997) I also control for elevation and ruggedness. Then, I 
control for a number of historical determinants of city size in Early Modern Europe that 
have received particular attention in the literature: being part of an Atlantic trading 
nation (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2005), majority Protestant in 1600 (Becker 
and Woessmann, 2009), a history of Roman rule and access to Roman roads (Landes, 
1998), being a university town (Cantoni et al. 2013), distance to battlegrounds 
(Dincecco et al. 2013), and distance to the coast. Finally, I show that the results are 
robust to the use of Conley (1999) standard errors that assume spatial autocorrelation 
between observations, to the inclusion of period-specific country border fixed effects, 
period-specific country border time trends, and city time trends. 
Then, I investigate heterogeneity in the effect of temperature. Results show that 
temperature had a nonlinear effect on city size. During the Little Ice Age, when 
temperature was relatively low, temperature increases had an overall positive effect on 
city size, especially in cold areas. The effect of temperature changes on economic 
growth is heterogeneous across climate zones. In parts of Europe with a hot and dry 
climate, especially in southern Spain, further temperature increases led to lower growth.  
I also investigate temperature’s effect on agricultural productivity. I combine yearly 
temperature data with yearly wheat prices for ten European cities over a period of ca. 
300 years starting in 1500 (Allen, 2003). As city level demand changes only gradually 
yearly fluctuations in wheat prices are likely to be a reflection of changes in supply. My 
analysis indicates that rising temperatures are associated with falling wheat prices in 
northern cities and with rising wheat prices in southern cities. This pattern of results 
suggests that temperature changes were related to changes in agricultural output which 
then affected city size. Then, I then introduce yield ratios as a direct measure of 
agricultural productivity (based on Slicher van Bath, 1963). Consistent with previous 
results,results show that higher temperatures increased yield ratios, and hence 
agricultural productivity. 
To further test the hypothesis that temperatures affected city size through its effect on 
agricultural productivity, I assess whether the effect of temperature on city size is 
different for relatively small cities that are likely to depend on average more on 
agriculture than relatively large cities. “In grain-growing villages [...] demographic 
crises caused by harvest failure were most destructive [compared to those that could] 
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cushion the blow through the existence of more varied economies [...],” (De Vries, 
1976: 7f.). Results show that the effect of temperature was significantly larger in 
relatively small towns compared to relatively large towns. I also show that the effect of 
temperature changes is significantly smaller for cities that were part of the Hanseatic 
League, a long-distance trade network. These results show that the effect of long-run 
temperature changes on economic growth varies across climate zones and with the 
degree to which an economy depends on agriculture. 
This study contributes to various strands of literature, in particular to the empirical 
literature on the effects of climate on economic growth. A number of studies have 
assessed the economic effects of short-term temperature fluctuations. Burgess et al. 
(2011), Dell, Jones, and Olken (2012) and Deschenes and Greenstone (2007, 2012) 
study the effects of sudden and temporary climatic events, such as droughts and 
excessive heat and of year-to-year temperature fluctuations. In these studies the authors 
emphasise that the effect of short-term temperature fluctuations are not the same as the 
effect of long term gradual temperature changes because it does not allow for 
adaptation. Burgess et al. (2011) find that rainfall shocks in India affects mortality in 
rural areas, but not in urban areas, through its effect on agricultural incomes. Based on 
extrapolation the authors estimate an increase in the Indian annual mortality rate of 
approximately 12% to 46% by the end of the century. These results are interpreted as 
an upper bound estimate as the authors “[...] fully expect rural Indians to adapt to an 
anticipated and slowly warming climate in various ways,” (Burgess et al., 2011: 3).  
Dell, Jones, and Olken (2012) use worldwide temperature and precipitation data 
between 1950 and 2003 and find large, negative effects of higher temperature on 
growth in the short-term, but only in poor countries. Dell, Jones and Olken (2012: 68) 
emphasise that “[...] in the long run, countries may adapt to a particular temperature, 
mitigating the short run economic impacts that we observe.” Deschenes and Greenstone 
(2007, 2012) use year-to-year temperature and agricultural data to conclude that 
warming will significantly decrease US agricultural output. “All of these estimates are 
derived under the unrealistic assumption of no technological progress and adaptation 
[...]. It seems reasonable to assume that these economic forces will contribute to 
reducing the predicted damages,” (Deschenes and Greenstone, 2012: 3763). Barreca et 
al. (2008) find relatively modest effects of heat waves on health outcomes in the US, 
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also because people are able to adapt their consumption of health-preserving goods 
such as air conditioning.  
Another strand of literature assesses the effects of climatic events on political outcome 
variables. Brückner and Ciccone (2011) study the effects of negative rainfall shocks on 
democratic institutions to show that transitory economic shocks may lead to long term 
improvements in institutional quality. Dell, Jones, and Olken (2012) find that 
temperature shocks reduce political stability. Miguel et al. (2004) use rainfall as an 
instrument to estimate the effect of economic shocks on civil conflict. Dell (2012) finds 
that the severity of drought affected insurgency during the Mexican Revolution and 
subsequent land redistribution.  
This chapter also contributes to the literature in economic history that examines the role 
of climate in the past. Oster (2004) shows that especially adverse weather conditions 
during the Little Ice Age led to economic stress and coincided with a higher number of 
witchcraft trials. Berger and Spoerer (2001) show that rising grain prices are related to 
the outbreak of the European Revolutions of 1848. Historians document a relationship 
between historical events and climatic trends. McCormick et al. (2007, 2012) show that 
the expansion of the Roman Empire and the reign of Charlemagne coincided with 
relatively benign weather conditions while the decline of the Roman Empire and the 
disintegration of Charlemagne’s empire were accompanied by less favourable climatic 
conditions that decreased food security. Diamond (2005) illustrates that the extinction 
of the Norse people of Greenland occurred because stifle institutions hampered their 
adaptation to changing environmental conditions during the Little Ice Age.  
The subsequent part of this chapter is structured as follows: In section 1.2, I provide 
historical background on the Little Ice Age, and its effect on agricultural productivity, 
city size, and urbanisation. Sections 1.3 and 1.4 describe the data set construction and 
empirical strategy used in this chapter. I present results in sections 1.5 to 1.8.  Sections 
1.9 and 1.10 discuss implications of results and external validity of results and 
conclude. 
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1.2. The Effect of the Little Ice Age on Agricultural 
Productivity and Urban Growth 
1.2.1. The Little Ice Age 
 
The Little Ice Age was a climatic period that lasted from ca. 1350 to 1750 and brought 
markedly colder and wetter climate to Europe. The cold conditions were interrupted a 
few times by short periods of relative warmth, e.g. around 1500 when it almost reached 
again temperature of the Medieval Warm Period (Fagan, 2000). It ends with the onset 
of the Industrial Revolution in the second half of the 18th century. "[The Little Ice Age] 
does represent the largest temperature event during historical times," (Aguado et al., 
2007: 483). 
While there is debate among climatologists about the causes of the Little Ice Age, 
different contributing factors have been identified: Besides increased volcanic activity 
and changes in atmospheric pressure fields over Europe, reduced amounts of solar 
energy emitted by the sun have contributed to colder temperatures in Europe (Cronin, 
2010: 300ff., Mann et al. 2009:1259).  
Historians have argued that climatic changes during the Little Ice Age had a negative 
effect on economic outcomes. „the unusually cold and damp seventeenth century [had a 
negative effect on] population, agricultural yields, and commerce," (Merriman, 2010: 
363). One mechanism through which the Little Ice Age may have affected economic 
growth has received particular attention in the literature: agricultural productivity. In 
the following, I discuss whether agricultural productivity is a plausible mechanism. 
through which temperature changes may have affected economic outcomes, and in 
particular city size. I will first discuss how temperature decreases may have decreased 
agricultural productivity. Then, I will discuss how decreases in agricultural productivity 
may have affected economic outcomes, in particular city size. I will provide evidence 
from historical case studies (Baten, 2002; Pfister et al. 2006). 
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1.2.2. Effect of the Little Ice Age on agricultural productivity 
 
"[D]uring [the Little Ice Age] temperatures fell by about 0.5 to 1 degree Celsius. 
Historical records indicate that this seemingly small decrease in mean temperature 
[during the Little Ice Age] had a considerable effect on living conditions throughout 
Europe, especially through its effect on agricultural productivity, as colder tempreatures 
led to shortened growing seasons,” (Aguado et al., 2007: 483). The unusually wet and 
cold conditions had detrimental effects on the harvest in certain regions of Europe (De 
Vries, 1976: 12). In particular crops that are dependend on relatively warm 
temperatures, such as wine and wheat, were affected. During the relatively mild and 
stable temprature of the Middle Ages, the Medieval Warm Period, viticulture had 
existed as much north as England, but was abandoned during the Little Ice Age. The 
tree line in the high Alps fell and mountain pastures had to be abandoned (Behringer, 
2005: 94). Later, "during the eighteenth century, Europe as a whole experienced 
warmer, drier weather [...] in stark contrast to the unusually cold and damp seventeenth 
century. This had a salutary effect on population, agricultural yields, and commerce," 
(Merriman, 2010: 363).  
 
1.2.3. Effect of agricultural productivity on economic and 
population growth 
 
How may the Little Ice Age’s effect on agricultural productivity have translated into 
effects on economic growth in general, and city growth in particular? 
The agricultural sector was by far the most important sector at the time. The majority of 
the labour force in early modern Europe worked in agriculture. Differences in 
agricultural productivity were the main determinant of differences in overall economic 
productivity (Dennison, 2010: 148f.). Changes in agricultural productivity were 
changes in productivity in the most important economic sector. It seems therefore 
plausible – as Fagan (2000) and Behringer (2010) argue – that these changes in 
productivity had a tangible effect on the economy as a whole.  
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Furthermore, a number of historians and climate historians have shown that changes in 
weather conditions and agricultural productivity during the Little Ice Age at the local 
level affected local economic and population growth. Pfister et al. (2006) provides 
interesting case studies to illustrate this point. The authors describe that local weather 
conditions during the Little Ice Age affected local economic conditions in Switzerland 
and the Czech Lands (1769-1779) by showing that differences in the local weather 
conditions translated into differences in local grain prices. „The amplitude of grain 
prices mirrors this difference in the magnitude of climate impacts [...]. Rye prices in 
Bern did not even double [while] average prices for rye tripled in Brno (Moravia) [and 
were] even more dramatic in Bohemia“, (Pfister et al. 2006: 122). In a similar vein, 
using London as a case study Galloway (1985) identifies a relationship between 
adverse weather conditions, reduced harvest, increases in prices and increases in 
mortality for London. „Among people living at or near subsistence level [...] variation 
in food prices were primary determinants of variation in the real wage.“ Increases in 
food prices therefore decreased the poor population‘s food intake. Malnutrition then 
increased their susceptibility to diseases. Similarly, Baten (2002) finds an effect of 
climate on grain production in 18th century Southern Germany: relatively mild winters 
from the 1730s to the early 1750s led to increases in production while relatively cold 
winters between 1750s and 1770s reduced agricultural productivity. He finds an effect 
of temperatures and agricultural productivity on the nutritional status of the local 
population. Oster (2004) also finds an effect of adverse local weather conditions on the 
local economy for Switzerland. 
At this time, potatoe cultivation became an attractive alternative to grain cultivation as 
the potatoe as a plant was less vulnerable to what Pfister et al. (2006) call ‘Little Ice 
Age Type Impacts’.  
These studies show empirical evidence that local changes in temperature that affected 
the local harvests and through this channel the local economy. If local decreases in 
agricultural productivity had not affected the local population then we would not expect 
to see famines in the aftermath of low agricultural yields as we see in Pfister et al. 
(2006).  
At the same time, these studies also show that the local change in temperature is one 
among many determinants of economic and nutritional conditions at this time period. 
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Pfister et al. (2006) identify two mechanisms that further affected the adverse economic 
effects of climatic change during this period: local access to trade and local quality of 
political institutions. While „the grain-harvest led to higher food prices, mounting 
unemployment rates, and an increase in the scale of begging, vagrancy, crime and 
social disorder“ in all areas under study, the degree of these calamities varied with local 
access to trade and with the response of the local political institutions (Pfister et al. 
2006: 123). In the canton of Bern, for example, social vulnerability was relatively low. 
From the late seventeenth century onwards, the Bern authorities had built a 
comprehensive network of grain stores. In addition, taxation was relatively low and was 
managed by a relatively efficient administration (Pfister et al., 2006: 124). The Bern 
authorities also systematically traded with adjacent territories. „In the event of bumper 
crops, Bern used to sell grain to the adjacent territories. In the event of deficient 
harvests, grain was usually imported by order of the administration from the 
surrounding belt of grainexporting territories such as the Alsace, Burgundy, Savoy and 
Swabia“,  (Pfister et al., 2006: 124). Starting around 1750, the authorities augmented 
these short-term measures by improving the legal framework such that would promote 
agricultural productivity, e.g. by privatisation of communal land and introducing poor 
relief.  
In comparison, the institutional framework of the Czech Lands made this area much 
more vulnerable to economic calamity caused by harvest failure. Heavy taxes and 
feudal dues were imposed on large parts of the population by the Austrian rulers. In 
addition, the authorities in Vienna reacted too slowly to the severe famine, at first only 
by prohibiting exports and grain distilling. When grain and flour were finally imported 
from Vienna and Hungary, it was not done in sufficient quantity. Bohemia had lost 
about 10% of its population during the third year of famine (Pfister et al., 2006: 125f.). 
These case studies illustrate that climatic changes affect local agricultural productivity, 
while the effect of changes in local agricultural productivity are shaped by a society‘s 
institutional framework and its access to trade. Cities that were in a better position to 
compensate for agricultural losses, e.g. by importing food from other regions were 
likely to be less affected. Food tranpsortation within England, for example, was 
relatively efficient. „[...] it was this efficiency with which food could be brought from 
the countryside to the city which would play a major factor in determining the size of 
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the city“, (Dennison et al., 2010: 156). In other parts of Europe, food transportation was 
more costly. The physical costs of transportation, the institutional impediments, such as 
taxes or the need for official transport permits, or the prohibition of the movements of 
goods affected these costs (Dennison et al., 2010: 156). In sum, local temperature 
affected agricultural productivity which affected nutrition and economic conditions. 
Better institutions and low-cost access to trade, however, shaped this effect. Better 
institutions and better access to agriculture made regions more climate-resilient.  
 
1.2.4. Effect of agricultural productivity on city growth and 
urbanisation 
 
In this section, I describe how increased agricultural productivity lead to city growth 
and to urbanisation. I follow Nunn et al. (2011). In a paper on the effects of the 
introduction of the potatoe on economic growth (measured as urban population growth 
and urbanisation), they argue that agricultural productivity affects urban growth and 
urbanisation. They identify two specific channels through which this effect might have 
taken place (Nunn et al., 2011: 605ff.). First, a shock to agricultural productivity 
changes the relative prices of agricultural and manufacturing products as prices for 
agricultural produce decrease and more workers in the rural economy will migrate to 
the urban economy. This mechanism depends on the assumptions that labour is mobile 
and that demand for agricultural produce is inelastic (i.e. a one percent decrease in 
prices increases demand by less than one percent). This assumption is consistent with 
empirical findings on the price elasticity of food (e.g. Andreyeva et al. 2010). Labour 
mobility was high within most parts of Europe (e.g. de Vries, 1976: 157). It was 
restricted in parts of Eastern Europe where serfdom restricted labour mobility (e.g. 
Nafziger, 2011). 
A second channel through which agricultural productivity might affect urbanisation is 
the effect of agricultural productivity on income per capita (Nunn et al., 2011: 607). 
When agricultural productivity increases workers in the rural economy have more to 
sell and earn more. An increase in income takes place if prices in the agricultural sector 
are not fully offset by rural-to-urban migration. The further above subsistence level 
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rural per capita income rises, the more income is available for manufacturing goods.  
Hence, demand for manufacturing goods and prices for manufacturing products 
increase. This further incites rural workers to move to cities as manufacturing activities 
were typically concentrated in cities (Voigtlaender and Voth, 2013: 781). In sum, 
„cities emerge once peasants’ productivity is large enough to provide above-subsistence 
consumption, such that agents also demand manufacturing goods,“ (Voigtlaender and 
Voth, 2013: 788). 
A third mechanism through which agricultural productivity might have affected urban 
growth and urbanisation was its effect on the urban death rate. For a given rate of rural 
to urban migration a decrease in urban mortality will increase city growth. „Infectious 
diseases dominate the causes of death. These diseases generally thrive in towns, where 
people live at relatively high densities and interact at comparatively high rates,“ 
(Dyson, 2011: 39). If infectious diseases are a more important cause for death in cities 
compared to rural areas then decreased prevalence of infectious diseases will benefit 
the urban population more compared to the rural population. Galloway (1985) shows 
that temperature changes – through their effect on  food prices – affect death from 
diseases in London in the 17th and 18th centuries. „[...] few persons actually died of 
starvation during poor harvest years. The increase in deaths was rather a function of the 
increased susceptibility of the body to various diseases as a result of malnourishment,“ 
(Galloway, 1985: 488). 
Agricultural productivity affected city growth and urbanisation through its effect on 
rural-to-urban migration and rural-to-urban migration was an important determinant of 
urban growth and urbanisation because in early modern cities urban mortality was 
higher than urban fertility. Cities would have ceased to exist without migrant inflow 
from the countryside. „the urban sector is a demographic “sink”—that is, in the long 
run its population would not exist without rural-to-urban migration“, (Dyson 2011: 39) 
and „migration from the countryside has, in past societies, been the immediate cause of 
urbanization“, (Malanima, 2010: 250).  
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1.3. Data  
The basic data set for this chapter is a balanced panel of 2115 European cities. It 
includes data on city size in 1600, 1700, and 1750 and data on annual mean temperature 
for Europe for each year since 1500 (see Table 1 for summary statistics).  
I use data on the size of European cities from Bairoch (1988) as a proxy for economic 
growth. The data set includes 2191 European cities that had more than 5000 inhabitants 
at least once between 800 and 1850. I use a version of the data set that has been 
modified by and used in Voigtländer and Voth (2013). They use linear interpolation to 
fill missing values for time periods between non-zero values. City size is available 
every 100 years for the years 800 to 1800 and additionally for the years 1750 and 1850. 
Of these 2191 cities, I drop 67 because they are located east of 40°E longitude, an area 
for which temperature data is not available. I drop nine cities because they are not 
located on the European continent. The final data set for this chapter includes 2115 
cities. 
The temperature data is taken from Luterbacher et al. (2004). They contain annual 
gridded seasonal temperature data for European land areas. Each grid cell measures 0.5 
by 0.5 degrees which corresponds to an area of about 50 by 50 km. The temperature in 
this data set has been reconstructed based on temperature proxies (tree ring series, ice 
cores), historical records, and directly measured temperature for later years 
(Luterbacher et al., 2004: 1500). The dataset covers European land area between 25°W 
to 40°E longitude and 35°N to 70°N latitude. It covers all European cities in the data 
set, except for Russian cities east of 40°E longitude. 
I combine the two datasets as follows. City size is available in 1600, 1700, and 1750. 
For each time period, I calculate mean temperature over the preceding 100 or 50 years. 
For t=1600 and t=1700: 
                
   
   
 
For t=1750          
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Local mean temperature at city i in time period t is calculated by taking the mean 
temperature over the preceding 100 years for the years 1600 and 1700, and over the 
preceding 50 years for the year 1750.     
I construct a second panel data set to explore the relationship between temperature 
changes and agricultural productivity. For this purpose, I combine yearly temperature 
data from Luterbacher et al. (2004) with yearly wheat prices for ten European cities 
from Allen (2001). Wheat prices are available for Amsterdam, London, Leipzig, 
Antwerp, Paris, Strasbourg, Munich, Florence, Naples, and Madrid. Yearly prices are 
available for these cities over a period of 200 to 250 years starting around 1500. 
Data on control variables is obtained as follows: Data on local potatoe suitability, 
wheat suitability, and altitude are taken from the Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO)'s Global Agro-Ecological Zones (GAEZ) database (IIASA/FAO, 2012). Data on 
ruggedness is taken from Nunn and Puga (2012). Location of the Roman road network 
is taken from the Digital Atlas of Roman and Medieval Civilizations (McCormick et 
al., 2014). Data on country borders in Early Modern Europe, on the extent of the 
Roman Empire in year 0, and information on the location of small and big rivers in pre-
modern Europe are taken from Nüssli (2012). Information on member cities of the 
Hanseatic League and on the spread of the Protestant Reformation in 1600 has been 
collected from Haywood (2000). 
As an alternative indicator for agricultural productivity data on yield ratios is collected 
from Slicher van Bath (1963). As an alternative indicator for economic growth I use 
country-level urbanisation rates. Urbanisation rates are measured as a country’s 
population living in cities divided by the total population. Data on a country’s 
population living in cities is taken as before from Bairoch (1988). Data on a country’s 
total population has been collected from McEvedy and Jones (1978). The authors 
provide information on total population for land areas that correspond to country 
borders in 1978.  
When assessing the effect of temperature on wheat prices and yield ratios I control for 
precipitation. I use reconstructed historical precipitation starting in 1500 which is taken 
from Pauling et al. (2006). The reconstruction is based on long instrumental 
precipitation series, precipitation indices based on documentary evidence and 
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precipitation-sensitive natural proxies such as tree-ring chronologies, ice cores, and 
corals. 
 
Figure 1 Temperature and City Size, 1600 
Note: Map shows European year temperature averaged over 100 years, between 1500 and 1600. Data is taken from 
Luterbacher (2004). It shows location of cities in 1600 according to Bairoch (1988). Symbols are proportionate to 
city size. 
 
Figure 2 shows European mean annual temperature between 1500 and 1750 according 
to Luterbacher (2004). Temperature generally decreases between 1550 and 1700 by ca. 
0.6 degree Celsius. An increase in temperature of around 0.35 degree Celsius occurs 
around 1600. This is followed by an upwards trend in temperature after 1700.  
 
27 
 
 
Figure 2  European annual mean temperature, 20 year moving average  
 
Figure 3 shows variation in mean temperature over time for different parts of Europe: 
north of 59 degree latitude, between 51 and 59 degree latitude, between 43 and 51 
degree latitude, and south of 43 degree latitude. The figures show that temperature 
changed differently over time in these different areas. In the northernmost area of 
Europe (north of 59 degree latitude, including Scotland, Scandinavia, and the Baltic 
states) the cooling trend is almost uninterrupted, with only a short warm period around 
1650 during which temperatures increase slightly. In the area between 51 and 59 degree 
latitude (Ireland and Great Britain, the Netherlands, north Germany and Poland) a 
temperature decrease of more than 0.6 degree Celsius between 1550 and 1600 is 
followed by 50 years of temperature during which temperatures increase by less than 
0.4 degree Celsius. Between 43 and 51 degree latitude (France, the Alpines region, 
Austria, the Czech Republic and Slovakia) the cooling trend after 1550 is completely 
interrupted by a relatively warm and stable period of close to 100 years after 1600. In 
southern Europe (south of 43 degree latitude, including Spain, Italy and Greece) a short 
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period of cooler temperatures after 1550 is completely compensated for by the 
following increase in temperature.  
 
Table 1 Summary Statistics 
   
      Temperature in °C 
   Year All Region 1 Region 2 Region 3 Region 4 
1600 10.6 4.2 8 9.72 14.41 
1700 10.51 3.95 7.84 9.62 14.4 
1750 10.6 4.46 8.1 9.71 14.33 
      City Size (number of inhabitants) 
  Year All Region 1 Region 2 Region 3 Region 4 
1600 5440 1600 4600 5507 6251 
1700 6500 3700 6836 6722 6033 
1750 8258 9167 9134 8338 7365 
Note: Regions 1 to 4 are defined as in Figure 3. Region 1 includes all cities north of 59 degree 
latitude (Scotland, Scandinavian countries, and the Baltic states). Region 2 includes all cities between 
59 and 51 degree latitude (Ireland, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Belgium, northern Germany and 
Poland). Region 3 includes all cities between 51 and 43 degree latitude (France, Switzerland, Austria, 
the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Rumania) and region 4 includes all cities south of 43 degree 
latitude (Spain, Italy and Greece). 
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Figure 3 European annual mean temperature as 20 years moving averages, according to latitude  
Note: The top left graph presents annual mean temperature for the area north of 59 degree latitude. Countries in this area include Scotland, Scandinavian countries, and 
the Baltic states (Region 1). The top right graph presents annual mean temperature for the area between 51 and 59 degree latitude. Countries in this area include Ireland, 
Great Britain, the Netherlands, Belgium, northern Germany and Poland. The bottom left graph presents annual mean temperature for the area between 51 and 43 degree 
latitude. The area includes France, Switzerland, Austria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Rumania. The bottom right graph presents data for the area south of 43 
degree latitude including Spain, Italy and Greece. 
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To investigate heterogeneity in the effect of temperature on city size I divide the sample 
according to climate groups (see Table 2). I define five climate groups based on the 
Köppen-Geiger climate classification for Europe. I use data on the extent of Köppen-
Geiger’s climate zones from Peel et al. (2007). The Köppen-Geiger climate 
classification divides the world into five major climate groups, denoted by the capital 
letters A to E. These climate groups are defined by temperature with A representing the 
warmest and E the coldest areas. An exception is climate group B whose defining 
characteristic is aridity. Subtypes of the groups are defined based on temperature and 
precipitation. In this chapter, I subdivide the sample into five climate groups. The 
climate group ‘arid hot climate’ represents Köppen-Geiger’s climate group B. The 
climate groups ‘temperate hot climate’ and ‘temperate warm climate’ represent 
Köppen-Geiger’s climate group C. The climate group ‘temperate hot climate’ 
represents a subgroup of Köppen-Geiger’s climate group C: temperate climate with hot 
summers. The climate group ‘temperate warm climate’ represents another subgroup of 
Köppen-Geiger’s climate group C: temperate climate with warm summers. The climate 
groups ‘moderately cold climate’ and ‘cold and alpine climate’ represent the Köppen-
Geiger’s climate groups D and E. The climate group ‘moderately cold climate’ 
represents a subgroup of Köppen-Geiger’s climate group D: cold climate with hot or 
warm summers. The climate group ‘cold and alpine climate’ represents a subgroup of 
Köppen-Geiger’s climate group D and climate group E: cold climate with cold 
summers and Alpine climate. 
 
Table 2 Climate Groups & Corresponding Koeppen-Geiger Climate Groups 
 Climate group 
KG Climate 
Group 
KG Climate Subgroups 
N° of 
Observations 
Arid climate 
  
  
Arid hot steppe 1 
B Arid 
 
Arid cold steppe 140 
  
  
Arid cold desert 2 
Temperate Hot 
Climate 
C Temperate 
 
Temperate climate with hot 
dry summer 396 
  
  
Temperate climate with hot 
summer 152 
Temperate Warm 
Climate C Temperate 
 
Temperate climate with 
warm dry summer 81 
 31 
 
  
  
Temperate climate with 
warm summer 758 
Moderately Cold 
Climate 
D Cold 
 
Cold climate with hot 
summer 26 
    
 
Cold climate with warm 
summer 491 
Cold and Alpine 
Climate 
E Polar 
 
Cold climate with cold 
summer 47 
    
 
Polar Tundra 20 
       
 
1.4. Empirical Strategy 
I use the panel data set for 2120 European cities to test whether temperature changes 
during the Little Ice Age, between 1500 and 1750, have affected city size. In the 
baseline specification, I include city fixed effects and year fixed effects. I further 
include various control variables. Each control variable is interacted with a full set of 
time period indicator variables.  
 
 (1)  City Sizeit    =  β + γMean Temperatureit + yt  + ii + cit + εict 
 
 
City Size is the size of city i in time period t. MeanTemperatureit is mean year 
temperature in city i, and time period t over the past 100 years (for the years 1600 and 
1700) and past 50 years (for the year 1750, see also previous section for more detail). ii 
are a full set of city fixed effects. The city fixed effects control for time-invariant city 
characteristics, e.g. distance to the sea and to waterways, permanent climatic or soil 
characteristics that may affect a city's access to trade or its agricultural productivity. yt 
are a full set of year fixed effects that control for variation in temperature and in city 
size over time that is common to all cities in the data set. cit are a number of control 
variables, each interacted with indicators for each time period. They will be described 
in more detail when introduced into the equation. εit is the error term. Standard errors 
are clustered at the city level. 
The coefficient of interest is γ. It is the estimated effect of a one degree increase in 
long-run mean temperature on city size conditional on control variables. This 
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specification estimates the effect of temperature on city size based on variation in both 
variables within each city conditional on year fixed effects and on control variables 
interacted with time period indicators. The identification relies on the assumption that 
temperature changes are not correlated with other determinants of city size besides 
those that are controlled for. 
 
1.5. Baseline Results   
1.5.1. Basic Results and Geographic Controls 
 
 Table 3 shows baseline results. The table reports results for five different 
specifications. The first specification in column 1 estimates the effect of mean 
temperature on city size including city fixed effects and year fixed effects. The 
relationship is positive and significant at the 1% level. This indicates that temperature 
decreases during the Little Ice Age had a negative effect on city size which is consistent 
with historical evidence on the negative economic effects of the Little Ice Age. While 
current climate change is concerned about temperature increases above the temperature 
optimum, temperatures during the Little Ice Age dropped below the optimal 
temperature for European agriculture. Actually, climate researchers have predicted that 
Northern European agriculture - but only in the short-term and only for very small 
increases - might benefit from mild temperature increases due to its relatively cold 
climate (European Environmental Agency 2012: 158). 
    In columns (2) to (6), I include one-by-one several geographic control variables: 
altitude, soil suitability for potato cultivation, for wheat cultivation, as well as terrain 
ruggedness. These geographic factors may have affected city size, for example through 
their effects on agricultural productivity. Local vegetation, for example, changes with 
higher altitudes and increased ruggedness (e.g. Beniston et al., 1997). Nunn and Qian 
(2011) show the importance of (soil suitability for) potato cultivation for population 
growth. If these variables are also correlated with temperature changes omitting them 
may lead to bias. Each variable is interacted with time indicator variables for each time 
period. Columns (2) to (6) in table 2 show that the point estimate remains stable. 
  
 
3
3
 
Table 3 The Effect of Temperature on City Size - Baseline Estimates and Geographic Controls 
 Ln City Size   
              
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       Mean Temperature 0.567*** 0.653*** 0.624*** 0.565*** 0.490*** 0.491*** 
(0.127) (0.142) (0.143) (0.139) (0.144) (0.144) 
       City Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
       
Geographic Controls 
(× Year fixed effects) 
      ln Elevation 
 
yes yes yes yes yes 
ln Wheat Suitability 
  
yes yes yes yes 
ln Potatoe Suitability 
   
yes yes yes 
ln Ruggedness 
    
yes yes 
precipitation 
     
yes 
       Observations 6,360 6,360 6,360 6,360 6,360 6,360 
R-Squared 0.885 0.886 0.886 0.886 0.887 0.887 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at city level 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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1.5.2. Controlling for Historical Determinants of Economic Growth 
 
Results thus far show that temperature decreases of the Little Ice Age have had a 
negative effect on city size. This result is consistent with historical evidence on the 
negative effects of the Little Ice Age on economic conditions. In addition, I have 
controlled for a set of geographical variables that may have been correlated with both 
city size and temperature changes, each variable interacted with time indicator 
variables. 
Yet, economic and urban growth has been uneven across Europe with especially high 
growth in Northwestern Europe. This pattern has been called by historians the Little 
Divergence. A number of factors have been held accountable for this divergence, e.g. 
the overseas trade expansion of the Atlantic powers and human capital accumulation. If 
temperature changes were correlated with these historical factors the estimated effect of 
temperature and city size would be biased. In the following, I therefore directly control 
for historical factors that have been identified as drivers of disparity in urban growth 
within Early Modern Europe. 
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2005) show that the overseas trade expansion of 
Western European countries had a positive effect on economic growth. I add an 
indicator for Atlantic traders, i.e. Great Britain, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, 
Spain, and Portugal. 
As an additional measure for a country's natural openness for overseas trade I include 
an indicator variable for all cities located within 10 km of the coast. 
Van Zanden (2009: 12) emphasises, among other factors, the importance of human 
capital accumulation for economic growth in Early Modern Europe. In the same vein, 
Cantoni and Yuchtman (2013) argue that the establishment of universities increased the 
number of people trained in law. This had a positive effect on economic activities in 
medieval Europe as it decreased the uncertainty of trade and. I include an indicator 
variable for cities that were university cities in 1500. 
Becker and Woessmann (2008, 2009) argue that Protestantism had a positive effect on 
human capital due to its emphasis on people's ability of reading the bible. Weber 
famously argued that Protestantism introduced a stricter work ethic making Protestant 
countries better off. Besides, for most European rulers choosing a Protestant 
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denomination was a highly political act. Rulers distanced themselves from the influence 
of the Roman Catholic Church that rejected, among other things, the newly developing 
ideas on scientific research (e.g. Merriman, 2010). As Protestantism may have affected 
economic development and hence city growth in these various ways I include indicator 
variables that are 1 if a city was majority Lutheran, Calvinist, Anglican, or Catholic in 
1600. 
Several studies identify war as an important factor in the development of Europe, e.g. 
through its effect on state-building (Tilly, 1990). Recently, Dincecco et al. (2013) argue 
that exposure to military conflict had a direct effect on urban growth as it induced 
people to seek protection from violence within city walls. I add a variable that measure 
the distance to the nearest battleground during the time period. 
In column 6 of Table 4, I add an indicator variable that is 1 for all cities that were part 
of the Roman empire. In column 7 of table 3, I add an indicator variable for all cities 
that were located within one kilometer of a Roman road. 
Table 4 shows estimates. Column 1 of Table 4 shows the baseline estimates including 
the geographic control variables. Columns 2 to 8 report estimates when including each 
alternative historical determinant of city size separately. Column 9 reports estimates 
when including all alternative historical determinants. Results show that the coefficient 
on temperature remains stable across these different specifications. These results 
suggest that, while important in their own right, the alternative determinants of city 
growth do not drive the relationship between temperature and city size.  
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Table 4 Robustness Additional Historical Control Variables 
  Ln City Size 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          Mean Temperature 0.491*** 0.740*** 0.500*** 0.426*** 0.548*** 0.411** 0.445*** 0.336** 0.489** 
(0.144) (0.185) (0.144) (0.151) (0.158) (0.160) (0.150) (0.156) (0.208) 
          City Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
          Geographic and Historical Controls (× Year fixed effects) 
Geographic Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Protestant  
 
yes 
      
yes 
University 
  
yes 
     
yes 
Atlantic Traders 
   
yes 
    
yes 
Battle 
    
yes 
   
yes 
Part of Roman Empire 
     
yes 
  
yes 
Access to Roman Roads 
      
yes 
 
yes 
Distance to Coast 
       
yes yes 
          Observations 6,360 6,360 6,360 6,360 6,360 6,360 6,360 6,360 6,360 
R-Squared 0.887 0.893 0.887 0.887 0.887 0.887 0.887 0.888 0.894 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at city level 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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1.5.3. The Effect of Temperature on Urbanisation 
 
So far, city size has been used as an indicator of economic growth. In this section, I 
introduce urbanisationan as an alternative indicator of economic growth. In the absence 
of a direct measure, it has been widely used as a measure of historical per capita GDP 
by a number of studies (e.g. DeLong and Shleifer, 1993; Acemoglu, Johnson, and 
Robinson, 2002, 2005) and it has been shown that urbanisation has been strongly 
correlated with economic growth (e.g. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2002). 
 
(2)  Urbanisationct    =  β + γMean Temperaturect + yt  + cc + gcct + hcct + εct 
 
To estimate the effect of mean temperature on urbanisation I regress urbanisation in 
country c in time period t on a country’s mean temperature, year fixed effects, country 
fixed effects, and the previously introduced geographic and historical controls, each of 
them interacted with time period indicator variables. 
Urbanisation is defined at the country level as the number of inhabitants living in cities 
divided by the total population. Countries are defined as in McEvedy and Jones (1978). 
The measure of urbanisation is available for 22 European countries and three time 
periods. Table 5 reports results from seven specifications. The first specification does 
not include controls. Each of the following specifications introduces one or more new 
controls. Specification (2) introduces year fixed effects in, specification (3) region fixed 
effects. Region times year fixed effects are included in specification (4) and country 
fixed effects in specification (5). Finally, the geographic and historical control variables 
as introduced previously in Table 3 and Table 4 are included in specifications (6) and 
(7).  
Results show a robust and positive relationship between mean temperature and 
urbanisation. With the introduction of new controls the size of the coefficient on mean 
temperature increases, except in the last specification where it decreases. These 
estimates confirm the earlier findings that showed a positive relationship between mean 
temperature and city size. The three specifications including country fixed effects are 
no longer statistically significant. This seems unsurprising given the small sample size. 
As the estimates are based on within-country variation in temperature and urbanisation, 
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variation used for estimation is much reduced. One might be concerned that the 
insignificant results in column (5) to (6) signify that the country fixed effect, hence 
country-wide institutional, economic or political factors – had been driving results. In 
this case, however, we would have expected to see a drop in the size of the coefficient 
and not only reduced statistical significance. It is reassuring that the size of the 
coefficients remains positive and relatively large.  
 
Table 5 The Effect of Temperature on Urbanisation 
          Ln Urbanisation 
                
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        Mean Temperature 0.134*** 0.134*** 0.188** 0.187** 0.598 0.445 0.288 
(0.0434) (0.0441) (0.0762) (0.0823) (0.474) (0.517) (0.633) 
        Year Fixed Effects 
 
yes yes 
 
yes yes yes 
Region Fixed Effects 
  
yes 
    Region*Year Fixed 
Effects 
   
yes 
   Country Fixed 
Effects 
    
yes yes yes 
Geographic Controls (× Year Fixed Effects) 
   
yes yes 
Historical Controls (× Year Fixed Effects) 
    
yes 
        Observations 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 
R-squared 0.263 0.295 0.512 0.533 0.915 0.939 0.943 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at country level 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
1.6. Robustness 
1.6.1. Alternative Samples 
 
Table 3 has shown a positive and significant relationship between mean temperature 
and city size. This is consistent with historical accounts of the adverse economic effects 
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of low temperatures in Europe during the Little Ice Age. In Table 6, I test the 
robustness of these results to the exclusion of potential outliers. Columns 1 and 2 show 
the result of the baseline specification (1) with year fixed effects and with country times 
year fixed effects. Columns 3 to 10 explore whether the results are robust to the 
exclusion of potential outliers to test whether results are driven by a small number of 
especially fast growing cities. Each time I provide estimates for two specifications, one 
including city fixed effects and year fixed effects, the other including city fixed effects 
and country times year fixed effects.  
In the early modern period, capital cities have grown particularly fast. In non-
democratic societies rulers were free to invest a disproportionate share of tax income 
into the capital, e.g. into infrastructure project or the state bureaucracy. In columns 3 
and 4, I exclude capital cities from the sample. Coefficients remain largely unchanged.  
Port cities have also grown especially fast because of their access to long distance trade. 
In columns 5 and 6, I exclude all potential port cities from the sample. Potential port 
cities are defined as cities that are located within 10 km of the Atlantic Ocean, 
Mediterranean Sea, North Sea, or Baltic Sea. Coefficients increase by 0.10 and 0.19 
and increase in significance. 
De Vries (1984: 140, see Table 7) provides a list of 34 cities that have been 
exceptionally successful because they were European capital cities, port cities or 
because they carried out industrial, commercial or administrative functions. In columns 
7 and 8, I show that coefficient estimates decrease 0.03 and 0.02 and remain significant 
when excluding this group of cities.  
Finally, in columns 9 and 10, I exclude cities located in Great Britain, Netherlands, 
France, Spain, and Portugal. Acemoglu et al. (2005) show that these countries, that 
were involved in long distance trade with the American colonies, were an especially 
successful region of early modern Europe. When excluding cities from these countries 
from the sample, the coefficient in column 9 decreases by 0.045 compared to the 
baseline specification and the coefficient in column 10 increases by 0.44. Results in 
columns 3 to 10 show that results are robust to the exclusion of potential outliers.  
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Log CITY SIZE  
  Entire Sample 
excl. 
 capitals 
excl. 
port cities 
excl.  
successful cities 
excl.  
Atlantic traders 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
           Mean Temperature 0.579*** 0.540* 0.571*** 0.557* 0.680*** 0.733** 0.556*** 0.519* 0.534*** 0.981** 
(0.127) (0.303) (0.128) (0.305) (0.160) (0.330) (0.129) (0.308) (0.157) (0.397) 
           City Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year Fixed Effects yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 Country*Year Fixed 
Effects  
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
           Observations 6,345 6,345 6,291 6,291 5,037 5,037 6,246 6,246 3,711 3,711 
R-Squared 0.885 0.899 0.881 0.895 0.878 0.897 0.880 0.895 0.892 0.907 
Notes: Data are a panel of 2215 European cities. The left-hand-side variable is the natural log of number of city inhabitants. Mean temperature is year 
temperature averaged over the periods 1500 to 1600, 1600 to 1700, and 1700 to 1750. Country times Year fixed effects use country borders in 1600. The 
sample in columns 3 and 4 is restricted to cities that were not capital cities between 1600 and 1750. Regressions 5 and 6 include cities that are located more 
than 10 km from the sea. Regressions 7 and 8 exclude cities that were listed by de Vries (1984:140) as especially successful, fast growing cities between 1600 
and 1750. Regression 8 includes cities that were not located in one of the countries identified in Acemoglu et al. (2005) as Atlantic traders: Portugal, Spain, 
France, England, and the Netherlands. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at city level. 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 6 The Effect of Temperature on City Size - Different Samples 
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Table 7 Fastest Growing  Cities in Europe in 1600 
  
Amsterdam Clermont-Ferrand Liege Nimes 
Berlin Copenhagen Liverpool Norwich 
London Cork Livorno Prague 
Madrid Dresden Lyon Rotterdam 
Paris Dublin Malaga Stockholm 
Turin Glasgow Nancy Toulon 
Brest The Hague Nantes Versailles 
Bristol Leipzig Newcastle Vienna 
Cadiz Kaliningrad     
Note: The table contains a list of cities, especially capital cities, port cities, 
and cities that served as administrative or trade centres that were identified by 
de Vries (1984: 140) as especially successful, fast-growing cities in early 
modern Europe. 
 
1.6.2. Alternative Fixed Effects and Time Trends 
 
In this section, I test whether the estimated effect of mean temperature on city size is 
robust to the inclusion of alternative spatial fixed effects and time trends at different 
levels. Column 1 of Table 8 shows a specification including city fixed effect and year 
fixed effects. In column 2, I introduce a linear time trend at the country level. In column 
3, the country level time trend is replaced by country level fixed effects. In column 4, a 
country level time trend is added to the specification. Then, the country level fixed 
effects are replaced by time-period specific fixed effects in column 4. Finally, a time-
period specific country time trend is added in column 5 and a city specific time trend in 
column 6. For the period specific country fixed effects, each city is assigned to the 
country that it was located in in each time period. If city X was part of country A in 
time period t but was part of country B in time period t+1, then country A is assigned to 
city X in time period t and country B is assigned in time period t+1. This takes into 
account changing country borders over the course of the period under study.  
Estimates in Table 8 show that the size of the coefficient are affected by the use of 
different fixed effects and time trends. However, they also show a positive and 
important relationship between mean temperature and city size across all specifications. 
The relationship is significant in most specifications, except in columns 4 and 7 that 
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include city level time trends. For these specifications standard errors could not be 
estimated, possibly because the combination of city fixed effects, year fixed effects, 
period-specific country fixed effects and a city time trend is too demanding as the data 
contains three observations per city.  
 
Table 8 Alternative Fixed Effects and Time Trends 
 Ln City Size   
                
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        Mean 
Temperature 
0.564*** 0.259** 0.526* 0.420 0.620*** 0.345*** 0.397 
(0.127) (0.127) (0.299) n/a (0.125) (0.130) n/a 
        Fixed Effects 
      City FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year FE yes yes 
  
yes yes yes 
Country in 1600 
× Year FE 
  
yes yes 
   Period-Specific 
Country FE 
    
yes yes yes 
        Linear Time Trend 
      Country in 1600 
 
yes 
     Period-Specific 
Country  
     
yes 
 City  
   
yes 
  
yes 
        Observations 6,360 6,360 6,360 6,360 6,360 6,360 6,360 
R-Squared 0.885 0.895 0.899 0.974 0.888 0.899 0.972 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at city level 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
1.6.3. Using Alternative Standard Errors 
 
Table 9 shows the baseline estimates applying different standard errors. Column 1 and 
2 of Table 9 is the baseline specification when clustered at city level when including 
geographical controls (column 1) and when including geographic and historical 
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controls (column 2). Column 3 and 4 show the same two specifications when clustering 
at the grid cell level of the underlying temperature data set. Temperature data is 
provided by grid cell (see section 3 for more detail). Each city is assigned temperature 
data of the grid cell that the city is located in. Different cities can have been assigned 
the same temperature data if they are located in the same grid cell. All cities whose 
temperature data has been informed by the same observation in the temperature 
reconstruction dataset form a cluster. Finally, column 5 and show the two specifications 
using Conley standard errors. Conley standard errors assume spatial autocorrelation for 
cities located within 100 km from each other. Spatial autocorrelation is assumed to 
decrease with distance between cities and complete independence is assumed for cities 
located further than 100 km apart. 
     
Table 9 Robustness Using Alternative Standard Errors 
 Ln City Size   
  Clustered at… 
 
City Level Grid Cell Level Conley SE 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       Mean 
Temperature 
0.487*** 0.483** 0.487*** 0.483** 0.487*** 0.483** 
(0.144) (0.208) (0.172) (0.224) (0.173) (0.200) 
 
      
City Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
 
      
Geographic 
Controls (× Year 
fixed effects) 
yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Historical Controls 
(× Year fixed 
effects) 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
      
Observations 6,360 6,360 6,360 6,360 6,360 6,360 
R-Squared 0.887 0.894 0.887 0.894 0.887 0.894 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at different levels 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 44 
 
1.6.4. The Effect of Temperature in Different Climate Zones 
 
The 2007 report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, Parry et al., 
2007) predicts that the effect of temperature change on agricultural productivity will be 
different in different climate zones. “In mid- to high-latitude regions [far from the 
equator], moderate warming benefits cereal crop and pasture yields, but even slight 
warming decreases yields in seasonally dry and tropical region,” (Parry et al., 2007: 
38). Schlenker et al. (2009) find that increases in temperature up to a certain point lead 
to increases in yield. After reaching an optimum further increases lead to a steep 
decline in yield. In this section, I test whether the effect of temperature change on city 
size during the Little Ice Age is different for cities in different climate zones within 
Europe. Mean annual temperature varies significantly across Europe (see Figure 1 for 
mean annual temperature across Europe in 1600). The difference between the warmest 
and the coldest areas is more than 12 degrees. The question arises whether the effect of 
temperature on city size varies with initial climate. 
For this purpose, I divide the sample into five subsamples based on the Köppen-Geiger 
climate zones for Europe (see section 1.3 for a detailed description). The five 
subsamples represent five climate groups: arid and hot climate, temperate hot climate, 
temperate warm climate, moderately cold climate, and cold, alpine climate (see Figure 
4 for a map). The groups with arid, hot climate and cold, alpine climates are the 
smallest with 143 and 67 cities respectively. Arid, hot climate prevails in parts of Spain, 
and cold, alpine climate in parts of Scandinavia and Russia, and in the Alps. The groups 
with temperate, hot climate, temperate warm climate, and moderately cold climate 
comprise between 517 and 839 cities. Temperate, hot climate prevails in the area 
bordering on the Mediterranean Sea. Temperate warm climate prevails in large parts of 
north-western Europe, e.g. England, the Netherlands, and France, and in parts of 
Germany and Spain. Moderately cold climate prevails in large parts of Eastern Europe. 
To examine whether the effect of temperature depends on a location’s initial climate I 
divide the sample into five subsamples each containing all the cities within one climate 
zone. I split the sample according to climate groups and estimate specification (3). 
 
(3)  City Sizeict    =  β + γMean Temperatureict + cyct  + ii + εict 
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Figure 4 European Climate Groups 
Note: This map shows the distribution of climate groups across Europe. The definition of climate groups follows the 
Koeppen-Geiger definition (Peel et al., 2007). Arid hot climate corresponds to Koeppen-Geiger climate group B. 
Temperate hot climate corresponds to Koeppen-Geiger climate groups Csa and Cfa. Temperate warm climate 
corresponds to Koeppen-Geiger climate groups Csb and Cfb. Moderately cold climte corresponds to Koeppen-
Geiger climate groups Dfa and Dfb, and Cold and alpine climate corresponds to Koeppen-Geiger climate groups Dfc 
and ET.  
 
The coefficient of interest is γ, the estimated effect of temperature on city size. The 
specification also contains a full set of country times year fixed effects, cy, and a full 
set of city fixed effects, i. ε denotes an error term. The subscripts i, c, and t denote city, 
country and time period respectively. 
Table 10 shows regression results for specification (1) and samples of cities in different 
climate groups. Column 1 includes the complete sample. Columns 2 to 6 shows the 
estimated effect of a one degree Celsius increase in temperature on city size for cities of 
each climate group. Results show a steady increase in the coefficient size from warm to 
cold areas. For cities with arid and hot climate, the coefficient is negative and 
significant. For cities with temperate hot climate the coefficient is also negative but 
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substantially closer to 0 and insignificant. The coefficient is very close to 0 for cities in 
temperate warm climate. It is positive for cities with moderately cold climate and 
positive and relatively large for cities with cold and alpine climate. The increase in 
coefficient size from hot to cold areas indicates that the effect of long-term temperature 
change on city size varies with initial climate. It is also consistent with the IPCC’s 
predictions for the effect of current climate change that different climatic zones will be 
differently affected by temperature changes. 
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Table 10 The Effect of Temperature in Different Climate Zones 
 
         LOG City Size (inhabitants) 
 
Entire Sample Arid Hot Climate Temperate Hot 
Climate 
Temperate Warm 
Climate 
 Moderately Cold 
Climate 
Cold and Alpine 
Climate 
Latitude (°N) 46.63 39.01 40.72 49.12 50.63 49.18 
Longitude (°E) 8.87 -2.05 10.6 9.97 20.38 12.48 
 
      
Temperature (°C) 10.71 14.39 14.15 9.99 7.7 7.48 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Mean Temperature 0.540* -4.222*** -0.0485 -0.00134 1.011 1.367 
(0.303) (1.120) (0.881) (0.532) (0.662) (1.550) 
 
      Country*Year Fixed 
Effects 
yes yes yes yes yes yes 
City Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
       Observations 6,345 429 1,644 2,517 1,551 201 
R-squared 0.899 0.947 0.947 0.879 0.872 0.919 
Note: Data are a panel of 2215 European cities. The left-hand-side variable is the natural log of number of city inhabitants. Mean temperature is year temperature 
averaged over the periods 1500 to 1600, 1600 to 1700, and 1700 to 1750. The definition of climate groups follows the Koeppen-Geiger definition (Peel et al. 2007). Arid 
hot climate corresponds to Koeppen-Geiger climate group B. Temperate hot climate corresponds to Koeppen-Geiger climate groups Csa and Cfa. Temperate warm 
climate corresponds to Koeppen-Geiger climate groups Csb and Cfb. Moderately cold climate corresponds to Koeppen-Geiger climate groups Dfa and Dfb, and Cold and 
alpine climate corresponds to Koeppen-Geiger climate groups Dfc and ET. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at city level 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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1.7. The Role of Agricultural Productivity 
1.7.1. The Effect of Temperature on Wheat Prices 
 
The results have shown that the effect of temperature on city size varies across climate 
zones. The question arises through which channel this effect occurs. Historians have 
argued that the Little Ice Age affected agricultural productivity. Fruit blossoming, 
haymaking and grape ripening were delayed because of cold weather (Behringer, 2010: 
93). “Shortened growing seasons [during the Little Ice Age] led to reductions in 
agricultural productivity, especially in northern Europe,” (Aguado, 2007: 483). The 
overwhelming importance of agriculture for the economy at the time also makes it 
plausible that temperature may have affected city size through its effect on agricultural 
productivity. “The growth rates of agricultural outputs and productivity within each 
country were the primary determinants of overall growth rates in each [European] 
country,” (Dennison, 2010: 148). It is therefore plausible that a negative effect of 
disadvantageous weather conditions during the Little Ice Age on agricultural 
productivity may have translated into an effect on city size and on the economy overall.  
To test this hypothesis, I combine yearly temperature data from Luterbacher et al. 
(2004) with annual data on wheat prices for ten European cities from Allen (2001). 
Data is available for Amsterdam, London, Leipzig, Antwerp, Paris, Strasbourg, 
Munich, Florence, Naples, and Madrid. In this section, I use wheat prices as a proxy for 
agricultural productivity. As city level demand changes only gradually yearly 
fluctuations in wheat prices are likely to be a reflection of changes in supply. 
Determinants of agricultural productivity, other than temperature, such as certain 
institutions or technologies, are unlikely to change immediately from year to year in 
response to temperature changes. The immediate effect of temperature on wheat prices 
is therefore likely to depend primarily on temperature’s effect on agricultural 
productivity. As people are likely to reduce consumption when prices increase the 
result may be seen as a lower bound estimate. I propose the following specifications to 
assess the effect of temperature on agricultural productivity: 
 
(4) Wheat Priceirt   =  β + γMean Temperatureirt + ii + ci + εirt 
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I regress the wheat price in city i and time period t on temperature in city i, and time 
period t. c denotes a number of additional control variables I also include a full set of 
city fixed effects i. The coefficient of interest here is γ. It describes the relationship 
between changes in temperature and changes in wheat price in city i and time period t.  
Table 11 reports results. Columns 1 to 5 contain estimates of the effect of temperature 
on wheat prices when including city fixed effects and year fixed effects. Columns 6 to 
10 contain estimates of the effect when including city fixed effects and region times 
year fixed effects. In columns 2 to 5 and 7 to 10 four additional control variables are 
introduced that may have affected wheat prices. Omitting them from the equation may 
lead to biased results if these variables are also correlated with mean temperature. It is 
therefore important to include them in the specification. I include reconstructed 
precipitation data. I then include a variable that counts the number of battles that were 
fought in a country in a given year. It is likely that wars in a country may have 
increased the costs of trading which could have affected wheat prices. I also control for 
whether a country has access to the Sea and whether it is an Atlantic trader. These two 
variables are proxies for access to trade. Access to trade and lower transportation costs 
may have affected wheat prices. If these variables were also correlated with mean 
temperature omitting them from the specification would bias results. The two variables, 
Access to Ocean and Atlantic Trader,  are interacted with a full set of year fixed effects 
to account for the possibility that these characteristics may have had affected differently 
at different points in time.  
The coefficient on mean temperature in column 1 is negative and significant. This 
indicates that a one degree increase in temperature leads to an average decrease in 
wheat prices of 11 percent. This suggests that an increase in temperature may have led 
to an average increase in wheat yields and therefore to a decrease in prices. This results 
is consistent with results in Table 3 showing that, overall, an increase in temperature 
had a positive effect on city size. This result is robust to the inclusion of the control 
variables described above (columns 2 to 5). The coefficient decreases only very slightly 
and remains significant. 
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The specification in columns 6 to 10, when replacing year fixed effects by region times 
year fixed effects, show the same pattern as regressions 1 to 5. The coefficient size is 
smaller. It remains robust to the inclusion of the aforementioned control variables. 
Then, I estimate specification (2) for each of the ten cities separately. I regress Wheat 
Price in time period t on mean temperature in time period t. Previous results have 
indicated that the effect of temperature on city size varies with initial climate. It is 
therefore interesting to test whether the effect of temperature on wheat prices varies 
with initial climate. The ten cities in the data set are located in different climate zones 
within Europe. An increase in temperature might affect agricultural productivity 
differently in northern Europe, where it is relatively cold, than in southern Europe, 
where it is relatively warm.  
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 12 contain specifications as estimated in columns 1 and 6 of 
Table 11. Columns 3 to 12 of show results of regressions for each city separately. 
Results are shown according to latitude, showing the northernmost city, Amsterdam, 
first and the southernmost city, Madrid, last. For the seven northernmost cities results 
coefficients on temperature are negative indicating that an increase in temperature in 
these areas improves agricultural productivity and lowers wheat prices. For the three 
southernmost cities, Florence, Naples and Madrid, the coefficient on temperature is 
positive indicating that an increase in temperature reduced agricultural productivity and 
lead to an increase in wheat prices. These results are consistent with previous results 
that have shown variation in the effect of temperature on city size across Europe.  
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Table 11 The effect of yearly temperature on yearly wheat prices - all cities 
             Ln Wheat Prices (grams of silver per kg) 
  Year Fixed Effects Region×Year fixed Effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
           Mean Temperature -0.110*** -0.104*** -0.106*** -0.106*** -0.103** -0.0626** -0.0646** -0.0681** -0.0681** -0.0864 
(0.0215) (0.0219) (0.0217) (0.0217) (0.0351) (0.0272) (0.0279) (0.0256) (0.0256) (0.0762) 
      
  
    City Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes   
    Region×Year fixed 
Effects 
     
yes yes yes yes yes 
      
  
    Control Variables (×Year Fixed Effects)   
    Precipitation 
 
yes yes yes yes   yes yes yes yes 
Battle 
  
yes yes yes   
 
yes yes yes 
Access to Ocean  
   
yes yes   
  
yes yes 
Atlantic Trader 
    
yes   
   
yes 
      
  
    Observations 2,111 2,111 2,111 2,111 2,111 2,111 2,111 2,111 2,111 2,111 
R-Squared 0.663 0.666 0.666 0.666 0.736 0.745 0.747 0.748 0.748 0.799 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at city level 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 12 The effect of yearly temperature on yearly wheat prices – by city 
               Ln Wheat Prices (grams of silver per kg) 
  All Cities All Cities Amsterdam London Leipzig Antwerp Paris Strasbourg Munich Florence Naples Madrid 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
             Mean 
Temperature 
-0.110*** -0.0626** -0.0908** -0.140** -0.0214 -0.110 -0.126*** -0.0354 -0.0401 0.118** 0.251*** 0.0276 
(0.0215) (0.0272) (0.0373) (0.0575) (0.0315) (0.0707) (0.0413) (0.0462) (0.0428) (0.0552) (0.0530) (0.0771) 
             City Fixed Effects yes yes 
          Year Fixed Effects yes 
           Region×Year 
fixed Effects 
 
yes 
          
             Observations 2,111 2,111 282 425 215 133 355 361 316 307 248 278 
R-Squared 0.663 0.745 0.021 0.014 0.002 0.018 0.026 0.002 0.003 0.015 0.084 0.000 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at city level 
     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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1.7.2. The Effect of Temperature on Yield Ratios 
 
In this section, I introduce historical yield ratios as an alternative, more direct measure 
of agricultural productivity. Yield ratio is defined as ratio of the amount of harvested 
crop grains over the amount of crop grains used for sowing. The data is taken from 
Slicher van Bath (1963). The author provides crop yields by year and city during the 
16
th
, 17
th
 and 18
th
 century for European countries. For each city, the number of years 
for which crop yield data is available varies between one and several hundred years. 
For certain years, information on crop yields is available from various cities within one 
country. For other years, data is available from only one city or not at all. I aggregate 
the yield ratio data at the country level (following Slicher van Bath (1963)’s 
classification of countries). For each year, I take the mean yield ratio of cities for which 
this information is available. This has the advantage that cities for which crop yields are 
available for only one year are not omitted. The estimates are reported in Table 13. In 
column 1, the relationship between yearly mean temperature and yield ratio is estimated 
with no further controls. Then, year fixed effects (column 2) and region fixed effects 
(column 3) are introduced into the specification. In column 4 country fixed effects are 
introduced into the specification following Silcher Bath’s information on the country in 
which each city is located. In columns 5 to 8, I add additional control variables to 
clarify whether it is really the link between yield ratios and weather that is of relevance 
here or whether other variables that were not included before could explain the 
estimated relationship. As described in the previous section, I control for precipitation, 
for the number of battles fought within one country during each year, and for a 
country’s access to an ocean and its status as an Atlantic Trader. 
 
(5) Yield Ratiocrt   =  β + γMean Temperaturecrt + countryFEc + ci + εirt 
 
 
Table 13 presents results. I estimate the effect of mean temperature on yield ratios 
without any control variables (column 1) and then including year fixed effects (column 
2). The relationship is positive but not significant. Then, I add country fixed effects and 
region fixed effects in columns 3 and 4. The size of the coefficient increases and it is 
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significant. In columns 5 to 8, as in the previous section, I control for various control 
variables: precipitation, how many battles took place in a country in each year, whether 
a country had access to the ocean or was an Atlantic trader. The coefficient size is 
robust to the inclusion of these controls. The standard errors also increase and the 
significance of the coefficient lies at 10 percent. 
 
Table 13 The effect of yearly temperature on yearly yield ratios 
           Yield Ratios 
                  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         Mean Temperature 0.182 0.139 0.499** 0.430*** 0.459*** 0.451*** 0.434** 0.543* 
(0.285) (0.282) (0.162) (0.111) (0.112) (0.112) (0.142) (0.259) 
         Year Fixed Effects 
 
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Region fixed Effects 
  
yes 
     Country Fixed 
Effects 
   
yes yes yes yes yes 
         Control Variables (×Year Fixed Effects) 
Precipitation 
    
yes yes yes yes 
Battle 
     
yes yes yes 
Access to Ocean  
      
yes yes 
Atlantic Trader 
       
yes 
         Observations 702 702 702 702 702 702 702 702 
R-Squared 0.017 0.321 0.732 0.802 0.803 0.803 0.820 0.847 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at country level 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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1.8. Heterogeneity in the Effect of Temperature 
1.8.1. The Effect of Temperature on Small and Large Cities 
  
If temperature affects city size through its effect on agricultural productivity we would 
expect cities that depend especially on agriculture to be more affected by temperature 
changes than cities whose economies are more diverse. De Vries (1976: 7f.) finds that 
grain-growing villages were more affected by harvest failure than places with more 
diverse economies. Burgess et al. (2011) find that short-term temperature shocks in 
India only affected rural, not urban, areas because the former depended on agriculture. 
To test this hypothesis, I propose specification 4. 
 
(6) City Sizeict  = β + γMeanTemperatureict + θMeanTemperature*BigCityict + cyct  + ii 
+ εict 
 
In the following, I estimate specification 5. I regress city size on mean temperature and 
on an interaction term of mean temperature and the dummy variable BigCity. BigCity is 
a dummy variable that is 1 for all cities that were larger than the median city in 1500. 
The subscripts i, c, and t denote city, country, and time. The specification includes 
country times year fixed effects, cy, and city fixed effects, i. 
Table 14 shows results. Columns 1 and 2 contain results for the entire sample. The first 
column excludes, the second column includes the interaction term. The coefficient on 
mean temperature in column 1 is the estimated effect of temperature on city size in all 
cities. The coefficient on mean temperature in column 2 is the estimated effect of 
temperature on city size in cities that were smaller than the median city in 1500. The 
coefficient of the interaction term estimates the difference in the effect of temperature 
on city size between small cities and large cities. The coefficient on mean temperature 
is larger in column 2 compared to column 1. It is larger for small cities than for the 
entire sample. The coefficient estimate on the interaction term is negative and 
significant. This indicates that the effect of temperature on large cities is significantly 
smaller compared to the effect of temperature on relatively small cities.  
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One interpretation of this finding is that the economy of big cities depended on average 
less on agriculture and is therefore less affected by temperature changes. Table 10 has 
shown that the effect of temperature on city size varies across climate zones. If this is 
true then we would expect to see the same pattern of heterogeneity here. We would 
expect that the effect of temperature on city size is always closer to 0 for large cities 
compared to small cities. For areas where the effect of temperature on city size is 
positive, such as in relatively cold climates, we would expect the interaction term to 
have a negative sign. For areas where the effect of temperature on city size is negative, 
such as in relatively warm climates, we would expect the interaction term to have a 
positive sign.  
Columns 3 to 7 in Table 14 show results for different climate areas. As expected, we 
see that the coefficient on the interaction term always has the opposite sign compared to 
the coefficient on mean temperature. The only exception is the result in column 3 for 
arid and hot climates. Despite its small sample, one might still be worried that the result 
in column 2 is mainly driven by this climate group. In column 8, I therefore estimate 
the specification including all cities except those in arid, hot climate. As can be 
expected the coefficient on mean temperature increases compared to column 2. This is 
not surprising because the average climate of cities included in this regression is cooler 
compared to cities included in the regression of column 2. The coefficient on the 
interaction term is slightly smaller but remains significant at the 10 percent level. This 
result indicates that the effect of temperature on city size is different for small and large 
cities. 
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Table 14 The Effect of Temperature in Small and Large Cities   
  LOG City Size (inhabitants) 
 
Entire 
Sample 
Entire 
Sample 
Arid Hot 
Climate 
Temperate 
Hot Climate 
Temperate 
Warm 
Climate 
Moderately 
Cold 
Climate 
Cold and 
Alpine 
Climate 
All Cities 
excl. Arid 
Hot Climate 
Latitude (°N) 46.63 46.63 39.01 40.72 49.12 50.63 49.18 47.18 
Longitude (°E) 8.87 8.87 -2.05 10.6 9.97 20.38 12.48 9.66 
Temperature (°C) 10.71 10.71 14.39 14.15 9.99 7.7 7.48 10.45 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Mean 
Temperature 
0.540* 0.760** -2.617* -1.23 0.432 1.285* 1.991 0.961*** 
(0.303) (0.334) (1.414) (0.999) (0.536) (0.694) (1.918) (0.342) 
  
 
  
    
  
Big City* Mean  -0.457** -3.260** 2.555*** -0.955*** -0.554 -1.28 -0.393* 
Temperature  (0.21) (1.308) (0.666) (0.269) (0.378) (1.672) (0.213) 
  
 
  
    
  
Country*Year 
Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
City Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
   
  
    
  
Observations 6,345 6,345 429 1,644 2,517 1,551 201 5,916 
R-squared 0.899 0.899 0.949 0.948 0.88 0.873 0.92 0.897 
Note: Data are a panel of 2215 European cities. The left-hand-side variable is the natural log of number of city inhabitants. Mean temperature is year temperature 
averaged over the periods 1500 to 1600, 1600 to 1700, and 1700 to 1750. Big City is a dummy variable that is 1 for all cities whose size was below the median in 
1600. Big City*Mean Temperature is an interaction of the dummy variable big City and the variable Mean Temperature. The definition of climate groups follows 
the Koeppen-Geiger definition (Peel et al. 2007). Arid hot climate corresponds to Koeppen-Geiger climate group B. Temperate hot climate corresponds to Koeppen-
Geiger climate groups Csa and Cfa. Temperate warm climate corresponds to Koeppen-Geiger climate groups Csb and Cfb. Moderately cold climte corresponds to 
Koeppen-Geiger climate groups Dfa and Dfb, and Cold and alpine climate corresponds to Koeppen-Geiger climate groups Dfc and ET  
 Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at city level *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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1.8.2. The Effect of Temperature on Trade Cities 
 
In section 1.7.2 we have seen that the effect of temperature on city size is significantly 
smaller for large cities whose economies are likely to depend less on agriculture than 
the economy of small cities. In this section, I want to add to this by testing 
temperature’s effect on cities that were part of long distance trade networks. In 
particular, I test whether the effect of temperature is different for cities that were part of 
the Hanseatic League, a network of independent trading towns in Medieval Europe. It 
had been established as an alliance between two trading cities in north Germany, 
Hamburg and Lübeck, that joined forces to fight piracy in the North and Baltic Sea 
(Merriman, 2010: 24). Later, more than 30 other cities joined it as members or as 
kontor cities that had constant offices of the Hanseatic league. The League granted each 
member trading privileges, provided nautical charts and waged war. The Hanseatic 
cities were located in the German states or in North and Eastern Europe. Most member 
cities were directly located at the North and Baltic Sea, others, such as Cologne and 
Dortmund, were not. At its peak in the 14
th
 century it controlled the sea routes of the 
North and Baltic Sea from London to Novgorod. In the period under study the 
Hanseatic League was beyond its most influential time. Yet, its members were still 
likely to be on average more involved in trading activities than the other European 
cities.  
 
(7) City Sizeict  = β + γMeanTemperatureict+ θMeanTemperature*HanseCityict + cyct  + 
ii +εict 
 
To test whether cities with access to long distance trade were affected differently by 
temperature change than cities that engaged less in trading activities I estimate 
specification 5. I regress city size on mean temperature and an interaction term of mean 
temperature and the variable HanseCity. HanseCity is a dummy variable that is 1 for all 
cities that were member or kontor cities of the Hanseatic League according to Haywood 
(2000; see Table 15). The subscripts i, c, and t denote city, country, and time period. 
The specification also includes country times year fixed effects cy and city fixed effects 
i. 
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Table 15 Cities of the Hanseatic League 
  
Berlin Cologne Elblag Deventer Kaliningrad Russia 
Braunschweig Lübeck Gdansk Groningen Riga Latvia 
Bremen Magdeburg Kolobrzeg Kampen Tallin Estonia 
Dortmund Osnabrueck Szczecin Nijmegen Tartu Estonia 
Hamburg Rostock Torun   
 
Visby Sweden 
Kiel Stralsund Wroclaw   
 
  
 Wismar             
Notes: This list of cities contains members cities and kontor cities of the Hanseatic League in 1500. 
Kontor cities were cities in which the Hanseatic League held permanent offices. The data is taken from 
Haywood et al. (2000). 
 
Table 16 shows results. Columns 1 and 2 contain results for the entire sample, the first 
column without, the second with the interaction term. The coefficient on mean 
temperature in column 2 shows the estimated effect of temperature on cities that were 
not Hanseatic cities. The coefficient on the interaction term in column 2 shows the 
difference in the effect of temperature on city size between cities that were and cities 
that were not part of the Hanseatic League. It shows that the effect of temperature on 
cities that were part of the Hanseatic League is significantly smaller than the effect of 
temperature on cities that were not.  
Columns 3 to 7 show results for climate groups separately. As the Hanseatic League 
existed mainly in the North and Baltic Sea region I only estimate the effect separately 
for cities in temperate warm and moderately cold climate. In both climate groups, the 
effect of temperature on city size is significantly smaller for cities that were part of the 
Hanseatic League compared to cities that were not part and the difference is larger in 
colder areas. While the combined estimated effect of temperature for trade cities with 
moderately cold climate is almost zero, it is negative for trade cities in temperate warm 
cities. This is somewhat surprising. While we would expect the combined coefficient to 
be smaller, we would not expect it to become negative indicating a negative effect of 
temperature increases in an area where temperature increases have generally a positive 
effect. One explanation for this pattern could be that temperature increases in the 
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temperate warm climate zone has positive effects on agriculture and increases in 
temperature therefore incite people working in in trade to relocate to the agricultural 
sector. This could have a direct negative effect on city size. It might also have long-run 
negative effects on economic growth. In the short-run, they might enjoy a higher 
income. In the long run, however, for example because trading activities might be 
easier to scale up compared to agricultural activities if costs of scaling up are higher in 
agriculture – e.g. buying land – compared to scaling up in trade which is possible to do 
in a more step-by-step way, e.g. by expanding the trading stock stepwise. 
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Table 16 The Effect of Temperature on Cities of the Hanseatic League 
        
  LOG City Size (inhabitants) 
 
Entire Sample Entire Sample Arid Hot 
Climate 
Temperate Hot 
Climate 
Temperate 
Warm Climate 
Moderately Cold 
Climate 
Cold and Alpine 
Climate 
Latitude (°N) 46.63 46.63 39.01 40.72 49.12 50.63 49.18 
Longitude (°E) 8.87 8.87 -2.05 10.6 9.97 20.38 12.48 
Temperature (°C) 10.71 10.71 14.39 14.15 9.99 7.7 7.48 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Mean Temperature 0.540* 0.658** -4.222*** -0.0485 0.0708 1.307* 1.367 
(0.303) (0.308) (1.120) (0.881) (0.536) (0.687) (1.550) 
 
  
  
    HanseCity* Mean 
 
-1.114***   
 
-0.969** -1.307*** 
 Temperature  (0.307)   
 
(0.407) (0.443) 
   
 
  
    Country*Year Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
City Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
   
  
    Observations 6,345 6,345 429 1,644 2,517 1,551 201 
R-squared 0.899 0.899 0.947 0.947 0.879 0.873 0.919 
Note: Data are a panel of 2215 European cities. The left-hand-side variable is the natural log of number of city inhabitants. Mean Temperature is year temperature averaged over the 
periods 1500 to 1600, 1600 to 1700, and 1700 to 1750. HanseCity is a dummy variable that is 1 for all cities that were part of the Hanseatic League, as members or kontor cities in 1500 
according to Haywood et al. (2000). HanseCity*Mean Temperature is an interaction of the dummy variable HanseCity and the variable Mean Temperature. The definition of climate 
groups follows the Koeppen-Geiger definition (Peel et al. 2007). Arid hot climate corresponds to Koeppen-Geiger climate group B. Temperate hot climate corresponds to Koeppen-
Geiger climate groups Csa and Cfa. Temperate warm climate corresponds to Koeppen-Geiger climate groups Csb and Cfb. Moderately cold climte corresponds to Koeppen-Geiger 
climate groups Dfa and Dfb, and Cold and alpine climate corresponds to Koeppen-Geiger climate groups Dfc and ET. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at city level 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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1.8.3. The Effect of Temperature Conditional on City Size and Trade 
Estimated Using Interaction Terms 
 
In this section, I estimate the effect of temperature conditional city size and access to 
trade. In this sense it is identical to sections 1.8.1 and 1.8.2. It is different from these 
sections as I am using interaction terms here while I have used split samples in the 
previous sections. The advantage of using interaction terms is that the complete sample 
instead of a subset is included in the regression which increases precision of estimates.  
Ideally, to estimate the effect of temperature conditional on another variable, we would 
introduce interaction terms of this variable with all other variables in the equation. To 
estimate the effect of temperature conditional on city size, for example, we would 
introduce an interaction term of temperature and city size, and also interaction terms of 
city size with all other variables in the equation, i.e. other control variables and all fixed 
effects. I follow this ideal as closely as computing power limitations permit. 
In Table 17, I summarise the regression equations as they should be ideally specified 
and as they are specified in Table 18. Column 1 estimates the effect of temperature on 
city size conditional on climate group. The specification estimates the main effects of 
mean temperature, country times year fixed effects and city fixed effects. The indicator 
variables for each climate group are not included here as they are constant within each 
city and are part of the city fixed effects. Then, it contains interaction terms of the 
indicator variables for each climate group with all other variables (Climate Groups × 
Mean Temperature, Climate Groups × Country Times Year Fixed), except city fixed 
effects. The group of interactions in the catgory Climate Groups × City Fixed Effects 
could not be included due to computing power limitations. For column 1, I also sketch 
out the various combinations of the indicator variables that constitute each category.  
Column 2 estimates the effect of temperature on city size conditional on climate group 
and city size. As in column 1, the specification estimates the main effects of mean 
temperature, country times year fixed effects and city fixed effects. It also includes 
interactions of the variable Big City and of the indicator variables for each climate 
group with these baseline variables. The only exceptions are the interactions of climate 
groups and Big City with city fixed effects due to computing power limitations. Finally, 
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the specification contains three-way interaction term of the indicator variables for each 
climate group, the variable Big City, and the baseline variables (Climate Groups × Big 
City × Mean Temperature and Climate Groups × Big City × CY Fixed Effects). 
The regression specification for column 3 is identical to the specification for column 2 
with main effects, two way interactions and three way interactions, except that the 
variable Big City is replaced by the variable Hanseatic League.  
Table 18 reports regression results. Column 1 estimates the effect of temperature 
conditional on climate group. Column 2 estimates the effect of temperature conditional 
on climate group and city size. Column 3 estimates the effect of temperature 
conditional on climate group and Membership in the Hanseatic League. The results of 
the regression are summarised in Table 18 where the coefficients of the relevant main 
effects and interaction terms are added up to effect of the categories of interest. 
The first section of Table 18 shows the resulting estimated effect of temperature on 
cities conditional on climate zone. Results indicate that the effect of a one degree 
increase in temperature is most positive for areas with cold climate while the effect is 
negative in places with hot and arid climate.  
The second section of Table 18 presents the estimated effect of temperature on cities 
conditional on being a relatively big city (above the median city in 1600) and on 
climate zone. The estimated effects are largest for small cities with cold and alpine, 
moderately cold, and temperate hot climate. For these climate zones, the effect of 
temperature on city size is substantially smaller for big cities. For the climate zone of 
temperate warm climate, the estimated effect is similar. It is substantially larger for 
cities with hot and arid climate.  
The third section of Table 18 reports the estimated effect of temperature on cities 
condition on being a member of the Hanseatic League. Member cities of the Hanseatic 
League are all located in areas with moderately cold or temperate warm climate. For 
cities of the Hanseatic League with moderately cold climate the effect of temperature 
on city size is smaller than for non-Hanseatic League members. For cities with 
temperate warm climate the estimated coefficient is substantially smaller, such that it is 
negative even though the overall estimated effect of temperature in this climate zone in 
this specification is close to zero. For the non-Hanseatic cities the coefficient is 
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negative in hot arid areas indicating a negative effect of further temperature increases 
while it is large and positive in moderately cold and cold and alpine areas.  
The patterns of the estimated effects are very similar to the estimated effects in Table 
10, but they are not identical. A plausible reason for this are the missing interaction 
terms between variables (e.g. climate zone indicator variables, big city indicator 
variable, and Hanseatic League indicator variable) with city fixed effects.  
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Table 17 Regression Equations and Interaction Terms For Table 18 
       Column 1 
Main Effect Interaction Terms 
Mean  
Temperature 
Included Not included 
Climate Groups × Mean Temperature Climate Groups × Country Times Year Fixed Effects Climate Groups × City Fixed Effects 
  hot arid climate mean temperature hot arid climate CY FE1, CY FE2, CY FE3… hot arid climate city FE1, city FE2, city FE3… 
  temperate hot climate mean temperature temperate hot climate CY FE1, CY FE2, CY FE3… temperate hot climate city FE1, city FE2, city FE3… 
   temperate warm climate mean temperature  temperate warm climate CY FE1, CY FE2, CY FE3…  temperate warm climate city FE1, city FE2, city FE3… 
  moderately cold climate mean temperature moderately cold climate CY FE1, CY FE2, CY FE3… moderately cold climate city FE1, city FE2, city FE3… 
 
 cold and alpine climate mean temperature  cold and alpine climate CY FE1, CY FE2, CY FE3…  cold and alpine climate city FE1, city FE2, city FE3… 
     
  
 Column 2 
  Included Not Included 
Mean  
Temperature 
Climate Groups × Mean Temperature Climate Groups × Country Times Year Fixed Effects Climate Groups × City Fixed Effects 
Big City  × Mean Temperature Big City × Country Times Year Fixed Effects Big City × City Fixed Effects 
 
Climate Groups × Big City × Mean Temperature Climate Groups × Big City × CY Fixed Effects Climate Groups × Big City × City Fixed Effects 
 
  
   
  
 Column 3 
  Included Not Included 
Mean  
Temperature 
Climate Groups × Mean Temperature Climate Groups × Country Times Year Fixed Effects Climate Groups × City Fixed Effects 
Hanse  × Mean Temperature Hanse × Country Times Year Fixed Effects Hanse × City Fixed Effects 
 
Climate Groups × Hanse × Mean Temperature Climate Groups × Hanse × CY Fixed Effects Climate Groups × Hanse × City Fixed Effects 
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Table 18 The Effect of Temperature on Cities Conditional on Climate, City Size, and Hanseatic League Membership 
  LOG City Size (inhabitants) 
 
Climate  
 
Climate  
and Big City 
Climate  
and Hanseatic League 
  (1) (2)   (3) 
Mean Temperature -4.203*** -2.531 Mean Temperature -4.203*** 
(1.104) (2.230) (1.106) 
 
  
  
 Mean Temperature  
*Arid Hot Climate 
omitted 
category 
omitted category 
Mean Temperature  
*Arid Hot Climate omitted category 
 
  
  
 Mean Temperature 
*Temperate Hot Climate 
4.345*** 
(1.369) 
4.374 
(2.883) 
Mean Temperature 
*Temperate Hot Climate 
4.345*** 
(1.373) 
 
  
  
 
Mean Temperature 
*Temperate Warm Climate 
 
4.145*** 
(1.222) 
2.377 
(2.409) 
Mean Temperature 
*Temperate Warm Climate 4.770*** 
(1.263) 
 
  
  
 Mean Temperature 
* Moderately Cold Climate 
5.206*** 
(1.285) 
5.246** 
(2.433) 
Mean Temperature 
* Moderately Cold Climate 
6.076*** 
(1.484) 
 
  
  
 Mean Temperature 
*Cold and Alpine Climate 
5.570*** 
(1.828) 
6.195* 
(3.267) 
Mean Temperature 
*Cold and Alpine Climate 
6.972*** 
(2.186) 
   
  
 Mean Temperature 
*BigCity 
 
-3.32 
Mean Temperature 
*Hanseatic League 
0.606 
(8.171) 
 
 
(92.538)   
 BigCity 
*Arid Hot Climate 
 
omitted category 
Hanseatic League 
*Arid Hot Climate 
 
   
  
 BigCity 
*Temperate Hot Climate 
 
1.676 
(3.196) 
Hanseatic League 
*Temperate Hot Climate 
 
   
  
 BigCity 
*Temperate Warm Climate 
 
3.282 
(2.717) 
Hanseatic League 
*Temperate Warm Climate -5.424 
   
  -8.601 
BigCity 
* Moderately Cold Climate 
 0.618 
(2.758) 
Hanseatic League 
* Moderately Cold Climate -2.005 
 
  
  (8.310) 
BigCity 
*Cold and Alpine Climate 
 
0.602 
(3.605) 
Hanseatic League 
*Cold and Alpine Climate 
 Observations 6,360 6,360   6,360 
R-squared 0.904 0.920   0.905 
Note: The same notes as in Table 14 and Table 16  apply. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at city level  
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 19 The effect of temperature on city size in… 
    
Conditional on climate zone 
cities with hot arid climate -4.203   
 cities with temperate hot climate 0.142   
 cities with temperature warm climate -.058   
 cities with moderately cold climate 1.003   
 cities with cold and alpine climate 1.367   
 
    
Conditional on city size and climate zone 
    
    big cities with hot arid climate -5.851 -2.531 small  cities with hot arid climate 
big cities with temperate hot climate 0.199 1.843 small cities with temperate hot climate 
big cities with temperate warm climate -0.192 -.154 small cities with temperate warm climate 
big cities with moderately cold climate 0.013 2.715 small cities with moderately cold climate 
big cities with cold and alpine climate 0.946 3.664 small cities with cold and alpine climate 
    
Conditional on city size and climate zone 
    Hanseatic cities with hot arid climate 
 
-4.203 non - Hanseatic cities with hot arid climate 
Hanseatic cities with temperate hot climate 
 
0.142 non- Hanseatic cities with temperate hot climate 
Hanseatic cities with temperature warm climate -4.251 0.567 non- Hanseatic cities with temperature warm climate 
Hanseatic cities with moderately cold climate 0.474 1.873 non- Hanseatic cities with moderately cold climate 
Hanseatic cities with cold and alpine climate   2.769 non- Hanseatic cities with cold and alpine climate 
 
  
1.9. Comparability to Current Economic Situation 
Economic characteristics of Early Modern and present-day Europe are clearly very 
different. One among many indicators of these changes has been the declining 
importance of the agricultural sector and the structural transformation of the European 
economy as a whole. While in 1600 and 1700 43.2 and 26.8 percent of UK GDP came 
from agriculture, this number has shrunk to 1 percent in 2012 (Broadberry et al., 2011; 
World Bank, 2014). At the same time, the importance of the service sector has 
increased dramatically from 24.3 and 34 percent in 1600 and 1700 to 78 percent in 
2012. Other indicators, such as the share of the work force employed in agriculture, 
also speak of the same transformation (see Table 20).  
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The same indicators today for countries in the developing world, however, are more 
similar to those from the Early Modern European economy. Between 35 and 56 percent 
of GDP in countries such as Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali come from the agricultural 
sector. These West African economies are of course still very different from the Early 
Modern European economy in many respects (e.g. the shares of GDP from services are 
mostly higher than in Early Modern economies). These numbers show, however, their 
heavy economic reliance on agriculture. Agricultural productivity, e.g. in Chad, 
Burkina Faso and Mali, are extremely low, even lower than the agricultural 
productivity in England (Broadberry et al., 2011). This chapter and previous research 
(e.g. Burgess et al., 2011) have identified temperature’s effect on agricultural 
productivity as an important channel through which temperature may affect economic 
growth. This could suggest that vulnerability to adverse climate change of developing 
countries’ economies might be similar as in Early Modern Europe. Climate researchers 
predict strong effects of adverse climate change on developing countries’ economies 
(e.g. Parry et al., 2007). 
Another important economic characteristic, especially for economies with an important 
agricultural sector, is farm size. Over past centuries, larger farms have usually been 
correlated with higher economic growth, e.g. because of economies of scale and higher 
investment into technological innovation. In Early Modern Europe a large part of the 
agricultural labour force worked on small landholdings (e.g. 52.4 percent in Savoy, 
35.7 percent in Bohemia). Of course, this varied very much within Europe. Currently, 
the share of small holdings has decreased very much (e.g. 5.6 percent of holdings in 
England and 15 percent in France are smaller than 2 hectares). In developing countries, 
e.g. Senegal, Ethiopia, or Uganda the share of small holdings (< 2 hectares) is still 
relatively high (37.5 percent in Senegal, 87.1 percent in Ethiopia, 73.4 percent in 
Uganda). 
Another important indicator of an country’s economic potential is the literacy rate. 
Literacy is a fundamental pre-condition for training people to move to higher value 
added activities, e.g. in services or to open up businesses. Literacy remains very low in 
countries such as Burkina Faso, Chad, or Mali, where only about one third of the 
population can read. This is comparable to the values for literacy between 1500 and 
1800. 
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The European economies have developed dramatically since the Early Modern period 
in every respect. They exhibit very different characteristics today than in the past. 
While developing countries’ economies are also clearly different from Early Modern 
European economies, they are more comparable, e.g. in their high dependence on 
agriculture, their low farm size, and low levels of human capital. 
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Table 20 Economic characteristics of Countries in Early Modern Europe and Today 
         Today Early Modern Europe 
Indicator Country Year Value Country Year Value 
Sectoral Shares in GDP, 
(%): Agriculture United Kingdom 
2012 1 England 1600 43.2 
 
France 2012 2 England 1700 26.8 
 
Burkina Faso 2012 35.0     
 
Chad 2012 56.0     
 
Mali 2012 42.0     
 
Senegal 2012 17.0     
Sectoral Shares in GDP, 
(%): Industry United Kingdom 
2012 21 England 1600 32.5 
 
France 2012 19   1700 39.2 
 
Burkina Faso 2012 24     
 
Chad 2012 13     
 
Mali 2012 22     
 
Senegal 2012 25     
Sectoral Shares in GDP, 
(%): Services United Kingdom 
2012 78 England 1600 24,3 
 
France 2012 79   1700 34.0 
 
Burkina Faso 2012 42.0     
 
Chad 2012 34.0     
 
Mali 2012 38.0     
 
Senegal 2012 59.0     
Share of Workforce 
employed  
United Kingdom 2012 1.0 England 1705 35 
in Agriculture (%) France 2013 3.0   1775 29 
 
Burkina Faso 2014 90.0 Prussia 1705 80 
 
Chad 2015 80.0   1775 70 
 
Mali 2016 80.0 Spain 1705 71 
 
Senegal 2017 77.5   1775 66 
 
    
France 1705 70 
 
    
  1775 65 
Farm Size(% of holdings 
of certain size) 
Burkina Faso 1993 
< 2 ha.:  
32.4 
Savoy 1600 
<1 ha.:  
52.4% 
 
Senegal 
1993 
< 2 ha.:  
37.5 
Hochberg,  
Germany 
1788 
<1 ha.:  
45% 
 
England 
1993 
< 2 ha.:  
5.6 
Bohemia 1725 
<1.5 ha.:  
35.7% 
 
France 
1988 
< 2 ha.:  
15 
  
  
 
Ethiopia 
2001 
< 2 ha.:  
87.1 
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Uganda 
1991 
< 2 ha.:  
73.4 
  
  
 
    
  
  
Literacy United Kingdom 2014 99.0 England 
1500 
6 
 
France 2014 99.0 Netherland 10 
 
Burkina Faso 2007 28.7 France 7 
 
Chad 2011 35.4 Spain 9 
 
Mali 2011 33.4 England 
1800 
53 
 
Senegal 2009 49.7 Netherland 68 
 
    
France 37 
 
    
Spain 20 
 
    
  
  
Agricultural Productivity France 2012 6831 England 1550-59 1593.2 
 (crop yields in kg per 
hectar) United Kingdom 
2012 6213   1600-10 2028.3 
 
Burkina Faso 2012 1230   1650-60 2411.8 
 
Chad 2012 1282   1700-10 2461.4 
 
Mali 2012 1667.0   1750-60 2890.7 
 
Senegal 2013 1310.0 
   
 
 
1.10. Conclusion 
This chapter studies a historical research question in order to contribute to our 
understanding of the historical period while also shedding light on a theoretical 
question with implications for today. In this chapter, I study the effects of the Little Ice 
Age on city size in Early Modern Europe. Historians have documented both the Little 
Ice Age and its adverse economic effects in certain areas of Europe (e.g. Fagan, 2000; 
Behringer, 2010; Pfister et al., 2006). In this chapter, I econometrically test the 
hypothesis the Little Ice Age affected economic growth in Europe. This research 
contributes to the strand of literature that examines the effects of climatic changes in 
history. Results show that the temperature decreases during the Little Ice Age had 
adverse effects on city size. This is consistent with the historical evidence on the 
adverse economic effects of the Little Ice Age. This research also contributes to 
research on the economic effects of climate change in general. It is one of the first 
studies to provide econometric estimates of the economic effects of long-term climate 
change, when climate change spans several centuries. Previous research used year-to-
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year temperature changes (e.g Deschenes and Greenstone, 2007, 2012; Dell et al., 
2012). The effects of year-to-year temperature changes, however, are unlikely to 
capture the effects of climate change, a long-term process to which people may adapt 
to. This chapter shows that - in the given setting - societies were not adapting 
sufficiently to the climatic changes in order to avoid negative long-term consequences. 
Results also show that the effect of temperature changes varied significantly with 
climatic and economic characteristics. Cities in already cold areas were especially 
affected by further temperature decreases. Cities that had better access to trade were 
significantly less affected.  
What can be learnt from these results about the likely effects of the current climate 
change? While studying a historical episode of climate change provides the opportunity 
of studying the economic effects of climate change in the long-run it also brings with it 
certain interpretative challenges. The economic circumstances of Early Modern Europe 
are clearly different from present-day Europe. The robust effects of temperature 
changes found in this study suggest that - in the context of very low levels of political 
and economic institutional quality, with very little technological change, and especially 
in areas with already extreme climate and with limited access to trade - the mitigating 
force of adaptation is not sufficient to overcome the adverse effects of climate change. 
Another interpretative challenge is that the period under study was exposed to 
temperature decreases, yet current climate change leads to temperature increases. Is the 
effect of temperature decreases likely to be similar to the effect of temperature 
increases? The literature on temperature and agircultural productivity shows that a one 
degree decreases in temperature away from the optimum has a smaller effect compared 
to a one degree increase in temperature (Schlenker et al., 2009). Besides, the magnitude 
of climate change is likely to be larger in the current climate change compared to the 
Little Ice Age. For both reasons, the direction and magnitude of the studied temperature 
changes it is very well possible that the estimated effects are underestimating the effects 
of the current climate change. 
Following Dell et al. (2014) an alternative way of drawing lessons from past climate 
experiences is to examine heterogeneity in the estimated economic effects of 
temperature changes along relevant economic and climatic dimensions. These within-
sample comparisons draw lessons based on variation in economic and political 
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characteristics. In this chapter, for example, I compare cities with better access to trade 
to cities with less access to trade showing that the effect of climate is smaller for better-
connected cities. The underlying mechanisms that have led to heterogeneous effects of 
temperature changes in the past can be expected to be still at work. Today, it is still 
likely that countries with better access to trade are in a better position to compensate for 
economic losses from adverse effects of climate change by specialising in non-affected 
sectors and increasing trade. These results are also consistent with evidence from short-
term temperature changes (e.g. Dell et al., 2012).  
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2. Drought and the French Revolution: The 
effect of economic downturn on peasant 
revolts in 1789 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Recent research has shown that recessions may trigger revolutions because they 
decrease people’s opportunity costs of contesting power (Acemoglu and Robinson, 
2001, 2006; Berger and Spoerer, 2001, for the European Revolutions in 1848; 
Brueckner and Ciccone, 2011, for regime change in Africa; Dell, 2012, for the Mexican 
Revolution). People have “nothing to lose” and protest against the government, even if 
the recession’s causes are known to be exogenous and transitory (Burke and Leigh, 
2010: 126, Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006). Protesters will uphold the threat of 
revolution until institutional changes ensure more redistributive policies in the future 
(Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006: 31f.)  
In 1788, on the eve of the French Revolution, a drought hit France and caused severe 
crop failure (Neumann, 1977). By 1789, grain prices had increased steeply and 
common people spent 88 percent of their income on bread compared to 50 percent in 
normal times (Neely, 2008: 72f.). The dry and hot summer was followed by a 
particularly cold winter. Ice blocked navigable rivers and prevented the transportation 
of cereals. Heating material became scarce and expensive. Living costs soared. The 
share of famished people grew rapidly. “On the eve of the Revolution, hunger was the 
great enemy for the majority of Frenchmen,” (Lefebvre, 1973: 7). Famished peasants 
turned to protest and violence. Their anger was especially directed against the feudal 
system that imposed heavy cash and labour obligations on the common population and 
severely reduced their incomes (Lefebvre, 1973: 118). After weeks of persistent and 
violent protests, in August 1789, “[...] in an effort to appease the peasants and to 
forestall further rural disorders, the National Assembly formally abolished the “feudal 
regime,” including seigneurial rights,” (Merriman, 2010: 447; Neely, 2008: 80). 
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I use variation in climatic conditions in the summer of 1788 and in the winter of 
1788/89 to test whether economic downturn on the eve of the French Revolution 
triggered political protest. I study two variables to measure weather variability: 
temperature levels and deviations in temperature from the long-term mean. To my 
knowledge, this study provides the first econometric test of the role of adverse weather 
conditions in the year preceding the French Revolution on peasant uprisings.  
Economic theory predicts that adverse climatic conditions affect the probability of 
revolt if adverse climatic conditions affect income (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001, 
2006). To test this hypothesis, I construct a community level data set that contains 
information on the precise locations of peasant revolts (Lefebvre, 1973) and gridded 
data on temperatures in the summer of 1788 and the winter of 1788/89 (Luterbacher et 
al., 2004). I digitise and geo-reference information on the locations of peasant revolts, 
where they first broke out, which areas they later spread to and which areas remained 
completely untouched.  
Results indicate that a one degree increase in summer temperatures during the drought 
summer 1788 significantly increased the probability of revolt by about 2.5 percentage 
points. A one degree decrease in temperatures in the severe winter of 1788/89 
significantly increased the probability of revolt by about 2.7 percentage point. 
Temperature also affected the revolt’s timing. Conditional on having a revolt, areas 
with higher summer temperatures in 1788 and lower winter temperatures in 1788/89 
experienced earlier uprisings. These results are robust to the inclusion of county 
(département) level fixed effects. Results from temperature deviations from the mean 
show the same pattern. Summer temperature deviations above the long-term mean 
summer temperature and winter temperature deviations below the long-term mean 
winter temperature both increase the probability of revolt. This set of results indicates 
that summer temperature deviations had a larger effect on revolt compared to witner 
temperature devations. 
 I also show evidence that temperature affected the probability of peasant revolt through 
its effect on peasant’s income as the effect of temperature on the probability of revolt 
was significantly higher in areas with a higher share of agriculture. 
I also investigate the effect of adverse conditions on revolt in manufacturing areas. 
Adverse weather conditions should only affect income from agriculture but not from 
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manufacturing.
1
  Historians have documented that a crisis in the French manufacturing 
sector in the 1780s added to the economic crisis (Lefebvre 1973: 12). My results 
indicate a positive correlation between the share of manufacturing and the frequency of 
revolts which is consistent with the crisis in manufacturing. Adverse weather 
conditions, however, did not increase the probability of revolt in manufacturing areas. 
This suggests that the effect of climate on the probability of revolt operates primarily 
through its effect on the living conditions of farmers.  
To test temperature’s effect on crop failure more directly, I construst a dataset of 
summer temperatures between 1780 and 1790 and wheat prices for the same time 
period based on date from Labrousse (1939). Estimates show that increases in summer 
temperature increased wheat prices. This suggests a negative effect of summer 
temperature increases on agricultural productivity. 
As a placebo test, I estimate the effect of summer and winter temperature deviations 
from the long-term mean in various years preceding the French Revolution. Estimates 
show that temperature in these previous years do not affect the probability of revolt in 
the way that theory would suggest. Instead, higher summer temperatures are mostly 
associated with a lower probability of peasant revolts. 
Overall, the empirical results suggest that the mechanisms highlighted in theoretical 
models on the economic origins of political protest, such as Acemoglu and Robinson 
(2001, 2006), played an important role in the outbreak of peasant revolts across France 
during the French Revolution. Adverse negative economic shocks in the form of 
adverse climatic conditions decreased people’s incomes, especially income from 
agriculture. They decreased people’s opportunity costs of contesting power and 
increased the incidences of political protests, especially in areas with a high share of 
agriculture. Persistent violent peasant protests formed a credible threat of revolution. In 
response to this threat feudal obligations and privileges of the nobility, the fundamental 
characteristics of the ancient regime, were abolished.  
This chapter contributes to various strands of literature, especially to the literature on 
the effect of negative economic shocks on political protest and subsequent institutional 
change. A study that is especially relevant to this chapter is Dell (2012). The author 
                                                 
1
 Burgess et al. (2011) show that adverse weather conditions in present-day India only affect income 
from agriculture, not income from manufacturing. 
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studies the effect of within-state variation in drought severity on municipality-level 
insurgency during the Mexican Revolution. She shows that municipalities that were 
more affected by drought also experienced more insurgency. After the Mexican 
Revolution, more land was redistributed in municipalities with more uprisings which 
had long-term negative effects on economic development Other studies have shown 
that within country variation in climatic conditions had effects on the development of 
democratic institutions (see Brückner and Ciccone, 2011 for sub-Saharan; Burke and 
Leigh, 2010, for a study on 150 countries). Analysing another historical episode, Berger 
and Spoerer (2001) provide evidence that the European Revolutions of 1848 were 
triggered by economic crisis and a shortfall in food supply. Others have estimated the 
effects of climate on other political outcome variables, such as civil conflict (Miguel et 
al., 2004; Hsiang et al. 2013), and historical uprisings in China (Jia, 2013).   
A related strand of literature examines the effects of climatic events on economic 
growth (Burgess et al., 2011 and Dell, Jones, and Olken, 2012), agricultural output 
(Deschenes and Greenstone 2007, 2012) and health (Barreca et al., 2012). 
This chapter also contributes to the historical literature that assesses the role of climate 
as a trigger of the French Revolution. Various historians have documented the 
relationship between adverse climatic conditions and the outbreak of the French 
Revolution (Neumann, 1977; Dettwiller, 1990; Le Roy Ladurie, 1972; Fagan, 2000). 
To my knowledge, this chapter is the first to provide an econometric assessment of this 
hypothesis. 
The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 2.3 provides useful background to the 
outbreak of the French Revolution. Section 2.3 introduces the theoretical and historical 
framework. The empirical strategy and data set construction are described in section 2.4 
I present results in section 2.5 and conclude in section 2.6. 
 
2.2. Political, Economic, and Intellectual Context 
before 1789 
An understanding of the political, economic, and intellectual context of pre-
revolutionary France in crucial to an adequate interpretation of results. The estimated 
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effect of weather shocks have to be interpreted as the effect of weather shocks 
conditional on accompanying characteristics, such as political, institutional, and social 
conditions  of the time and place. While it is possible to take some of these factors 
explicitly into account as control variables and to test empirically whether the effect of 
weather shocks is affected by them, this is not possible for factors that do not vary 
within France because they are national level conditions or for factors that are 
unobservable. The estimated effect of weather shocks on uprisings has to be interpreted 
as an effect conditional on these underlying conditions. In other words, the same 
weather conditions may not have had an effect on uprisings at all in countries with 
different underlying political, economic and social conditions. England, for example, 
was also affected by the same adverse weather conditions in the 1780s. As their 
economy depended less on agriculture and had already moved more into manufacturing 
the general population was economically less affected by these weather conditions and 
riots did not take place. It is therefore important to interpret the effect of weather 
shocks in the context in which they appeared. In this section, I will therefore present the 
broader historical context of the period under study, in particular those factors that 
historians have discussed as causes of the French Revolution.  
In the 1780s, a financial crisis  severely weakened the political and economic power of 
the French king. Three main reasons, Bossenga (2011: 38) argues, lead up to this 
financial crisis. First, over the 18th century the French monarchy had been involved in 
several expensive wars to strengthen their position in Europe: the War of the Austrian 
Succession (1740-48), the Seven Years’ War (1756-63), and the American War of 
Independence. Maintaining the French military and fighting these wars were very 
costly. Three-fourths of the money spent by the French monarchy in the 1780s was to 
maintain the military or to pay off war debts. Second, the French monarchy had to 
borrow money at relatively high interest rates. One reason for this was that it had 
defaulted several times on their debts in the past and lenders demanded compensation 
for the risk of default (Rosenthal, 1992: 11). Another reason was that – unlike the 
English monarchy – the French monarchy lacked a financial institution such as the 
Bank of the England from where it could have borrowed at lower interest rates 
(Norberg, 1994: 270; Bossenga, 2011: 38 ; Hoffman and Rosenthal, 2000: 442). 
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Thirdly, the French tax system was inefficient and did not generate enough income to 
repay debts.  
The limited financial means made it impossible for the French King during the 
Revolution to either appease or subdue the uprisings.  Formerly, the French kings had 
provided free grain in times of harvest crisis. As protests during the French Revolution 
were also partly motivated by food shortages (e.g. Neumann, 1977) the king might have 
had a chance to take momentum out of the protests if he had been able to feed the 
population. This was, however, beyond his financial scope. Furthermore, in the past, 
the French kings had also used military force to subdue uprisings. During the French 
Revolution, however, members of the military deserted in droves as the King was no 
longer able to pay their salaries. The lack of food and payment were of course only part 
of the motivation for uprisings. The King’s ability to limit the scope of uprisings by 
providing food and using military force as French kings had formerly done was 
severely limited by the financial crisis. 
Before the outbreak of the French Revolution the financial crisis already put the French 
king in a politically difficult situation vis-à-vis the French political elite. One option 
would have been to default as the French kings had done several times before. “[...] it 
had become a long-standing tradition for French monarchs to use default to solve, so to 
speak, the financial woes,” (Bossenga, 2011: 38). However, the French king decided 
against this option. Declaring bankruptcy had always been a sign of political weakness 
and it was feared that France would lose investors’ confidence entirely and would no 
longer be able to borrow, thereby making its financial situation even worse (Bossenga, 
2011: 60). Instead, the French king chose to attempt a reform of the French public 
finances in order to improve French financial viability. “[...] if France was to maintain 
its position in Europe, tax revenues would have to rise [but] attitudes had changed and 
the traditional solution, raising taxes without a change in the distribution of power, was 
no longer acceptable even to the aristocracy,” (Rosenthal 1992: 11).  The monarchy 
depended on the wealthy elite to reform the tax system and to agree to tax raises, but 
the elite had no intention to agree unless more power was distributed to them (Hoffman, 
and Rosenthal, 2000). As a result, the Estates General were called. “It was this act, the 
calling of the Estates-General [...] that was novel in French history. This fateful 
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decision opened the way to a whole new era in politics, in fact, to revolution,” 
(Bossenga, 2011: 38). 
The financial crisis of the Revolution were tightly interwoven with political and 
institutional conditions (Bossenga, 2001: 66). As mentioned above, one of the reasons 
of the financial crisis was the inefficient French tax system. It was inefficient because 
the right to raise taxes had been sold to individuals in return for short-term loans. Many 
powerful groups within the French society, especially the aristocracy and the church, 
had also been exempt from taxes in return for their loyalty, and their political and 
military support. In the French political tradition, these privileges were irrevocable. 
Each new king was accepted by the provincial nobility based on his promise to respect 
the existing privileges. “[...] the French king got the support of the important people in 
the kingdom by promising to preserve their power and privileges” (Neely 2008: 2, 4). 
In the long-term, the money that French kings had raised in return for tax exemptions 
and other privileges did not generate as much income as taxes. “Fiscal immunities, 
whether inherited or purchased, undermined French finances and put the king in the 
apparently ridiculous situation of taxing those who had nothing to tax. They also made 
it impossible for the Crown to reform the fiscal system and render it more equitable and 
more efficient,” (Norberg, 1994: 256). In sum, the King’s inability to raise taxes was at 
the heart of his inability to address the crisis adequately (Hoffman and Rosenthal, 2000: 
443).  
The manifold privileges and tax exemptions did not only render the French tax system 
inefficient and unresponsive they also lead to a highly unequal distribution of the tax 
burden across the French population. The poorest part of the population paid taxes to 
the King and had feudal obligations toward their local land lords (Neely 2008: 7). The 
high tax burden was among the main grievances of the French population at the eve of 
the French Revolution. Many nobles could still administer the law over peasants. 
Forests, lakes, and streams were controlled by the landlord and peasants did not have 
the right to hunt and fish (Merriman 2010: 438). 
The hypothesis that an economic crisis was one of the causes of the French Revolution 
was pioneered by Labrousse (e.g. 1939, 1944). Labrousse argued that France 
experienced a broad economic crisis in the 18
th
 century with rising population and grain 
prices, stagnant agricultural sector and falling real wages accompanied by falling 
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demand in manufacturing products. More recently, this aggregate view of the 18th 
century French economy has been refined (Goldstone, 2001: 73). “Agriculture made 
only slow advances in yields in most areas during the century, but seaborne trade, 
especially through the Atlantic ports, was a great success story. The expansion of textile 
manufacturing and the beginnings of a chemical and metallurgical industry also helped 
France to have similar overall growth figures to Britain [...],” (Campbell, 2006: 18). It 
was not so much the absence of growth, but the failure to tax this growth sufficiently 
that left French finances strained. Instead, “French finances were overdependent upon 
internal tariffs (which inhibited trade) and the large but undynamic agricultural sector,” 
(Campbell, 2006: 18). Furthermore, growth of the urban and trade sector benefited only 
a relatively small proportion of the population, while modest increases in food 
production lead to only limited surpluses in some years and serious national food 
shortages in others resulting in the long-term in an increase in grain prices (Goldstone, 
2001: 74). As one reason for stagnant agricultural productivity, Rosenthal (1992) 
identifies poorly defined property rights. He shows evidence that incentives for long-
term investment in agricultural productivity, for example through investments in 
irrigations facilities, were limited because poorly defined property rights made it 
uncertain that the person investing would be able to benefit from the investment in the 
long-term. In sum, institutional short-coming were underlying causes of low economic 
growth in the agricultural sector and hindered the French state to take advantage of 
relatively high economic growth in the manufacturing sector. 
Besides the long-term growth trajectory of the French economy, the implications of the 
economic crisis of the late 1780s, in particular of the manufacturing crisis of 1787/9 
and the harvest failure of the year 1788/9, for the events of the French Revolution has 
received considerable attention. First, this crisis directly exacerbated the financial crisis. 
“[...] the unemployment of textile workers caused by France’s commercial treaty with 
England [...] or the famine resulting from the catastrophic harvest of 1788 bore directly 
on the fiscal crisis since they cut into the precious flow of tax revenues.” (Kaiser et al. 
2001: 6) 
Besides, the economic crisis of the 1780s has come to be seen not so much as a long-
term development that caused, but as an event that triggered uprisings. This did not 
lessen the political importance of such uprisings. “Economic factors adversely affecting 
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the most populous classes of the nation may not have generated the revolutionary crisis 
on their own. But surely they came to weigh heavily in the calculations of established 
authorities once hungry crowds in search of bread began to surge through the capital 
and countryside early in 1789, thereby posing increasingly ominous threats to public 
order,” (Kaiser et al., 2011: 5). This interpretation of the economic crisis of the 1780s 
as a trigger that developed political effects in interaction with other factors chimes with 
Rosenthal (1992: 10)’s observation that “short-term food shortages far worse than those 
of 1788-9 had been weathered before without precipitating a Revolution. The 
subsistence crisis may indeed have fuelled the Revolution, because over the previous 
half-century expectations had changed and individuals had demanded state intervention 
to reduce the impact of food shortages.” This observation is also corroborated by 
temperature data for the year preceding and following the Revolution. The temperatures 
in 1788 were not exceptional. They were soon after followed by similar temperatures. 
By this time, however, the underlying political, economic, and social conditions had 
already changed. 
 
 
Figure 5 Mean summer temperature for France between 1784 and 1796 
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Or in Campbell (2006: 32)’s words: “As the price of bread rose to its highest points 
(actually on July 14 in Paris), the interaction between subsistence problems and the 
stimulated popular awareness of politics became explosive.” 
Another institutional feature exacerbated the effects of harvest failure in 1788. A large 
part of the agricultural sector consisted of small peasant cultivators with little financial 
cushion living just above self-sufficiency. While landlords of larger estates could often 
rely on financial reserves the small scale workers could not. In addition, many small 
peasants depended on revenue from wine harvest, but the 1780s had seen several years 
of very low vintage thereby reducing even this income source (Doyle, 1980: 160). 
Finally, as already mentioned above, the intellectual origins of the French Revolution 
have received considerable attention. Again, the intellectual origins can only be 
understood in interaction with the political, economic and social conditions at the time. 
“Intellectual origins also played an essential role in transforming a fiscal crisis into a 
revolution. [...],” (Kaiser et al., 2011: 6). The behaviour and insistence of the third 
estate in the Estates-General can hardly be understood without new ways of thinking 
about the constitution of the importance on the nation. This was helped by an increasing 
number of pamphlets that raised political awareness among growing parts of the 
population. (Kaiser et al., 2011: 6; Neely, 2008: 23; Bossenga, 2011: 37). 
Also the drawing up of the cahiers de doleances incited political debates in towns and 
villages. Many parts together led to increased political awareness and to confidence of 
the general population that demanding an overhaul of the entire French political system 
was in their right. 
 
2.3. Theoretical and Historical Framework 
As the previous section makes clear, many factors affected the outbreak of the French 
Revolution. In this chapter, I examine one of these factors, the effect of adverse weather 
conditions in the year leading up to the French Revolution on the probability of peasant 
revolt. This analysis is guided by a theory on political transitions by Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2001, 2006). In the model, a nondemocratic society consists of two groups, a 
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small rich elite and a large group of the poor and disenfranchised. The rich elite 
controls society and possesses all de jure political power.  
The poor and disenfranchised do not hold any de jure political power, but they are the 
majority and hold de facto political power if they can solve the collective-action 
problem in a moment when the elite is “unable to use the military to effectively 
suppress the uprising,” (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006: 25). 
The disenfranchised population gains de facto political power if they overcome 
collective-action problem and are able to “create significant social unrest and 
turbulence, or even pose a serious revolutionary threat,” (Acemoglu and Robinson, 
2006: 25).  
The theory predicts that revolutions are more likely during times of economic crises, 
for example after harvest failure (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006: 31f.). During 
economic crises, people’s opportunity costs. They have less to lose and are more likely 
to contest power. As a result, economic recession increases the probability of uprisings 
even if the crisis’ causes are known to be exogenous and transitory. 
If the poor are able to overcome collective action problems and pose a credible 
revolutionary threat that the elite is unable to suppress, then the elite has to make 
concessions to avoid costs of revolution. The elite is likely to promise more 
redistributive policies in the future. Yet, the poor are aware of the transitory nature of 
their revolutionary threat. They will not be able to enforce such policies in the future, 
once their threat has passed. If possible, the poor will uphold the revolutionary threat 
until institutional changes are made that will ensure more redistributive policies in the 
future and are costly to reverse (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006: 25f.).  
 
2.3.1. The elite and the disenfranchised in French society in 1789 
 
In French society in 1789 the rich, small elite consisted of the king, the nobility, and 
part of the clergy. The formed the first two privileged estates and comprised about two 
percent of the population. The vast majority of the population, about 98 percent of the 
population, consisted of people with limited economic means (Neely, 2007: 7). Many 
of them had difficulties reaching subsistence level (Lefebvre, 1973: 8). The part of 
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society consisted of rural and urban wage-labourers, free peasants, the urban 
bourgeoisie, craftsmen, and others.  
The political power of the king and the first two estates was reflected in the highly 
inequitable tax system. The king exempted the nobility and the church from most taxes 
while imposing a crushing tax burden on the third estate that normally did not have 
enough power to negotiate exemptions (Neely, 2008: 7). The third estate paid taxes to 
the king and had feudal obligations in cash and labour towards their local landlord. 
 
2.3.2. Collective action by the disenfranchised  
 
In 18
th
 century France, the third estate formed the vast majority of the population, but 
did not hold any de jure political power. Bread riots in larger towns sometimes led to 
state provision of bread, but these riots were never coordinated and strong enough to 
enforce more profound institutional changes. In the 1780s, however, a severe financial 
crisis occurred in France and changed the balance of power. After decades of constant 
warfare and high military expenditure the government had exhausted its resources. To 
raise further taxes the king was compelled to convoke the Estates-General, an assembly 
of representatives of the first two estates, the clergy and the nobility, and of the third 
estates, the common people (Merriman, 2010: 441). It was an opportunity for the third 
estate to coordinate and to unify their political power. In preparation of the Estates-
General, they had been asked by the king to democratically elect representatives and 
list their requests in cahiers de doléances (Merriman, 2010: 443). Their representatives 
advocated these requests at the Estates-General in Paris starting in May 1789.  
 
2.3.3. The de facto political power of the disenfranchised vs. the 
elite’s military force 
 
The king was unable to simply suppress these requests because his military power had 
been limited by the severe financial crisis. Parts of his troops defected in 1789 after not 
being paid and joined popular protests. Meanwhile, people of the third estate 
demonstrated violently in support of their representatives on the streets of Paris. When 
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the population noticed an increase in royal troops in mid-July 1789, they feared that the 
king intended to subdue their representatives by force. In response, they stormed the 
Bastille (Neely, 2008: 66f). The people of the third estate gained de facto political 
power through their representatives at the Estates General in Paris and their own 
protests. They demanded in particular reform of the highly inequitable tax system and 
the abolition of the feudal regime.  
Since May 1789, after three months, the representatives in Paris had still not been able 
to enforce changes in the feudal system that had been one of the main requests of the 
rural population in the cahiers de doléances. The population of rural France was 
disappointed with the slow progress. In July 1789, shortly after the fall of the Bastille, 
they organised armed protests against their landlords and against the feudal obligations 
that they owed them. “’none of them was moved by any motive other than that of the 
pillage and the licence which the exaggeration of their so-called rights appeared to 
allow them: they seem to have gathered by common consent with the intention of 
laying waste chateaux and houses and freeing themselves from their rents by burning 
their charters [...]’,” (cited in Lefebvre, 1973: 118). Their anger against the feudal 
system had been a concern of the rural population for a long time. An immediate trigger 
of the peasant protests in July and August 1789 was the population’s economic 
hardship that the drought of 1788 and the harsh winter of 1789 had still exacerbated. 
Besides, rumours had spread that the aristocracy planned to exploit the fact their 
economically difficult situation to make them give up on their political requests. The 
rumour said that the aristocracy had sent out brigands to destroy the much needed 
harvest of 1789 to “[starve] the country people into submission,” (Merriman, 2010: 
447). These rumours quickly spread from one village to the next, via messengers, 
travellers, or official circulars sent out by the authorities (Lefebvre, 1973: 14).  
To defend themselves against increased number of brigands and the supposed 
aristocratic plot, in July 1789, villages and rural towns in various parts of France started 
organising groups of armed men. After the storming of the Bastille in July 1789, 
landowners’ estates were stormed (Merriman, 2010: 438, 446).  
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2.3.4. Revolution during Recession 
 
Historians have argued that peasant revolts in revolutionary France against the 
aristocracy were spurred by severe economic crisis (e.g. Lefebvre, 1973; Merriman, 
2010). Hot and dry weather in the summer of 1788 had caused crop failure and 
especially cold weather in the winter of 1788/89 further increased people’s survival 
costs. In normal years, people spent about 50 percent of their income on bread. After 
the crop failure of 1788, the share rose to 88 percent in 1789 (Neely, 2008: 72f.). The 
number of famished people rose. The harsh winter conditions of 1788/89 further 
increased food prices and living costs in general because navigable rivers froze and 
prevented the transportation of cereals. Heating material also became scarce and 
expensive. The situation was made worse by the peasants’ obligations and the nobility’s 
rights that were enshrined in the feudal system. The peasants’ owed cash and labour to 
their local landlords. The nobility’s exclusive rights to exploit forests, streams, and 
lakes made it illegal for common people to augment their diets with fish and game and 
to collect fire wood. (Merriman, 2010: 438). They were not even allowed to protect 
their fields from deer or from the lord’s pigeons that trampled on their fields or fed on 
the seeds. Besides, many nobles still held judiciary rights over peasants. Feudal 
obligations had always been a heavy burden for the peasants but especially after the 
crop failure of 1788 and the harsh conditions of the following winter.  
 
2.3.5. Peasant Revolt and Institutional Reform 
 
The king tried to calm the revolts by promising tax reform but insisted on feudal 
obligations and privileges of the first estates. “To the radicalised members of the third 
estate, [these] concessions were not enough,” (Merriman, 2010: 444).  
In August 1789, after weeks of persistent and violent peasant revolts, all members of 
the National Assembly, that comprised representatives of the nobility, the clergy, and 
the third estate, were concerned about the situation and wished to re-establish public 
order. Many sympathised with the peasants’ request to abolish feudal obligations and 
nobles’ privileges. But even the privileged members of the assembly who did not 
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sympathise with the peasants requests’ were willing to make concessions in order to 
end the revolts because many of them owned property that the peasants were attacking 
(Neely, 2008: 80). The persistent revolts and the scale of the violence had shown the 
peasants’ ability to organise resistance and to do lasting damage. “On August 4, 1789, 
in an effort to appease the peasants and to forestall further rural disorders, the National 
Assembly formally abolished the “feudal regime,” including seigneurial rights,” 
(Merriman, 2010: 447). In particular, personal labour and cash obligations were 
eliminated. Afterwards, the freedom of worship, the nobles’ judiciary rights, and their 
exclusive right to hunt were also eliminated. Provinces and cities also had to give up 
privileges. “The members of the National Assembly thus renounced privilege, the 
fundamental organizing principle of French society,” (Merriman, 2010; 447). 
 
2.4. Empirical Strategy and Data 
2.4.1. Data Description 
 
The basic dataset is a cross section of 3596 cantons. They cover the entire territory of 
mainland France in 1789. The canton is a territorial subdivision of the French state, one 
level above the communes, the lowest administrative division. The main components of 
the data set are the geographic locations of rural uprisings in 1789 and gridded 
temperature data for the summer of 1788 and the winter of 1788/89.  
I collected information on the locations of rural uprisings in 1789 from Lefebvre (1973: 
4). I digitised a map of all localities in France that had rural revolts in the summer of 
the French Revolution. I also collected information on the starting points of revolts and 
their gradual spread to other localities. I define two outcome variables. The main 
outcome variable describes the probability of revolt. It is a dummy variable that is 1 if 
an uprising took place in a canton and 0 otherwise. The second outcome variable  
measures the timing of revolt. The baseline map by Lefebvre (1973: 4) indicates that 
uprisings originally broke out in only about five different towns. From there, uprisings 
spread to surrounding towns. Lefebvre (1973: 4) uses arrows pointing from town A to 
one or more towns to indicate that uprisings in town A spread from there to one or more 
towns. Eventually, the uprisings had spread to most parts of France. To proxy for how 
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early a town joined the uprisings, I count how many stages (stages equal arrows in 
Lefebvre’s map) lie between one town and the town of original uprising. It is a measure 
of revolt delay in that a higher numbers indicate that a town’s towns is further removed 
from the original uprising and that uprising have been likely to have started later. In 
Figure 6, I indicate the number of stages and thereby the delay with which towns joined 
uprisings with a colour code (darker colours indicate between a town’s uprisings I 
define the variable revolt delay as a number between 0 and 20. I assign a value of 0 for 
localities where uprising first broke out (indicated in Figure 6 by the star symbol). I 
assign a value of 1 to a locality if only one stage separates a town from the original 
uprising. A value of 2 is assigned if two stages (two arrows in Lefebvre’s map) lie 
between a locality and the locality where uprisings first broke and so forth.  
The map below illustrates the distribution of localities with uprisings across France and 
the gradual spread of uprising over France. As mentioned above, the star symbol 
represents localities where the first original uprisings broke out. Darker colours indicate 
that a locality started uprising relatively quickly after the first uprising took place. 
Information on temperature in 1788/89 is taken from Luterbacher et al. (2004). The 
data is reconstructed seasonal and gridded temperature. It provides yearly ‘temperature 
maps’ that show variation within France for grid cells of about 50 by 50 kilometres. For 
this data set, climatologists have reconstructed temperatures based on proxy indicators 
such as tree ring series and ice cores and based on historical records. For the years 
1788/89, directly measured monthly temperature from ten weather stations in France is 
available (Garnier, 1974). Summer temperature 1788 is the average temperature in the 
months June, July, and August of the year 1788. Winter temperature 1789 is the 
average temperature in the months December 1788, January 1789, and February 1789.  
I also collected information on population density in 1789, the routes of communication 
in 1789, on salt tax rates in 1789, the share of the labour force that works in agriculture 
in 1789 and the share of the population that works in manufacturing in 1789. I digitised 
these data and assign to each canton the value of the area that applies to the largest part 
of the canton.  
Information on population density in 1789 (Clout, 1977: 217) is provided in the unit 
‘population density per square league’. It is provided in seven categories: below 500 
inhabitants per square league, between 500 and 750 inhabitants per square league, 
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between 750 and 1000 inhabitants per square league, and so forth, until above 1750 
inhabitants per square league. 
Information on the routes of communication in 1789 (Bonin et al., 1987: 15) is 
available for four categories: postal routes, navigable rivers, canals, and other important 
routes. I digitise the map and assign to each canton the routes that intersect it. I create a 
variable that counts the number of routes that intersects a canton.  
I obtain information on the salt tax rate in 1789 from Shepherd (1926). Tax rates varied 
substantially across provinces within France in 1789. The highest tax rate applied to the 
northern centre of France. Other provinces, such as Brittany, were exempt from tax 
rate. These tax rates are reflected in the salt prices that are about thirty times higher in 
northern central France compared to Brittany. 
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Figure 6 Peasant Revolts, July - August 1789 
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I collect data on the share of the labour force that works in agriculture in 1789 from 
Planhol (1994: 157f.) is provided in five categories. The lowest category is assigned to 
areas where less than 43.4% of men are employed in agriculture. The next category is 
assigned to areas where between 43.4 and 51.57% of men are employed in agriculture. 
Each higher category is assigned to areas with an increase in the share by about 10 
percentage points. The highest categories assigned to areas with more than 72.85% of 
men working in agriculture. 
The share of the population that works in industry in 1789 (Planhol, 1994: 157f.) 
comprises workers in the manufacturing of leather, wood, iron and other metals. These 
categories range from the lowest (under 11.88%) to the highest (over 21.74%) with 
three categories in between (11.88-15.39%, 15.40-18.29%, and 18.3-21.74%) 
In my dataset, I create variables for population density, share of workers in agriculture, 
and share of workers in manufacturing. The average of the highest and lowest value of 
the relevant category is assigned to the canton. 
 
Table 21 Summary Statistics 
 
Cantons with 
uprisings 
Cantons without 
uprisings 
Untouched areas 
Number 298 3,298 1317 
Population density 1115 1147 1184 
Share of Labour Force 
in Agriculture 
0.52 0.48 0.48 
Share of Labour Force 
in Industry 
0.10 0.11 0.11 
Share of canton in 
heavily taxed area 
0.41 0.36 0.27 
canton area 4.26 3.95 3.95 
distance to 
communication routes 
2.45 2.13 1.73 
 
Table 11 shows summary statistics for cantons with and without uprisings, and for 
cantons in areas that Lefebvre (1973: 4) described as completely untouched by 
insurgency. These untouched areas systematically experienced no peasant revolts (see 
Figure 6 for a map, the striped areas are areas that experienced no peasant revolts). The 
table shows that population density in cantons with uprisings is lower than in cantons 
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without uprisings. The share of labour force in agriculture is slightly higher and the 
share of labour force in manufacturing is slightly lower. 41 percent of cantons with 
uprisings lie in areas with especially high taxes compared to 36 percent of cantons 
without uprisings. Distance to communication routes is slightly larger than in the other 
cantons. In sum, the table shows some but rather small differences between cantons 
with and without uprisings. 
Information on froment (wheat) prices are collected from Labrousse (1939). The paper 
provides froment prices for the years 1782 to 1790 for 35 French Generalites, that 
correspond to historical French provinces. The data are provided in the form of graphs 
from which I collect the prices. 
 
2.4.2. Empirical Strategy 
 
In this chapter, I test the theory’s prediction that uprisings are more likely to occur 
during economic downturn. The model predicts that areas with worse economic 
conditions are more likely to experience uprisings. Economic conditions in France in 
1789 were affected by the drought in the summer of 1788 and by the cold winter of 
1788/89. The theory’s prediction in this case is that areas with especially hot 
temperatures during the summer of 1788 and with especially cold temperatures during 
the winter of 1788/89 are more likely to experience uprisings. 
To investigate this hypothesis, I use cross-section data set for 3596 French cantons (see 
section 2.4.1 for a detailed description). It contains information on the locations of 
peasant uprising in the summer of 1789, on mean temperature in the summer of 1788, 
and on mean temperature in the winter of 1788/89. I test whether uprisings were more 
likely in areas with especially high summer temperature in 1788 and especially low 
winter temperature 1788/89.  
I propose the following regression specification: 
 
(8) PeasantRevoltcr = α + β SummerTemp1788cr + γ WinterTemp1789cr + fr + 
εcr 
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PeasantRevoltcr is a dummy variable that is 1 if canton c in region r has experienced 
peasant revolt during the French Revolution. SummerTemp1788cr is the mean 
temperature in canton c and region r during the months June, July, and August in 1788. 
WinterTemp1789cr is the mean temperature in canton c and department r during the 
months December 1788, January 1789, and February 1789. fr is a full set of region fixed 
effects; and εcr  is the error term. Standard errors are adjusted for 94 clusters at the 
department level.  
The main coefficients of interest are β and γ. β captures the effect of a one degree 
increase in summer temperature on the probability that a canton experiences peasant 
revolt. γ captures the effect of a one degree increase in winter temperature on the 
probability that a canton experience peasant revolt. Both coefficients are estimated 
based on variation in temperature and peasant revolt within each region. In other words, 
they estimate whether a canton with different summer and winter temperatures 
compared to the other cantons in the same region also has a different probability of 
experiencing peasant revolt. The main prediction of the model is that β should be 
positive and that γ should be negative. 
An alternative measure of environmental stress are deviations of summer temperature 
1788 and winter temperature 1788/89 from the long-term summer and winter 
temperature means. While high summer and low winter temperature per se could lead 
to economic stress it is also likely that the population are to a certain extent adapted to 
the long-term temperature mean, e.g. through the establishment of irrigation systems 
during summer or the adoption of transportation technology such as Pferdeschlitten in 
winter that could at least partially and possibly fully offset the negative effects of 
adverse temperatures. In this case, deviations from mean temperature are a better 
measure of environmental stress. Following Dell (2012), the variable summer 
temperature deviation from long-term mean temperature is defined as the ratio of 
summer temperature in 1788 over the mean summer temperature between 1700 and 
1788. The variable winter temperature 1789 deviation from mean temperature is 
defined accordingly. 
 
(9)  PeasantRevoltcr = α + β Summer Temp 1788 Deviation from Mean Tempcr + γ 
WinterTemp1789 Deviation from Mean Tempcr + fr + εcr 
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The model would predict that β should be positive and that γ should be negative. In 
other words, as economic stress from summer temperatures stems from excessive heat 
summer temperatures above the long-term mean would put the economy under stress. 
The more the summer temperature of 1788 exceeds the long-term mean the larger 
would be the economic stress and – according to the model – the larger should be the 
probability of revolt. 
Accordingly, economic stress from winter temperatures stems from excessive cold 
winter temperatures below the long-term mean would put the economy under stress. 
The more the winter temperature 1788/89 lies below the long-term mean the more 
likely are negative economic consequences.  
 
2.5. Empirical Results 
2.5.1. Basic Specifications 
 
Table 22 contains basic results. I estimate the baseline regression without region fixed 
effects in column 1, with region fixed effects in column 2, and with department fixed 
effects in column 3. Results in column 1 of Table 22 show that the coefficient β on 
SummerTemp1788cr is positive and significant at the ten percent level. The coefficient γ 
on WinterTemp1789cr is negative and significant at the five percent level. This is 
consistent with the model’s prediction. It indicates that cantons with higher 
temperatures during the summer 1788 and with lower temperatures during the winter of 
1788/89 are more likely to have peasant revolts.  
The specification in column 1 estimates the relationship between temperature and 
peasant revolt based on variation in both variables within all of France. One might be 
concerned that areas in France with relatively extreme temperatures share certain 
characteristics that also affect the probability of revolt. If areas with extreme 
temperature are on average worse off than areas with more moderate temperature these 
results could reflect that particularly poor areas were more likely to revolt. In the 
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following column, I therefore introduce region fixed effects and estimate specification 
(1). 
Column 2 shows results. This time, region fixed effects control for unobserved regional 
characteristics that may affect temperature’s effect on the outbreak of peasant revolt. 
They capture, for example, the effects of any geographic, political, or economic 
characteristics that cantons within one region share. The main coefficients of interest β 
and γ are estimated based on variation in temperature and peasant revolt within each 
region. In other words, they estimate whether a canton with different summer and 
winter temperatures compared to the other cantons in the same region has a different 
probability to experience peasant revolt.  
The main coefficients of interest β and γ are about three times larger as in the previous 
estimation. Both are significant at the one percent level. This result indicates that 
cantons with higher summer temperature 1788 and lower winter temperature 1789 are 
more likely to experience peasant revolt than the other cantons in their region. 
 
 
Table 22 Peasant Revolts and Extreme Temperatures – Basic Results 
          Probability of Peasant Revolt Revolt Delay 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        Summer 
Temperature 
0.00762* 0.0245*** 0.0474*** -0.107 -0.439*** -0.790*** -0.885* 
(0.00451) (0.00857) (0.0139) (0.0719) (0.145) (0.222) (0.450) 
 
   
  
   Winter 
Temperature 
-0.00709** -0.0271*** -0.0491*** 0.121** 0.454*** 0.777*** 0.727* 
(0.00345) (0.00760) (0.0140) (0.0592) (0.132) (0.221) (0.416) 
 
   
  
   Sample All All All All All All Revolt 
towns 
only 
         
Region Fixed 
Effects  
yes 
 
  yes 
  Department 
Fixed Effects   
yes   
 
yes yes 
    
  
   Observations 3,596 3,596 3,596 3,596 3,596 3,596 298 
R-squared 0.003 0.024 0.102 0.002 0.027 0.103 0.971 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at department level 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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In column 3, I estimate the baseline specification but replace region fixed effects with 
department fixed effects. The department fixed effects control for all department level 
characteristics that affect the probability of revolt and are correlated with temperature. 
Results could be biased if a department within a region has a certain economic structure 
because of its climatic conditions and also experiences more peasant revolt because of 
this economic structure. I therefore introduce department fixed effects into the 
regression. 
Column 3 of Table 22 shows that the coefficient on summer temperature remains 
positive and highly significant. The coefficient on winter temperature also remains 
negative and highly significant. These results indicate a significant effect of 
temperature on peasant uprisings even when only taking into account variation in 
temperatures and uprisings within each department. 
In columns 4 to 7, I use an alternative outcome variable to indicate revolt delay. Revolt 
delay is an indicator of revolt timing. It is a number between 0 and 20. The higher the 
value the longer it took a revolt to break out compared to the first revolt. The value 20 
is assigned to cantons that were untouched by revolt. The value is assigned based on 
information on revolt delay from Lefebvre (1973: 4) that provides detailed information 
on the spread of revolt across France. 
Results in column 4 to 6 indicate that higher summer temperature in 1788 and lower 
winter temperature 1789 decreased a canton’s delay in joining the revolts. The higher 
summer temperature and the lower winter temperature the sooner revolt broke out.  
One might be concerned that these results are driven by certain systematic differences 
between towns that revolted and the others that did not. To investigate this concern I 
limit the sample in column 7 to those towns that were affected by peasant revolts. 
Results show that, conditional on having a revolt, summer and winter temperature 
affected a town’s revolt delay.  
In Table 23, I estimate the effects of temperature deviations from the long-term mean 
on peasant revolts (columns 1 and 2) and on revolt rank (columns 3 and 4). Results for 
both outcome variables indicate that deviations of summer temperature above the long-
term mean and deviations of winter temperature below the long-term mean increase the 
probability of revolt. The size of the coefficients indicate that a one degree increase in 
summer temperature above the long-term mean had a substantially larger effect on 
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revolt probability than a one degree decrease in winter temperature. Then, after the 
introduction of region fixed effects the estimated coefficients become both substantially 
larger and are significant. This indicates the importance of regional characteristics in 
determining incidences of revolts. Once, these are controlled for the estimates become 
more precise and significant. The increase in all coefficients after the introduction of 
region fixed effects (columns 2 and 4) compared to the previous specification (columns 
1 and 3) indicates that omitting regional characteristics from the specification tended to 
bias results downwards. 
  
Table 23 Peasant Revolts and Deviations from Long-Term Mean 
Temperature – Basic Results 
       Peasant Revolt Revolt Rank 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     1788 Deviation from 
Mean Summer 
Temperature 
0.629 2.585** -7.844 -38.26** 
(0.564) (1.097) (9.804) (18.65) 
 
  
  
 1788/89 Deviation from  
Mean Winter 
Temperature 
-0.000349 -0.000564** 0.00576 0.0102** 
(0.000434) (0.000281) (0.00776) (0.00490) 
 
  
  
 Region Fixed Effects 
 
yes   yes 
   
  
 Observations 3,596 3,596 3,596 3,596 
R-squared 0.001 0.022 0.000 0.024 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at department level 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
2.5.2. Augmented Specifications 
 
In this section, I introduce further controls to specifications (1) and (2). Column 1 of 
Table 24 is the estimate of the baseline regression equation (1) and identical to column 
2 of Table 22. Likewise, column 1 of Table 25 is identical to the baseline estimation 
reported in column 2 of Table 23. I start by adding the control variables population 
density and canton area to the equations (columns 2 and 3 of Table 24 and Table 25). In 
preindustrial times, population density is a useful proxy for an area’s affluence. It is 
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also important to control for a canton’s area. It is thinkable that larger cantons are 
located in more agricultural areas with lower population density. Besides, if population 
size was larger in larger cantons, then larger cantons could be more likely to experience 
revolt.  In column 2 and 3 of Table 24 and Table 25 show that including these control 
variables affects the coefficients very little.  
News availability, it has been argued, was pivotal to the spread of uprisings to other 
areas. The historian Georges Lefebvre (1973) argues that the fear of an aristocratic plot 
broke out in seven points across France and then spread from there to other localities. 
Lefebvre suggests that messengers were sent out to warn other communities, that 
travellers transmitted the rumours on their journey and that the postal service 
distributed warnings of an aristocratic plot to other regions (Lefebvre, 1973: 150-152). 
To test this hypothesis, I add the variable News Availability to the specification. It is 
defined as the number of news routes that intersected a canton in 1789. News routes 
include postal routes, navigable rivers, canals, or other important routes like well-paved 
roads. Results in column 4 of Table 24 and column 4 of Table 25 show a highly 
significant positive relationship between news routes and peasant uprisings. This 
supports Lefebvre’s hypothesis that peasant revolts spread through France via news 
routes. At the same time, News Availability is also an important control variable for a 
place’s economic situation. Relatively affluent areas are likely to be better connected 
than relatively poor areas. Results show that adding this control variable hardly affects 
the estimated effects of summer and winter temperature on peasant uprisings. Both 
coefficients remain highly statistically significant with only a slight decrease in size. 
As mentioned before, the high tax burden was a main concern of the protesting French 
people. In column 5 of Table 24 and Table 25 , I add a dummy variable to the equation 
that is 1 for all cantons with the highest tax rates. This tax rate was around 30 times as 
high as the lowest tax rate and around double the rate of the second highest tax rate. 
The high tax rates might have further reduced the economic resources of the 
population. Adverse temperature changes here might have had different effects 
compared to less heavily taxed areas. Coefficients in columns 5 of both tables show 
insignificant effects of being located in the heavily taxed region. The sign of the 
coefficients are differ with a positive sign of the main effect and negative signs of the 
interaction term in Table 24 and a negative sign of the main effect and positive signs of 
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the interaction term in Table 25. The interpretation of these results is not clear. They 
could indicate that high taxes did not spur revolt, e.g. because the tax regime was 
correlated with other institutional characteristics that compensated for the economic 
constraints of high taxes. It could also be the case that the effect of taxes, that were 
determined at the regional level, on revolt are already captured by the region fixed 
effect. The main coefficients of summer and winter temperature levels and deviations 
do not change substantially. 
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Table 24 Peasant Revolts and Extreme Temperatures – Augmented Specifications 
        Probability of Peasant Revolt 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      Summer Temperature 0.0245*** 0.0242*** 0.0249*** 0.0188** 0.0188** 
(0.00857) (0.00869) (0.00868) (0.00848) (0.00871) 
 
     Winter Temperature -0.0271*** -0.0269*** -0.0268*** -0.0234*** -0.0231*** 
(0.00760) (0.00770) (0.00766) (0.00764) (0.00768) 
 
     News Availability 
   
0.0263*** 0.0263*** 
    
(0.00493) (0.00494) 
      Heavy Tax 
    
0.0635 
 
    
(0.182) 
 
     Heavy Tax*Summer 
Temperature 
    
-0.0115 
 
    
(0.0109) 
 
     Heavy Tax*Winter 
Temperature 
    
-0.00220 
 
    
(0.0100) 
 
     Region Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes 
Population Density 
 
yes yes yes yes 
Canton Area 
  
yes yes yes 
      Observations 3,596 3,596 3,596 3,596 3,596 
R-squared 0.024 0.024 0.026 0.036 0.036 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at department level 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 25 Peasant Revolts and Deviations From Long-Term Mean Temperature - Augmented 
Specifications 
        Peasant Revolt 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      1788 Deviation from 
Mean Summer Temp 
2.585** 2.579** 2.473** 3.073*** 3.092*** 
(1.097) (1.097) (1.100) (1.037) (1.010) 
 
     1788/89 Deviation from  
Mean Winter Temp 
-0.000564** -0.000562* -0.000596** -0.000506* -0.000483* 
(0.000281) (0.000284) (0.000287) (0.000268) (0.000267) 
 
     
News Availability    
0.0280*** 0.0279*** 
   
(0.00510) (0.00511) 
      
Heavy Tax     
-2.781 
    
(1.731) 
 
     
Heavy Tax*Summer 
Temperature 
    2.685 
    
(1.659) 
 
     
Heavy Tax*Winter 
Temperature 
    0.0284 
    
(0.0298) 
 
     Region Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes 
Population Density 
 
yes yes yes yes 
Canton Area 
  
yes yes yes 
      Observations 3,596 3,596 3,596 3,596 3,596 
R-squared 0.022 0.022 0.024 0.035 0.036 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at department level 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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2.5.3. Testing for an Effect of Temperature Deviations in Earlier 
Years 
 
The question arises whether the observed relationships between extreme temperatures, 
temperature deviations from the long-term mean and peasant revolts is due to 
temperature volatility during the specific year preceding the French Revolution. An 
alternative possibility is that areas that experienced temperature volatility in the year 
preceding the French Revolution have generally been exposed to a higher degree of 
temperature volatility. If this is the case than we would expect to observe a similar 
relationship between temperature deviations from the long-term mean and peasant 
revolts for earlier years long-preceding the French Revolution. If this was the case one 
possible explanation would be that temperature volatility caused economic hardship in 
certain areas that accumulated over time. Another possible explanation would be that 
temperature volatility is systematically higher in certain areas that might systematically 
differ from other areas with respect to other observable or unobservable characteristics.  
In Table 26, I test whether summer and winter deviations from the long-term mean 
temperatures in earlier years predict the outbreak of peasant revolts in 1789. I test 
whether temperature deviations in the years 1700, 1720, 1730, 1750, and 1770 from the 
long-term mean predict peasant revolts. For each specification, temperature deviations 
from the long-term mean are defined, as before, as the ratio of summer and winter 
temperature in a given year over the long-term mean temperature between 1700 and 
1782 (see section 2.4.1. for more detail). For each year I show results for two 
specifications: the baseline specification including region fixed effects and the 
augmented specification including the control variables introduced in section 2.5.2. 
Results show that summer and winter deviations from the mean in these years do not 
predict peasant revolts in 1789. The pattern of coefficients differ strongly from the 
estimated effects of summer and winter temperature deviations in 1788/89. Summer 
temperature deviations are always negative and some of them significant. This suggests 
that peasant revolts arose more often in areas with especially low summer temperatures 
in the years 1700, 1720, 1730, 1750, and 1770. Likewise, deviations from mean winter 
temperature are mostly positive and sometimes significant. This indicates that peasant 
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revolts were more likely in areas with especially warm winters in these early years. 
These results indicate that temperature deviations in 1788/89 played a decisive role in 
stimulating revolt and that temperature deviations in 1788/89 were not preceded by a 
history of temperature volatility. 
  
 
1
0
5
 
Table 26  Testing for an Effect of Temperature Deviations on Peasant Revolts in Earlier Years 
           
 
YEAR = 
  1700 1720 1730 1750 1770 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
           Deviation from 
Mean Summer Temperature 
-1.799 -2.708** -2.106** -2.438*** -1.481 -1.983** -1.672 -2.445 -5.001*** -6.417*** 
(1.266) (1.160) (0.854) (0.766) (0.901) (0.868) (2.831) (2.801) (1.817) (1.714) 
 
          Deviation from  
Mean Winter Temperature 
-0.0101 -0.00854 0.00392* 0.00348* 0.00152*** 0.00135** 0.00121** 0.00111** 0.00600 0.00570 
(0.00613) (0.00648) (0.00213) (0.00204) (0.000567) (0.000553) (0.000467) (0.000448) (0.00498) (0.00486) 
 
          Control Variabls 
       News Availability 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
Heavy Tax 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
Population Density 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
Canton Area 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
Region Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
           Observations 3,596 3,596 3,596 3,596 3,596 3,596 3,596 3,596 3,596 3,596 
R-squared 0.021 0.035 0.022 0.035 0.021 0.035 0.020 0.033 0.022 0.036 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at department level 
       *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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2.5.4. Temperature, Peasant Revolt, and Different Economic Sectors 
 
Previous research has shown that the agricultural sector compared to the industrial 
sector is normally especially affected by adverse weather changes as weather can be an 
important determinant of agricultural productivity, in particular in the absence of 
mitigating technology such as irrigation systems (e.g. Burgess et al., 2011). In the 
following, I therefore examine heterogeneity in the effect of temperature on peasant 
uprisings in different economic sectors. Table 27 reports results. Columns 1 to 3 report 
results for summer and winter temperature levels, columns 4 to 6 for summer and 
winter temperature deviations from the long-term mean temperature. Columns 1 and 4 
contain estimates for the augmented specifications on the effect of summer and winter 
temperature levels and deviations on peasant revolts when including region fixed 
effects and control variables introduced in section 2.5.2. These are identical to columns 
5 of Table 24 and Table 25. 
Then, I introduce a variable that measures the share of the labour force that works in 
agriculture in1789 into the specification. Columns 2 and 5 report a positive relationship 
between this share and the probability of peasant revolt. Areas with a higher share of 
workers in agriculture had on average more peasant uprisings.  
Motivated by the observation that agricultural productivity may be especially affected 
by temperature changes, I test whether the effect of a temperature change varies 
depending on an economy’s dependence on agriculture. I introduce interaction terms of 
the share of the labour force that works in agriculture and summer and winter 
temperature levels and deviations from the mean.  
Columns 3 and 6 show results. Interestingly, results change substantially with the 
introduction of these interaction terms. In column 3, the main coefficients on summer 
temperature, winter temperature and the share of the labour force in agriculture become 
much smaller and insignificant while the coefficients on the interaction terms are 
significant and higher than the estimated coefficients on the summer and winter 
temperature variables in Table 22. The coefficients on the first interaction term 
indicates that the effect of a one degree increase in summer temperature in areas with a 
high share of labour force in agriculture is significantly higher compared to the effect of 
a one degree increase in summer temperature in non-agricultural areas. The effect of a 
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one degree increase in summer temperature on the probability of peasant revolts in non-
agricultural areas is close to zero and insignificant. The coefficient on the second 
interaction term indicates that the effect of a one degree increase in winter temperature 
is significantly lower in agricultural areas compared to non-agricultural areas. In other 
words, a decrease in winter temperature increases the probability of peasant revolt in 
agricultural areas but not in non-agricultural areas.  
In column 6, that estimates the effect of temperature deviations on peasant revolt, the 
patterns of the coefficients in terms of the signs and sizes of the main variables and 
interaction terms behave similarly to those in column 3. They are, however, not 
statistically significant as the standard errors increase in size. 
Finally, in Table 28, I investigate the relationship between the share of the labour force 
that works in manufacturing and peasant revolt. On the one hand, the French 
manufacturing sector was hit by a crisis in the years after 1786 because it was 
outcompeted by English manufacturing imports. As a result, unemployment in 
manufacturing rose steeply and decreased people’s incomes. One could expect an effect 
of manufacturing on peasant revolt on this basis. On the other hand, one would not 
expect a significant interaction effect of manufacturing and temperatures because 
productivity and income in manufacturing depends relatively little on weather 
conditions (see e.g. Burgess et al., 2011).  
Table 28 reports results. Columns 1 and 4 are identical to columns 5 in Table 24 and 
Table 25. It is the baseline specification with control variables. In columns 2 and 4 of 
Table 28, I add a variable for the share of the labour force that works in manufacturing 
and interaction terms of summer and winter temperature (both levels and deviations) 
and the share of the labour force in manufacturing. The coefficient on the main effect of 
the share of manufacturing is large and positive in both specifications (columns 2 and 
5). It is significant only in the specification of column 2. The interaction terms of 
summer temperature and manufacturing are negative for both measures, temperature 
levels and temperature deviations. The interactions of winter temperature and 
manufacturing are positive for both measures. While there is a strong positive 
relationship between manufacturing and peasant revolt, there is no indication that 
adverse weather conditions such as high summer temperatures and low winter 
temperatures increase the probability of revolt in manufacturing areas. This is 
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consistent with the historical evidence on an economic crisis in the manufacturing 
sector which could incite the population to revolt. It is also consistent with research that 
shows that weather does not have a negative effect on industrial production. In stark 
contrast led to the corresponding results for agriculture (columns 3 and 6 in Table 27) 
the introduction of the manufacturing variables leads to an increase in the estimated 
effect of temperature on peasant revolt.  
Finally, I also include the variables on the share of the work force in agriculture and the 
corresponding interaction terms to the specification. For the specification using 
temperature levels in column 3, the coefficients have the same signs and patterns 
compared to column 6 in Table 27.  The sign of the variable on agriculture is negative 
while the interaction between agriculture and summer temperature deviation is positive 
and about the same absolute size. They are not significant. The coefficient on the 
interaction between agriculture and winter temperature deviation is negative and small. 
It is also insignificant.  
The manufacturing variable and interactions with summer and winter temperature 
deviations have unexpected signs. In contrast to results in column 5 using temperature 
deviations (while excluding agricultural variables) and to columns 2 and 3 using levels 
of temperature (excluding and including agricultural variables), the coefficients on 
share of the labour force in manufacturing is negative, and the coefficients on the 
interaction terms between summer temperature, winter temperature and manufacturing 
are positive. Except for the interaction between winter temperature and manufacturing 
these coefficients are not significant. It is nevertheless puzzling that the sign of the 
coefficients describing the relationships between manufacturing, temperature deviations 
and revolts are so little consistent with neither economic theory nor previous results.  
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Table 27 Peasant Revolts, Temperature and Agriculture 
       
 
Outcome Variable = 
  Temperature Levels Deviations from Mean Temperature 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
    
  
  Summer Temperature 0.0188** 0.0231** -0.0129 3.092*** 2.681** -2.180 
(0.00871) (0.00889) (0.0206) (1.010) (1.122) (2.980) 
 
   
  
  Winter Temperature -0.0231*** -0.0250*** 0.0142 -0.000483* -0.000451 0.00469 
(0.00768) (0.00787) (0.0150) (0.000267) (0.000279) (0.00352) 
 
   
  
  Share of Labour 
Force in Agriculture  
0.126*** -1.011*   0.0995** -8.440 
 
(0.0383) (0.564)   (0.0406) (5.513) 
    
  
  Summer Temperature  
* Agriculture   
0.0661**   
 
8.209 
  
(0.0311)   
 
(5.301) 
    
  
  Winter Temperature * 
Agriculture   
-0.0712***   
 
-0.0104 
  
(0.0207)   
 
(0.00758) 
    
  
  News Availability yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Heavy Tax yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Population Density yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Canton Area yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Region Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
       Observations 3,596 3,596 3,596 3,596 3,596 3,596 
R-squared 0.036 0.039 0.042 0.036 0.037 0.039 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at department level 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 28  Peasant Revolts, Temperature and Manufacturing 
       
 
Outcome Variable = 
  Temperature Levels Deviations from Mean Temperature 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
    
  
  Summer 
Temperature 
0.0188** 0.0514*** 0.0150 3.092*** 3.700** -3.453 
(0.00871) (0.0141) (0.0242) (1.010) (1.699) (4.080) 
 
   
  
  Winter Temperature -0.0231*** -0.0410*** 0.0105 -0.000483* -0.0152** -0.00968 
(0.00768) (0.0105) (0.0209) (0.000267) (0.00636) (0.00784) 
 
   
  
  Share of Labour 
Force in Agriculture   
-0.713   
 
-9.293 
  
(0.539)   
 
(5.906) 
    
  
  Summer Temperature  
* Agriculture   
0.0507*   
 
9.027 
  
(0.0297)   
 
(5.684) 
 
   
  
  Winter Temperature * 
Agriculture   
-0.0688***   
 
-0.00393 
  
(0.0227)   
 
(0.00726) 
    
  
  Share of Labour 
Force in 
Manufacturing 
 
6.593*** 4.356*   8.105 -7.643 
 
(2.324) (2.374)   (14.76) (17.17) 
    
  
  Summer Temperature  
* Manufacturing  
-0.373*** -0.236*   -7.891 7.346 
 
(0.132) (0.134)   (14.10) (16.42) 
 
   
  
  Winter Temperature * 
Manufacturing  
0.175* 0.0149   0.109** 0.0819* 
 
(0.0932) (0.0962)   (0.0459) (0.0446) 
    
  
  News Availability yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Heavy Tax yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Population Density yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Canton Area yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Region Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
    
  
  Observations 3,596 3,596 3,596 3,596 3,596 3,596 
R-squared 0.036 0.039 0.044 0.036 0.037 0.039 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at department level 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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2.5.5. Exploring Temperature’s Direct Effect on Agricultural 
Productivity 
 
The previous sections have shown evidence that temperature levels as well as 
deviations from temperature in the year preceding the French Revolution affected the 
probability of peasant revolts. We have also seen evidence that this effect of 
temperature on peasant revolts was especially strong for areas where a relatively large 
share of the labour force worked in agriculture. These results, together with economic 
theory (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006) and previous research on the economic effects 
of adverse temperature changes (Burgess et al. 2011) suggest that temperature’s effect 
on peasant uprising operates also through temperature’s effect on agricultural 
productivity. In this section, I use froment (wheat) prices from Labrousse (1939) as a 
more direct measure of agricultural productivity to estimate whether temperatures had a 
direct effect on agricultural productivity. As the froment prices are available in each 
region for several years I construct a panel data set with information on froment prices, 
winter and summer temperature information for the years 1780 to 1790. The panel 
structure of the data allows me to include region and year fixed effects. I estimate the 
effect of deviations from the temperature mean within each region and specify the 
following equation. 
 
(10) Wheat Pricery  = α + β Summer Temperaturery + γ Winter Temperature ry 
+ yearFEt + regionFEr + cr + ε 
 
I regress wheat price in region r and year y on summer temperature within this region in 
the year 1788 and on winter temperature in the year 1788/89. I additionally include the 
control variables for the tax regime, population density, average canton area, and news 
availability. As these variables are stable over time each control variable is interacted 
with both temperature variables. This allows exploring whether a relationship between 
temperature and prices might be driven by one or more of these variables that can be 
seen as proxies for local institutional or economic conditions.  
Table 29 reports results. In column 1, I estimate the effect of within-region year-to-year 
changes in summer and winter temperature on froment prices at the regional level 
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without any controls except year fixed effects. Then, I introduce region fixed effects 
(column 2), a variable on whether the region is part of the heavily taxed area (column 
3), and finally the remaining control variables population density, canton area, and 
news availability. 
Results show a positive relationship between summer temperatures and froment prices. 
This is consistent with evidence on the importance of growing season temperatures for 
agricultural productivity. The coefficient on winter temperatures is either positive, 
insignificant and small compared to the coefficient on summer temperature or relatively 
large, significant and negative. This is consistent with historical arguments stating that 
waterways blocked by ice and roads blocked by snow often hindered the transportation 
of crops and thereby lead to increases in food prices. 
This assessment of the effect of temperatures on agricultural productivity suggests a 
direct effect of temperature on agricultural productivity and possibly, may have reduced 
the population’s financial resources and through this channel lead to increases in 
incidences of revolt. 
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Table 29  Effect of Temperature Deviations on Froment (Wheat) Prices 
       Froment Price 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     Summer Temperature  1.581*** 1.321*** 1.004** 3.329** 
(0.456) (0.379) (0.430) (1.234) 
 
    Winter Temperature  0.354 -1.780*** -1.147* 0.206 
(0.250) (0.462) (0.567) (1.777) 
 
    Heavy Tax 
  
0.535 0.899** 
*Summer Temperature 
  
(0.405) (0.365) 
 
    Heavy Tax 
  
-0.948*** -0.816*** 
*Winter Temperature 
  
(0.330) (0.289) 
 
    Year Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes 
Region 1798 Fixed Effects 
 
yes yes yes 
     Control Variables (Interacted with Summer and Winter Temp.) 
Population Density 
   
yes 
Canton Area 
   
yes 
News Availability 
   
yes 
     Observations 361 361 361 361 
R-squared 0.583 0.829 0.838 0.847 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at region 1789 level 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
2.6. Conclusion 
As laid out in the Preface to this thesis, this chapter has the two-fold objective of 
examining the impact of a historical event using by applying econometric methodology 
to newly available data while learning from this examination about a broader 
theoretical question.  
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The historical event in this case is the French Revolution and the question which forces 
lead to its outbreak. This has been a much debated question for a long time and the 
importance of different political, financial, institutional, and social factors (e.g. Norberg 
1994; Kaiser and Kley, 2001; Doyle, 1980) has been shown. In this chapter, I examine 
the hypothesis that the drought of 1788 followed by crop failure and an especially harsh 
winter in 1788/89 contributed to economic hardship and the outbreak of peasant revolts 
during the French Revolution. I econometrically test the effect of weather conditions on 
the probability of peasant uprisings. This effect is thought of as a trigger that worked in 
interaction with an array of other variables, such as the financial crisis of the French 
state, limited growth in agricultural productivity and limited crop reserves, an 
inefficient and irresponsive tax system as well as an unequal distribution of the tax 
burden among the population. First introduced by Labrousse (1943), the hypothesis that 
economic factors affected the outbreak of the French Revolution and its timing has 
been subject to considerable debate. This chapter contributes to this work by providing 
the first econometric analysis of the question by combining newly available weather 
data as well as economic data on France during the French Revolution that has been 
collected by historians. The main advantage of using econometric methods in 
comparison to other methods lies in the ability to estimate the effect of one factor on 
revolts conditional on a number of other factors. By incorporating data on political and 
economic conditions into the dataset I find evidence that the effect of adverse weather 
is different for areas with different political and economic conditions. This chapter also 
contributes to the debate by establishing causality by estimating an effect of economic 
factors on the outbreak of revolt based on within-country variation in the economic 
factors. 
Third, this chapter sheds new light on the old question on the economic origins of the 
French Revolution  by using newly available weather data. These weather data were 
reconstructed by a group of climatologists and have not been used before in the context 
of this research question. The results of this chapter provide evidence in support of the 
hypothesis that the drought of 1788 and the harsh winter of 1788/89 affected the 
outbreak of peasant uprisings during the French revolution. As mentioned above, these 
results do not negate at all the importance of other political, financial and social factors 
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that contributed their part to the outbreak of the revolution. Instead they have to be 
interpreted as the effect of weather on peasant uprising conditional on all these factors. 
This chapter also contributes to the literature that explores the relationship between 
adverse weather shocks and political uprisings in general (e.g. Dell, 2012). It shows that 
historical events – and even exogenous events such as weather shocks – can have long-
term effects conditional on societal circumstances (Dell, 2012: 1).  
It is also relevant to the current debate on the economic and political effects of climate 
change in the course of which extreme weather events are likely to become more 
frequent. Why is it that in some cases adverse weather shocks lead to political uprising 
while in other cases it does not? Results of this chapter show a very context-specific 
effect of weather shocks: It matters for areas that depend on agriculture whereas it does 
to a significantly less in areas with a strong manufacturing sector. Consistent with this 
evidence, historical evidence suggests that adverse weather conditions in 1788/89 also 
brought drought to England. In this case, it did not lead to a revolution. The reason for 
this non-effect might be England’s advanced manufacturing sector that secured 
weather-independent income for parts of the population.   
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3. Missionaries and Development in Mexico 
 
3.1. Introduction 
When the Spanish came to America in 1492 Catholic missionary orders accompanied 
the conquest to convert the native population to the Christian faith. These missionary 
orders represented different monastic traditions and obeyed different sets of rules. In 
colonial Mexico, the Franciscan, Dominican and Augustinian order followed the 
Mendicant tradition, whereas the Jesuit order did not. In contrast to the Jesuits, 
Mendicant orders shared a strong commitment to poverty. They argued that wealth 
inevitably corrupts Christians and leads them away from a lifestyle pleasing to God. 
Life in poverty makes Christians free to live a holy life and to gain salvation in the 
afterlife. According to these values, Mendicant orders were strongly committed to the 
poor. They cared for the urban poor in Europe, before coming to America, (Lawrence, 
1994). In colonial Mexico, they advocated social equality between the native 
population and the colonial elite. In particular, they “sought equality between Indians 
and Spanish through education,” (MacLachlan, 1980: 126). Mendicant orders opened 
the first school for natives in colonial Mexico (Ricard, 1966: 207). They regularly 
denounced the miserable living conditions of the native population, as did Bartolomé de 
las Casas in his book “A Short Account of the Destruction of the Indies” in 1552 
(Griffin, 1992).  
The Jesuit order, in contrast, was not defined by its commitment to poverty and to the 
poor. It was founded in 1540 shortly after the Protestant Reformation in Europe with 
the purpose of strengthening the position of the weakened Roman Catholic Church. 
Jesuits endorsed economic wealth and influence as valuable means to this end. “If God 
has given you an abundance of this world's goods it is to help you to earn those in 
heaven,” (Worcester, 2008: 33). In colonial Mexico, they established a “close 
connection [with] the criollo elite [that] rested on the order’s educational 
contributions,” (MacLachlan, 1980: 137). They strengthened the position of the 
Catholic elite in the colony and contributed to the strong position of the Catholic 
Church in the country. To them, social inequality was justifiable as “the Spanish were 
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the instrument chosen by God to incorporate the Indies into Christian society through 
subjecting their inhabitants to Spanish dominion,” (Liss, 1973: 458).  
This study examines the effects of Mendicant and Jesuit mission stations in colonial 
Mexico on educational and cultural outcomes. For this purpose, I construct the first 
comprehensive data set of the locations, founding years and founding orders of all 
historical mission stations in colonial Mexico between 1524 and 1810. I combine this 
information with current locality level information on literacy, schooling, employment, 
and conversion. To address the potential endogeneity of mission locations I use an 
instrumental variable strategy.  
Upon arrival, missionary orders first went to Mexico City because only central Mexico 
had been conquered at the time. From there, missionary expeditions departed in 
different directions. The orders tended to maintain these early directions for the rest of 
the colonial period even though geographic and ethnic characteristics of the 
environment varied along the way. I use the directions of each order’s ten earliest 
missions from Mexico City as instruments for their final distribution across Mexico. 
The Mendicant orders established 942 and the Jesuit order 203 mission stations 
between 1524 and 1810.  
I further control for factors that may have influenced both the settlement patterns of 
missionaries and outcome variables today: geographic conditions (climate, altitude, 
longitude and latitude, distance to the nearest river and lake), location (distance to 
Mexico City, to the ocean, and to the USA), and pre-colonial characteristics, in 
particular, pre-colonial settlements, political and cultural conditions, and the number of 
years before a place got under Spanish control, a useful proxy for native resistance.  
Results show that people in a locality that had a Mendicant mission station during the 
colonial period have significantly higher educational attainment today compared to 
places without a mission. Literacy rates are higher, the population has on average more 
years of schooling, and more people have received secondary and higher education. 
The Jesuit coefficients are negative in the IV regressions. These results are consistent 
with the strong emphasis that Mendicant orders put on educating the native population. 
In contrast, Jesuits focused on educating the Spanish and Creole youth in the city 
centres, rather than the native population in rural areas. Mendicants and Jesuits both 
have affected conversion to Catholicism.  
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This chapter contributes to the strand of literature that assesses the long term effects of 
missionary orders by examining heterogeneous effects of Catholic orders and by 
instrumenting for the endogenous location of mission stations. My findings corroborate 
results by Woodberry (2004) and Gallego and Woodberry (2010) who show that 
missionaries in colonial Africa matter for a country’s long term development, mostly 
through its effect on people’s education. Results are also similar to Nunn (2010) who 
shows missionaries’ long term effects on conversion in Africa. Descendants of Africans 
who have been more exposed to missionaries are more likely to be Christians today. 
This shows the missionaries’ role in shaping religious beliefs and the historic origins of 
cultural norms.  
The study also adds to the strand of literature that assesses the effect of religion in 
general on people’s education and economic well-being. Becker and Woessmann 
(2008, 2009) find that religious denomination affected current economic outcomes 
through its effect on educational institutions in 19
th
-century Prussia. McCleary and 
Barro (2006) document that religious beliefs are “the main channel through which 
religion matters for economic and other outcomes” (McCleary and Barro, 2006: 51) and 
that religious norms alter people’s behaviour (McCleary, 2007).  
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 provides historical background. Section 
3.3 presents data sources and the construction of the data set. OLS and IV results are 
shown in sections 3.4 and 3.6 and section 3.7. concludes. 
 
3.2. Historical Background 
3.2.1. Mexico in 1524 
 
In 1524, when the first missionaries came to the territory that constitutes Mexico today, 
it encompassed distinct regions with different political and economic. The Aztec 
empire covered central Mexico. Small kingdoms surrounding its capital Tenochtitlan 
were obliged to pay tribute, mostly in kind. The area’s extensive agriculture permitted 
the growth of urban settlements that were political, economic, and religious centres. A 
centralised political structure and a complex social order had evolved under the Aztecs. 
Pre-colonial settlements existed primarily in this part of Mexico. Mexico's south was 
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organised in small, independent kingdoms. It had been home to the Maya civilization 
that had reached its height long before the Aztecs, before AD 900. At the Spanish 
arrival, it still had an elaborate system of exchange. The north of Mexico was inhabited 
by nomadic or semi-sedentary independent groups that were more loosely organised. 
The area was called Chichimeca (“barbarian”) by the Spanish. The majority of them 
lived as hunters, gatherers, or fishermen (Solanes Carraro et al., 2000). Population 
density here was low compared to central and south Mexico.  
The Spanish first conquered the Aztec empire, then South Mexico and finally North 
Mexico. After they had captured its capital Tenochtitlan the centralised Aztec empire 
collapsed and came quickly under Spanish control. The more decentralised Mayan 
south fought back longer. It was conquered 25 years later in 1546 (Clendinnen, 1982: 
32). North Mexico, the so-called Chichimeca, resisted the longest. The independent 
tribes in Mexico’s north posed great challenges to the Spanish military conquest “as 
guerrilla tactics in modern warfare today,” (Deeds, 2011: 101, 122). Its conquest took 
more than 70 years. Even after 1590, Spanish military expeditions departed regularly 
from central Mexico towards the south and especially the north to put down uprisings.  
When examining the role and long term effects of missionaries it is crucial to take these 
differences into account. Each place’s political, economic, and cultural conditions may 
well have influenced both the missionaries’ decision to settle and educational 
attainment today. When estimating the effect of missionaries I therefore include fixed 
effects for each of the pre-colonial regions. I further control for the number of years 
before an area was under Spanish control. This is a useful proxy for native resistance to 
conquest and for geographic characteristics that may have facilitated it. It further 
measures how long a place has been exposed to Spanish institutions, including 
missions, before Mexican independence. I further include a locality’s distance to pre-
colonial settlements as a proxy for pre-colonial population density. Its effect on the 
establishment of missions is not entirely clear. Nunn (2012: 2) suggests for Africa that 
“the general effect [of population density] is ambiguous. Some missionaries and 
societies intentionally built missions in more remote locations, where the word of God 
otherwise would not have reached, while others recognized the benefits and efficiencies 
associated with dense populations, and targeted these groups.” 
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Mexico is also very diverse in terms of its geographic conditions. Climate and altitude, 
access to rivers and lakes vary within the country and are relevant factors for the 
establishment of mission stations and for a locality’s economic potential. The same is 
true for its location within the country, its distance from Mexico City, the sea, and from 
the USA. Rivers, lakes, and access to the sea, for example, may well have attracted 
both missionaries and trade by providing relatively low cost transport infrastructure. If 
omitted from the regression, one 
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Figure 7 Catholic Mission Stations in Colonial Mexico by Order 1524 – 1810 Catholic 
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might mistake a positive effect of waterways for the effect of missionaries who were 
merely attracted by waterways. I therefore include these geographic factors into the 
regression. Shortly after conquering Tenochtitlan, Cortés asked for missionaries and 
specifically for Mendicant orders to be sent to Mexico. Unlike other orders, Mendicant 
friars had the advantage that their rules did not prescribe to remain in one monastery. 
Besides, they had already proven their worth as missionaries in the Reconquista of 
Spain. Finally, other orders, such as the Benedictines, owned large land estates across 
Europe and were in Cortes' opinion too powerful to give them a say in colonial affairs. 
The Mendicant orders, in contrast, had in principle renounced all worldly goods and 
were less likely to compete with Spanish conquerors for land and resources. The three 
Mendicant orders, the Franciscans, Dominicans and Augustinian, arrived in Mexico in 
1524, 1526, and 1533. The Jesuit order was founded in 1540 and sent its first 
missionaries to Mexico in 1571. Figure 7 shows the locations of all mission stations 
that are part of my data. The missions were established during the colonial period 
between the arrival of the first missionaries in 1524 and the start of the war of 
Independence in 1810 in Mexico. 
The Mendicant orders established 942 missions of which the Franciscan order 
established 610, the Dominican order 192 and the Augustinian order 140. The Jesuit 
order established 203 missions. 
In the Americas, the Spanish Crown was the administrative head of the Catholic 
Church. The Spanish state, not the pope nor the religious orders, funded missionary 
activities. Spain paid for the journey of missionaries to America, for missionary 
expeditions within America and a yearly stipend for the maintenance of mission 
stations. The financial and administrative dependence of the Catholic Church in 
colonial Mexico on the Spanish Crown made the church an arm of the colonial state 
(Deeds et al., 2011: 142). 
The Spanish Crown invested in the evangelization of overseas territories for various 
reasons, also because it provided legitimation for its conquest and the subjugation of its 
population. In return for Spain's pledge to convert the American peoples to Catholicism 
Pope Alexander VI officially approved of the conquest of America by the Spanish 
(Colegio de México, 2009: 249). Both sides benefited. Spain’s undertaking was 
declared to be legitimate by what was then Europe’s highest moral authority and the 
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Roman Catholic Church gained an unimagined number of new adherents at a time 
when the Reformation dramatically challenged its influence in Europe. 
Missionaries proved useful in the conquest of territory and people. Their status as 
religious men sometimes granted them easier access to native groups. Missions were 
cheap to maintain and, “played a critical role in the colonization of frontier areas, which 
in many cases held little or no economic attraction for settlers,” (Langer et al., 1995). 
Because of their importance as “pioneering agencies” Bolton describes Mexican 
missions in Mexico as “frontier institution” of Spanish conquest (Bolton, 1917). 
Establishment of Missions and of Spanish Military Control in 1540, 1580 and 1700 
illustrates this aspect of missions in the conquest of Mexico. It shows the spread of 
mission at three points in time: shortly before the conquest of southern Mexico, shortly 
before the conquest of northern Mexico, and before the completion of the conquest. The 
darker areas indicate which parts of Mexico were not yet under Spanish control. The 
spread of mission stations closely accompanies and at times precedes Spanish military 
conquest. Missions in Latin America “[...] were characteristically and designedly 
frontier institutions [...]. They served [...] to aid in extending, holding, and civilizing 
[the frontier] [...]” (Bolton, 1917: 47).  This sometimes made them the only Spanish 
institution in peripheral areas (Langer et al., 1995; Bolton, 1917: 50).  
Once mission stations were established they served multiple purposes. They were 
centres of conversion and also contributed to the economic and cultural conquest of the 
native population. The resettlement of natives in missions permitted missionaries to 
regularly gather children and adults for religious service and indoctrination. Religious 
teaching took a prominent role in mission life because conversion remained at the heart 
of missionary work (Bolton, 1917). Missionaries regularly assembled mission 
inhabitants, on a daily or weekly basis, to teach them doctrines of the Roman Catholic 
Church and how to lead lives pleasing to God. At the same time, it facilitated the use of 
the native labour force by Spanish land owners (Langer et al., 1995; Cushner, 2006; 
Knight, 2002). Furthermore, missionaries contributed to the cultural assimilation of the 
natives. “The importance of the [missions] goes beyond conversion to Christianity. 
They represent the attempt to change not only a belief system but fixed, traditional 
ways of behaving,” (Cushner, 2006). Missionaries forced natives to give up 
polygamous relationships and to cover their entire body with clothes. They also 
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Figure 8 Establishment of Missions and of Spanish Military Control in 1540, 1580 and 1700 
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imposed a strict daily schedule of work and prayer to assure the mission's sustenance 
and missionaries’ control over the natives. Besides, the friars believed that life as a 
good Christian naturally included a disciplined life style of work and prayer (Ricard, 
1966: 212). It introduced the European perception of time and work, of dividing time 
into hours and minutes and splitting the day into work and leisure time. Conversion, 
cultural assimilation and economic exploitation went hand in hand (Langer et al., 
1995).  
 
3.2.2. Differences between Mendicant Orders and Jesuits 
 
The early histories of missionary orders “shaped their approaches to conversion and 
their views of the people they wished to convert,” (Wade, 2008: XIV). The Mendicant 
orders, i.e. the Franciscan, Dominican and Augustinian order, were founded in the 13
th
 
century by men who rejected the opulent and decadent lifestyles of Catholic churchmen 
and their lack of education (Lawrence, 1994: 3, 9). Mendicant orders took the stance 
that wealth inevitably corrupts Christians and leads them away from a lifestyle pleasing 
to God. To become a good Christian one should therefore imitate the Vita Apostolica, 
“the life of the disciples of Jesus as it was revealed in the Gospels: a life of poverty 
devoted to evangelising the unconverted in which the missionaries were supported by 
alms,” (Lawrence, 1994: 32). The key idea of the Mendicant way of life is that poverty 
makes Christians free to lead better lives and gain salvation in the afterlife. Unlike other 
orders, mendicant orders as a whole, not only the individual members, commit to 
poverty. The Mendicant orders had also an egalitarian organisation at their heart. While 
friars owed obedience to their superior, all superiors were democratically elected and 
could be dispelled by the friars or their elected representatives. Certain friars were 
elected to visit monasteries and judge the wrongdoings of their fellow monks and 
superiors.  
The Jesuit order was founded in a different context and with different values. It was 
founded shortly after the Protestant Reformation in 1540 to help maintain the influence 
of the Roman Catholic Church in Europe. The founder Ignatius of Loyola intended to 
build a group of well-trained priests that stood in the pope’s service and served his 
purposes. Jesuits were directly answerable to the pope and unlike any other order, its   
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Table 30 The Orders’ Principles and Excerpts from their Rules 
Subject Rules of the Mendicant orders Constitution of the Jesuits 
Founding 
Principle  
 
Life in poverty 
 
“The brothers shall appropriate 
nothing to themselves, neither a 
place nor anything; but as 
pilgrims and strangers in this 
world, serving God in poverty and 
humility, they shall with 
confidence go seeking alms. Nor 
need they be ashamed, for the 
Lord made himself poor for us in 
this world. This is that summit of 
most lofty poverty which made 
you, my most beloved brothers, 
heirs and kings of the kingdom of 
heaven” (Lawrence, 1994: 33) 
 
 
Obedience to the Pope 
 
“the society as a whole, and each of 
them, owes obedience to our most 
holy lord, the pope […]. For the 
greater humility of our society, and 
toward the complete self-mortification 
of each one, and in order to aid the 
abnegation of our own wills to the 
greatest extent, let each one, besides 
that common obligation, be devoted to 
this by special vow.” 
 
Internal 
organisation 
 
Egalitarian Principles 
 
“The election shall be conducted 
as follows: [they] shall ascertain 
and faithfully record the will of 
each member, one by one, in the 
same house and in the presence of 
all the members; then they shall 
publicly announce the result in the 
same place before the brethren 
leave or confer with one another.” 
 
Concentration of Power 
 
“let the deciding of the grade of each, 
of the offices, and whole arrangement 
be in the hands of the general or 
prelate selected through us, in order 
that the harmony so necessary in all 
well-governed institutions may be 
preserved” 
 
 
 “[The visitadores] visit the 
province [and] are to hear the 
accounts of transgressions 
“The right of carrying out laws, 
however, belongs only to the general.” 
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committed by conventual priors 
or the brethren and correct them 
without changing the constitution 
and status of the house.” 
 
“The difinitores have plenary 
power with respect to correcting 
any transgressions of the Master 
of the Order and even of 
removing him from office.” 
 
 
members vowed direct obedience to him. The individual Jesuits vowed to have no 
private property, but - unlike Mendicant orders - the order as a whole did not commit to 
remain poor. It endorsed economic wealth and influence as important means to serve 
the interests of the Church. “If God has given you an abundance of this world's goods it 
is to help you to earn those in heaven,” (Worcester, 2008: 33). The Jesuit order became 
an important land owner in Mexico. All founding members of the Jesuit orders held 
degrees from the renowned university in Paris (Hoepfl, 2004: 9). Their excellent 
education allowed them to mix in the best society. Jesuits soon gained influence in the 
political and economic spheres of society. They acquired positions as confessors to 
Catholic princes and leading figures of the society (Hoepfl, 2004: 16).  
Whilst Mendicant orders argued that wealth prevents people from leading a truly 
Christian life Jesuits saw economic means as a help to reach salvation. Whereas the 
Mendicant orders were organised on egalitarian principles, the Jesuit order concentrated 
power in the hands of few. The padre general was elected for life and could then not be 
held accountable (Aviles et al., 1997). He had the power to staff all other positions of 
importance and had power to carry out laws.  
Differences between the orders’ attitudes shaped the way that they carried out 
missionary work in colonial Mexico (Wade, 2008: XIV). The Mendicant emphasis on 
poverty led these orders to esteem, sometimes to romanticise, the simple living 
conditions of the native population. In the beginning, they considered their way of life 
superior to Spanish culture because it seemed to be uncorrupted by money and greed, in 
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perfect harmony with their own ideal of poverty. In the beginning, mendicant orders 
had naively cherished utopian hopes of creating the perfect Christian egalitarian 
community among them (Phelan, 1970). These hopes dissipated soon in the realities of 
the Spanish conquest and native resistance to conversion. Nevertheless, Mendicant 
orders still advocated equal opportunities between colonisers and colonised. They saw 
their educational institutions as a means to achieve “equality between Indians and 
Spanish through education” (MacLachlan, 1980: 126). In 1523, Franciscans opened the 
first school for natives in Texcoco. Later, a school in Mexico City was opened for 
native and Spanish orphans (Ricard, 1966: 207). The Dominican Bartolomé de las 
Casas was among the most important defenders of native rights. His book “A Short 
Account of the Destruction of the Indies”, published in 1552, was the first serious 
attempt to draw attention to the miserable living conditions of the native population in 
the Spanish land holdings (Griffin, 1992). 
The Jesuits also established missions but their main focus was the establishment of 
educational institutions in cities providing education for the colonial elite and the 
administration of large land estates for their maintenance. They collected money from 
wealthy Mexican land owners, supposedly for the establishment of missions, but these 
assets might have been invested elsewhere. “The fund’s relative abundant assets 
contrasted with the poverty in which the missionaries lived who had to use all their 
energy and imagination to make ends meet [...]. The administration of the Fund turns 
out to be, at least, suspicious,” (Negro et al., 2005: 152) The Jesuits sought to 
strengthen the position of the Roman Catholic Church in Mexico. They gained 
influence in Mexican society through the provision of high quality education to the 
Spanish and Creole youth. “The close connection between the Society of Jesus and the 
criollo elite rested on the order’s educational contributions,” (MacLachlan, 1980: 137). 
This was in line with “the [general Jesuit] educational vision [...] to offer capable and 
zealous leaders to the social order,” (Cesareo, 1993: 26). 
 
3.3. Data Sources and Data Set Construction 
The main source of information on the locations of mission stations in colonial Mexico 
is a series of three volumes on political, economic and pre-colonial characteristics of 
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colonial Mexico by historical geographer Peter Gerhard (Gerhard, 1972, 1982, 1993). 
The author systematically describes in text format all historical municipalities of 
Mexico (New Spain). In this text, he provides names of missions, the respective order 
in charge of the mission, and the mission’s start and end year.  
The exact locations of the historical mission stations are not provided. Based on the 
names I find the geographic coordinates of historical missions with the help of various 
sources. If the mission had become a present-day locality I could find its coordinates in 
locality level census data published by the Mexican Institute of Statistics and 
Geography (INEGI, 2000). Oftentimes, former mission stations had changed names or 
ceased to exist. In this case, I consulted the Illustrated Atlas of Indian Villages of New 
Spain in 1800 (Tanck de Estrada, 2005) which includes maps and geographic 
coordinates of Indian villages. Some of these had originally been mission stations. I 
also consulted the Historical Archive of Localities (INEGI, 2011), an online resource 
provided by the Institute of Statistics and Geography of Mexico, with lists of locality 
names that have ceased to exist and former names of current localities. If these options 
failed, an internet search helped to find details about a specific mission’s history and its 
coordinates. In total, I have been able to geo-reference 95% of the mission stations 
compiled by Gerhard (1972, 1982, 1993). The data set contains 1145 mission stations 
in total. 
A list of all localities in Mexico is taken from census data of the year 2000 (INEGI, 
2000). The dummy variable Mission of Any Order is one for all localities that were 
located within five kilometres of a mission station of any of the orders. The dummy 
variable Mendicant mission is 1 for all localities that were located within five 
kilometres of a mission station of one of the Mendicant orders. The dummy variable 
Jesuit mission is defined accordingly. I obtain locality level information on outcome 
variables from census data on Mexico for 2000 (INEGI, 2000).  
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Table 31 Summary Statistics 
  
Localities With 
  All No Mission 
Mission of 
Any Order 
Mendicant 
mission Jesuit mission 
# of missions 1,145 0 1,145 942 203 
# of localities 104,439 86580 17859 16573 2330 
% of localities 100% 82.90% 17.10% 15.87% 2.23% 
Years of Schooling 4.21 4.13 5.00 4.98 4.68 
Literacy 76.03% 75.73% 79.07% 78.55% 77.37% 
Secondary Education 19.86% 19.01% 28.35% 28.26% 24.93% 
Higher Education 1.48% 1.33% 3.00% 2.99% 2.76% 
Employment 42.17% 41.90% 44.83% 45.09% 40.06% 
Catholic 85.31% 84.94% 89.06% 89.09% 88.24% 
 
 
I take information on a locality’s climate from the database “Climate Project” (INEGI, 
2009). I assign one of 13 climate zones to each locality. Climate zones are defined 
based on a locality’s average temperature, rainfall frequency, and overall humidity. I 
calculate a locality’s distance to the nearest river or lake based on GIS data. I further 
take information on a locality’s altitude, and its latitude and longitude from locality 
level census data from 2000 (INEGI, 2009). I use the locality’s coordinates to calculate 
each locality’s distance from Mexico City. I use GIS data on Mexican boundaries to 
calculate each locality’s distance from the sea, and from the USA. 
The location of prehispanic settlements in Mexico are taken from Solanes Carraro 
(2000). Precolonial settlement measures a locality’s distance from the nearest pre-
colonial settlement. Information on the extent of Aztec territory in central Mexico, of 
the Maya region in Mexico’s south and the northern zone that was home to nomadic 
and semi-sedentary groups is taken from three maps in Gerhard (1972, 1982, 1993). I 
further define the region non-nomadic north, which is an area in the north of Mexico 
that was neither part of the Aztec empire nor of the nomadic north. I likewise define the 
non-Mayan south as the south of Mexico that was neither part of the Mayan kingdoms 
nor of the Aztec empire. I assign each locality to one of these five pre-conquest zones: 
Aztec centre, Mayan South, nomadic north, non-nomadic north, and non-Mayan south. 
Finally, I include the variable conquest delay, the number of years between Cortés’ 
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arrival in Mexico in 1519 and the establishment of Spanish control. This information 
has been collected at the municipality level from Gerhard (1972, 1982, 1993). 
A main concern in the identification strategy is the endogenous location of mission 
stations. In the next section, I will therefore introduce an array of control variables that 
are likely to affect both the location of mission stations and current outcome variables. 
Not accounting for these could bias results. Table 32 provides a table of summary 
statistics that underlines the importance of controlling carefully for such factors. It 
reports means and differences in means of these control variables between localities 
with and without any mission station, and between localities with and without mission 
stations of each missionary order. All differences are highly statistically significant. If 
they are also correlated with outcome variables omitting these from the specification 
would bias results. 
 
  
 
1
3
2
 
  Table 32 Summary Statistics - Comparision of Differences in Means of Pre-Colonial Variables 
  Mission Type 
  Complete Sample FRAN 
No 
FRAN DOM 
No 
DOM AUG 
No 
AUG JES 
No 
JES Mission No Mission 
Number of Observations 110379 4866 105513 1971 108408  1611 108768  1269 109110 8767  101612 
  
      
 
  
 
  
 
  
 Average Temperature 17.828 17.653 17.836 19.092 17.805 17.561 17.83 18.77 17.81 18.086 17.806 
Difference in Means   0.183***  -1.286*** .27136*** -.9562*** .2802*** 
Altitude 1084.7 1379.7 1033.7 1266 1045 1421.3 1043.4  916.7 1050.4 1305.8 1026.79 
Difference in Means   -345.94*** -221*** -377.95*** 133.78*** 279.0*** 
Distance from river 2.719 .14670  2.8380 .112 2.7667 .1451  2.757  .0773 2.750 .134  2.942 
Difference in Means   2.6913*** 2.6546*** 2.612***  2.672***  -2.808*** 
Distance from lake 3.439 .71241 3.565 .88468 3.485 .6514 3.480 .8027 3.470 .7497 3.671 
Difference in Means   2.8527***  2.601***  2.829*** 2.667*** -2.921*** 
Distance from ocean 5.72  1.6733 5.9087 1.253  5.80  1.603 5.783 1.390 5.772 1.523 6.084 
Difference in Means   4.2353*** 4.5500*** 4.1793*** 4.381*** -4.560*** 
Latitude 19.76 21.479 19.702 17.795 19.81 20.109 19.77 25.98 19.708 20.80 19.693 
Difference in Means   -1.7762*** 2.0215*** -.3332** -6.279***  1.108*** 
Longitude -95.12 -100.594 -94.739  -96.047 -94.978 -99.471 -94.931 -107.329 -94.85 -99.99 -94.56 
Difference in Means   5.8544*** 1.0681*** 4.539*** 12.475*** -5.426*** 
Distance from 
prehispanic settlements 4.90 
0.499 5.1038 .3107 4.984 .3584 4.9682 1.250 4.943 .4947 5.281 
Difference in Means   4.604*** 4.673*** 4.6097*** 3.693*** -4.786*** 
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3.4. Results 
In the following, I use this data set to assess the question whether missionaries in 
colonial Mexico have had long term effects on educational and cultural outcomes, 
whether these effects vary across orders and whether they are robust to instrumental 
variable estimation. I first estimate the average effect of mission stations of any order 
on outcome variables.  
 
(11)  Outcomei = 
β0 + β1 Mission of Any Orderi 
+ β2 climatei  + β3 altitudei + β4 latitude/longitudei + β5  river/lakei 
+ β6 distance to capitali  + β7 distance to seai + β8 distance to USAi 
+ β9 pre-colonial political-cultural zonei + β10 pre-colonial settlementsi 
+ β11 conquest delaym  + εi 
 
The variable Mission of Any Order is a dummy variable that is 1 for all localities 
located within less than 5 kilometres of a historical missions station. The main 
coefficient of interest is β1. It indicates whether outcomes in locality i with a mission 
station of any of the orders are significantly different from outcomes in localities 
without mission station. To control for a location’s geographic characteristics I include 
measures for a locality’s climate and altitude, latitude and longitude, and distance to the 
nearest river and lake. I further control for a locality’s distance to Mexico City, to the 
USA, and to the sea as these may affect a locality’s economic potential. Finally, I 
include a place’s pre-colonial characteristics: distance to pre-colonial settlements, a set 
of dummy variables for its pre-colonial political-cultural region, and the number of 
years between the arrival of the Spanish in 1519 and an area’s conquest. I cluster 
standard errors at the municipality level. The outcome variable Years of Schooling 
measures the average years of schooling of the population above 15 years. Literacy rate 
is the share of the population above 15 years that is able to read. Secondary Education 
and Higher Education is the share of the population above 15 that has received 
secondary and higher education.  The outcome variable Catholic is the share of 
Catholics in the population. 
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Table 33 The Aggregate Effect of Orders on Outcomes 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES 
Years of 
Schooling Literacy 
Secondary 
Education 
Higher 
Education Catholic 
            
All Orders 0.83*** 0.04*** 0.09*** 0.02*** 0.01*** 
 
(0.05) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
      Geographic Controls yes yes yes yes yes 
Climate yes yes yes yes yes 
Location yes yes yes yes yes 
Pre-Conquest Controls yes yes yes yes yes 
      Observations 107,743 107,227 107,227 107,227 107,229 
R-squared 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.04 0.23 
Robust se clustered at municipality level in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
OLS results in Table 33 indicate that the populations of localities with a historical 
mission of any order have significantly more years of schooling; a higher share of the 
population is able to read, has received secondary and higher education, and is catholic.  
As described before, the missionary orders of colonial Mexico prescribed to different 
values which have influenced their activities in Mexico. Hence, the results in Table 33 
may hide heterogeneity in the effects of missionary orders. In the next specification, I 
therefore compare localities with mission stations run by Mendicant orders and by the 
Jesuit order to localities without mission stations. Again, I include the full set of control 
variables as in regression equation 1. 
 
(12) Outcomei =  
β0 + β1 Mendicant missioni + β2 Jesuit missioni 
+ β3 climatei  + β4 altitudei + β5 latitude/longitudei + β6  river/lakei 
+  β7  distance to capitali  + β8 distance to seai  + β9 distance to USAi 
+ β10 pre-colonial political-cultural zonei + β11 pre-colonial 
settlementsi + β12 conquest delaym  + εi  
 
 
The variable Mendicant mission is a dummy variable that is 1 for all localities within 
less than 5 kilometres of a historical mission station of the Mendicant orders, 0 
otherwise. The variable Jesuit mission is defined accordingly. The main coefficients of 
interest are β1 and β2. β1 compares the average outcome variables in localities with 
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missions of Mendicant orders to localities without a mission. β2 compares the average 
outcome variables in localities with missions of the Jesuit order to localities without a 
mission. 
Results in Table 34 show that people in localities with Mendicant missions have on 
average more schooling, a higher share of the population is able to read, has received 
secondary and higher education, and is catholic. The coefficient of Jesuit mission for 
literacy is significantly negative. For Years of Schooling, Secondary Education, and 
Higher Education the coefficient is always insignificant and zero or negative. For a 
locality’s shares of Catholics, the Jesuit coefficient is positive, significant and larger 
than the Mendicant coefficient. 
 
Table 34 The Effect of Mendicant and Jesuit Orders on Outcomes 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES 
Years of 
Schooling Literacy 
Secondary 
Education 
Higher 
Education Catholic 
            
Mendicant Mission 0.59*** 0.03*** 0.06*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 
(0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
      Jesuit Mission 0.08 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.03*** 
 
(0.10) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
      Geographic Controls yes yes yes yes yes 
Climate yes yes yes yes yes 
Location yes yes yes yes yes 
Pre-Conquest Controls yes yes yes yes yes 
Municipality Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes 
      Observations 107,743 107,227 107,227 107,227 107,229 
R-squared 0.41 0.45 0.36 0.14 0.39 
Robust se clustered at municipality level in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
 
Even though I control for geographic factors, a locality’s location and pre-colonial 
characteristics one might still be worried that other factors that are not explicitly 
controlled for explain the results In the next specification, I therefore include 
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municipality fixed effects. This specification estimates coefficients only based on 
variation within each municipality.  
 
(13)  Outcomei =  
β0 + β1 Mendicant missioni + β2 Jesuit missioni 
+ β3 climatei  + β4 altitudei + β5 latitude/longitudei + β6  river/lakei 
+  β7  distance to capitali  + β8 distance to seai  + β9 distance to USAi 
+ β10 pre-colonial settlementsi + β11 conquest delaym   
+ β12 municipality fixed effects+ εi  
 
Table 35 The Effect of Mendicant and Jesuit Orders Including Municipality Fixed Effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES 
Years of 
Schooling Literacy 
Secondary 
Education 
Higher 
Education Catholic 
            
Mendicant Mission 0.59*** 0.03*** 0.06*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 
(0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
      Jesuit Mission 0.08 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.03*** 
 
(0.10) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
      Geographic Controls yes yes yes yes yes 
Climate yes yes yes yes yes 
Location yes yes yes yes yes 
Pre-Conquest Controls yes yes yes yes yes 
Municipality Fixed 
Effects 
yes yes yes yes yes 
      Observations 107,743 107,227 107,227 107,227 107,229 
R-squared 0.41 0.45 0.36 0.14 0.39 
Robust se clustered at municipality level in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
   
Results in Table 35 show that the previous results are robust to the inclusion of 
municipality fixed effects. We see positive and highly significant coefficients for 
Mendicant missions. The coefficients of Jesuit missions are close to zero and 
insignificant. The only exception is that localities with a Jesuit mission stations has 
significantly more Catholics than a locality without a mission station. The coefficient is 
larger than the respective coefficient for Mendicant mission. This indicates that Jesuits 
have affected conversion but not educational attainment. 
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We have seen that three Mendicant orders were present in colonial Mexico, the 
Franciscan, Dominicans, and Augustinians. These orders are part of the same monastic 
tradition and share many values. In the following I test whether their estimated effect is 
similar, too. I therefore replace the dummy variable Mendicant mission by three 
dummy variables: Franciscan mission, Dominican mission and Augustinian mission. 
Franciscans mission is a dummy variable that is 1 for a locality if a mission station of 
the Franciscan order is located less than 5 kilometres from this location. Dominican 
mission and Augustinian mission are defined accordingly. Specification (14) includes 
the four dummy variables, one for each order, the full set of control variables and fixed 
effects for the pre-colonial political-cultural zones described in section 2. Specification 
(15) is identical to specification (4) except that municipality fixed effects replace the 
pre-colonial zones fixed effects. 
 
(14) Outcomei =  
β0 + β1 Franciscan missioni +  β2 Dominican missioni  
+ β3 Augustinian missioni  + β4 Jesuit missioni 
+ β5 climatei  + β6 altitudei + β7 latitude/longitudei + β8  river/lakei 
+ β9 distance to capitali  + β10 distance to seai  + β11 distance to USAi 
+ β12 pre-colonial settlementsi + β13 conquest delaym   
+ β14 pre-colonial political-cultural zone fixed effectsi + εi  
 
(15) Outcomei =  
β0 + β1 Franciscan missioni +  β2 Dominican missioni  
+ β3 Augustinian missioni  + β4 Jesuit missioni 
+ β5 climatei  + β6 altitudei + β7 latitude/longitudei + β8  river/lakei 
+ β9 distance to capitali  + β10 distance to seai  + β11 distance to USAi 
+ β12 pre-colonial settlementsi + β13 conquest delaym   
+ β14 municipality fixed effects+ εi  
 
 
Table 36 and Table 37 show results. We see that results are similar for the three 
Mendicant orders. Their estimated effect is positive and most of the time significant. 
We can see that the Franciscan order has in some cases a larger coefficient than the 
Dominican and Augustinian order. Results for the Dominican order tend to be relatively 
weak compared to the other Mendicant orders. 
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Table 36 The Effect of Each Order Separately on Outcomes 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES 
Years of 
Schooling Literacy 
Secondary 
Education 
Higher 
Education Catholic 
            
Franciscan Mission 0.89*** 0.05*** 0.09*** 0.02*** 0.01* 
 
(0.07) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
      Dominican Mission 0.58*** 0.03** 0.06*** 0.01*** 0.00 
 
(0.12) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
      Augustinian Mission 0.64*** 0.03*** 0.08*** 0.01*** -0.00 
 
(0.09) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
      Jesuit Mission -0.12 -0.04** -0.00 0.00 0.03*** 
 
(0.18) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) 
      Geographic Controls yes yes yes yes yes 
Climate yes yes yes yes yes 
Location yes yes yes yes yes 
Pre-Conquest 
Controls yes yes yes yes yes 
      Observations 107,743 107,227 107,227 107,227 107,229 
R-squared 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.04 0.23 
Robust se clustered at municipality level in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 37 The Effect of Each Order Separately Including Municipality Fixed Effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES 
Years of 
Schooling Literacy 
Secondary 
Education 
Higher 
Education Catholic 
            
Franciscan Mission 0.62*** 0.03*** 0.06*** 0.02*** 0.01*** 
 
(0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
      Dominican Mission 0.29*** 0.01 0.03*** 0.01*** 0.01 
 
(0.09) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
      Augustinian Mission 0.53*** 0.03*** 0.06*** 0.01*** 0.01 
 
(0.08) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
      Jesuit Mission 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.03*** 
 
(0.10) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
      Geographic Controls yes yes yes yes yes 
Climate yes yes yes yes yes 
Location yes yes yes yes yes 
Pre-Conquest Controls yes yes yes yes yes 
Municipality Fixed 
Effects 
yes yes yes yes yes 
      Observations 107,743 107,227 107,227 107,227 107,229 
R-squared 0.41 0.45 0.36 0.14 0.39 
Robust se clustered at municipality level in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
3.5. Robustness 
3.5.1. Results within Mission Area 
 
Despite the inclusion of an array of control variables, including municipality fixed 
effects, one might still be concerned that the endogenous selection of mission locations 
biases results. In this section, I propose an additional robustness check by estimating 
the effects of missions within chosen mission areas. The chosen mission areas are the 
result of the early directions of the missionaries’ expeditions away from Mexico City 
combined with their tendency to maintain these directions for the rest of the colonial 
period. Details on these mission areas are provided in section 3.6.  
By restricting the sample to localities within these mission areas we estimate the effect 
of missionaries conditional on observable and unobservable factors that might have 
shaped the direction of their missionary expeditions.  
Table 38 to Table 41 report results. Table 38 and Table 39 estimate the effects of 
 
Table 38 OLS Results Within Mission Areas 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES 
Years of 
Schooling Literacy 
Secondary 
Education 
Higher 
Education Catholic 
            
Mendicant Mission 0.88*** 0.04*** 0.09*** 0.02*** 0.01** 
 
(0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
      Jesuit Mission -0.22 -0.04** -0.01 0.00 0.05*** 
 
(0.15) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
     Geographic Controls yes yes yes yes yes 
Climate yes yes yes yes yes 
Location yes yes yes yes yes 
Pre-Conquest 
Controls yes yes yes yes yes 
      Observations 57,133 57,111 57,111 57,111 57,113 
R-squared 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.04 0.14 
Robust se clustered at municipality level in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 39 OLS Results Within Mission Areas Municipality Fixed Effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES 
Years of 
Schooling Literacy 
Secondary 
Education 
Higher 
Education Catholic 
Mendicant Mission 0.58*** 0.03*** 0.06*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 
(0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
      Jesuit Mission 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.04*** 
 
(0.11) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
      Geographic Controls yes yes yes yes yes 
Climate yes yes yes yes yes 
Location yes yes yes yes yes 
Pre-Conquest Controls yes yes yes yes yes 
Municipality Fixed 
Effects yes yes yes yes yes 
      Observations 57,133 57,111 57,111 57,111 57,113 
R-squared 0.40 0.45 0.35 0.14 0.30 
Robust se clustered at municipality level in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
 
 
 
 
 
    Table 40 OLS Results Per Order Within Mission Areas 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES 
Years of 
Schooling Literacy 
Secondary 
Education 
Higher 
Education Catholic 
Franciscan Mission 0.78*** 0.04*** 0.08*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 
 
(0.08) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
      Dominican Mission 1.00*** 0.06*** 0.09*** 0.02*** -0.01 
 
(0.15) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
      Augustinian Mission 0.55*** 0.02 0.06*** 0.01*** 0.00 
 
(0.11) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
      Jesuit Mission -0.18 -0.04** -0.01 0.00 0.05*** 
 
(0.14) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
      Geographic Controls yes yes yes yes yes 
Climate yes yes yes yes yes 
Location yes yes yes yes yes 
Pre-Conquest 
Controls 
yes yes yes yes yes 
      Observations 57,133 57,111 57,111 57,111 57,113 
R-squared 0.16 0.17 0.15 0.04 0.14 
Robust se clustered at municipality level in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 41 OLS Results Per Order Within Mission Areas Municipality Fixed Effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES 
Years of 
Schooling Literacy 
Secondary 
Education 
Higher 
Education Catholic 
            
Franciscan Mission 0.55*** 0.02*** 0.06*** 0.01*** 0.01** 
 
(0.07) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
      Dominican Mission 0.33*** 0.01 0.04*** 0.01*** 0.00 
 
(0.10) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
      Augustinian Mission 0.51*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.01*** 0.01 
 
(0.09) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
      Jesuit Mission 0.09 0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.04*** 
 
(0.11) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
      Geographic Controls yes yes yes yes yes 
Climate yes yes yes yes yes 
Location yes yes yes yes yes 
Pre-Conquest Controls yes yes yes yes yes 
Municipality Fixed 
Effects yes yes yes yes yes 
      Observations 57,133 57,111 57,111 57,111 57,113 
R-squared 0.40 0.45 0.35 0.14 0.30 
Robust se clustered at municipality level in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
 
3.5.2. Altonji-Elder-Taber statistics  
In this section, I use the Altonji-Elder-Taber statistic to explore whether the omission of 
variables from the regression, either because they are unobservable or because data is 
not available at present, is likely to bias results (Oster, 2013). The basic idea behind this 
test is that coefficients movements in combination with changes in R-squared values as 
control variables are introduced into the specification are informative of relevant 
omitted variables under the assumption that selection on observables is proportional to 
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selection on unobservables. The test statistic δ is a test of “how important the 
unobservables would need to be relative to the observables to eliminate the estimated 
effect. [...]”. (Oster, 2013: 9). Oster (2013: 13) tests the validity of the test statistic and 
finds that “estimates which require a higher δ to produce β = 0 are more likely to have 
been confirmed in randomised trials.”  
Table 42 shows results for different explanatory variables used in this studies. For the 
explanatory variable Franciscan mission the δ -value is large and positive. This suggests 
that unobservable variables in the model would have to facto 2.3 or factor 7.6 as large 
as observable characteristics so that the coefficient on this explanatory variable would 
be 0. For the other explanatory variables Dominican, Augustinian, Jesuit and 
Mendicant mission, however, the coefficients on δ are negative. This suggests that if 
unobservable variables could we controlled for the estimated effect of the explanatory 
variable would be 0. Further research would be needed to investigate what the 
implications of this test result are. A starting point would be to examine the 
relationships between the introduction of specific control variables and corresponding 
changes in R-Squared values. Another important pathway would be to test the 
relevance of control variables for the outcome variable, to include more control 
variables to increase R-Squared values and to be able to get a better sense of the 
importance of the unobservable variables. 
 
Table 42 Altonji-Elder-Taber statistics δ-values 
Outcome Variable 
Franciscan 
mission 
Dominican 
mission 
Augustinian 
mission 
Jesuit 
mission 
Mendicant 
mission 
Years of Schooling 2.341 -0.161 -0.696 -0.043 -0.729 
Secondary Education 7.66 -0.223 -0.87 -0.015 -0.669 
 
 
 
 
 
 143 
 
3.6. Instrumental Variable Estimation – Early 
Directions and Missionary Momentum 
In the past section I have presented OLS results on the effects of missionary orders on 
educational attainment and conversion. I have been careful to control for factors that 
may have affected both the location of historical mission stations and the outcome 
variables. In this section I propose an instrumental variable estimation strategy. The 
missionary orders left Mexico City very early onwards in different directions. These 
initial directions substantially affected the final distribution of mission stations across 
Mexico. I use the orders’ early directions as a source of exogenous variation in their 
final locations of missions. 
Upon arrival, all missionary orders first went to Mexico City. From there, they sent out 
missionary expeditions in different directions to establish mission stations among the 
native population
2
. Then, the orders tended to maintain this direction for the rest of the 
colonial period even though geographic and ethnic characteristics of the environment 
varied along the way. There were two reasons for this behaviour. The first reason was 
the presence of the other orders. Once an order had taken up a direction the other orders 
generally accepted that this order had earned the right and responsibility to establish 
missions in this direction. This code of conduct prevented orders from encroaching on 
each other’s territory and minimised tensions between orders over territory. The second 
reason is the persistent support that missionary expeditions received from their sending 
orders in Europe. At first, the early directions of the missionary orders consisted of only 
a handful of mission stations established by a relatively small number of missionaries. 
Yet, these missionary expeditions received powerful backing by their order in Europe 
which had the human and financial resources to pursue these initial directions and to 
persevere even in the face of difficulties. The powerful organisations of the religious 
orders lent momentum to their members’ early missionary expeditions. As a result these 
early beginnings partly predict the final distribution of missionary orders across 
colonial Mexico (Figure 7, Figure 9 to Figure 12).  
                                                 
2
 In the colonial period, Mexico and present-day Guatemala together formed the administrative entity 
New Spain. Unlike Mexico, the more peripheral Guatemala was later divided among missionary orders 
to ensure its evangelization. This did not occur in Mexico. 
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The Franciscan order left Mexico City towards the northwest, northeast and southeast. 
Their main ambition was to reach the “uncivilized territories of the north”, (Ricard, 
1966: 66). The second order to arrive in Mexico, the Dominicans, headed south because 
their “expansion [...] was limited and conditioned by that of the Franciscans” (Ricard, 
1966: 66). The Augustinian order left Mexico City in several directions that were still 
unoccupied by the Franciscan and Dominican order and “squeezed their missions into 
the gaps left by the Franciscans and Dominicans” (Ricard, 1966: 68). They went into 
the northwest, northeast and southwest while remaining in the centre. The Jesuits left 
Mexico City in north western direction because this region was yet untouched by the 
other missionary orders.  
I propose the initial directions of each missionary order to instrument for their final 
locations. More specifically, I identify each order’s 10 earliest establishments in the 
context of a missionary expedition and identify initial directions based on Ricard (1966, 
see Table 43). I draw two lines for each direction, each starting at Mexico City and 
going through the outermost mission station of each direction until the limits of the 
Mexican territory (Figure 9 to Figure 12).  The area between the lines is then used to 
instrument for the final distribution of mission stations. 
The Dominican and Jesuit order left Mexico City in one direction only. The 
Augustinians and Franciscans went into three directions each. I determine which 
missions constitute one direction based on a classification of early missionary 
directions by Ricard (1966). 
Table 43 The Orders' Early Directions 
 
Number of 
Initial 
Directions 
Names of Directions in 
Ricard 1966 
Identifier 
in map 
Dominican Directions 1 Southern Direction   
Augustinian Directions 
  
3 Southern Thrust A1 
 
Northern Thrust A2 
  Westward Thrust A3 
Franciscan  
Directions 
  
3 Puebla-Tlaxcala group F1 
 
Hidalgo Querétaro group F2 
  Michoacán group  F3 
Jesuit Directions 1  North-western Direction   
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For the Franciscan order, Ricard (1966) identifies three early directions: the southeast 
(the Puebla-Tlaxcala group), the northeast (the Hidalgo Querétaro group), and the 
northwest (the Michoacán group) (Ricard, 1966: 76). For the Augustinian order, he lists 
the “southern thrust, [...] the northern thrust [...], [...] the westward thrust,” (Ricard, 
1966: 77).  Geographic names for the Franciscan directions corroborate that the 10 
earliest mission stations were part of the early missionary expeditions. I only include 
establishments that lie outside a 40 miles zone around Mexico City because 
establishments in the vicinity of Mexico City were not part of the orders’ missionary 
expeditions. They consisted of more than one mission station. In some cases more than 
one mission station was established in the same year as the 10
th
 mission station. As it 
was not possible to determine which of the mission stations has been built earlier in the 
year I include them all. 
I define the dummy variable Jesuit area that is one for all localities that lie within the 
direction lines of the Jesuit order. The dummy variable Mendicant area is one for all 
localities that lie within the direction lines of one of the Mendicant orders. I use Jesuit 
area as an instrumental variable for the variable Jesuit mission that is one for a locality 
if a historical mission station of the Jesuit order was located less than 5 kilometres 
away. I use Mendicant area to instrument for Mendicant mission that is one for a 
locality if a historical mission station of one of the Mendicant orders is located less than 
5 kilometres away. Due to the spatial nature of the instrument it is not possible to 
include control variables that describe areas within Mexico. I replace dummy variables 
for climate groups within Mexico with measures for rainfall and average temperature. I 
also omit the dummy variables for the pre-colonial political-cultural zones. To see the 
small impact of these changes on regression I compare OLS specifications with the full 
set of control variables and with the reduced set of control variables for all outcome 
variables in Table 44. The precision of the estimates decreases, but the coefficient 
estimates remain the same or are very similar. 
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Figure 9 First 10 Dominican Missions in Mexico and Final Distribution  
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Figure 10 First 10 Augustinian Missions in Mexico and Final Distribution 
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Figure 11 First 10 Franciscan Missions in Mexico and Final Distribution  
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Figure 12  First 10 Jesuit Missions in Mexico and Final Distribution 
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5
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Table 44 The Effect of Mendicant and Jesuit Orders with Different Control Variables 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Years of Schooling Literacy 
Secondary 
Education Higher Education Catholic 
                      
Mendicant Mission 0.84*** 0.93*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.01** 0.01*** 
 
(0.06) (0.07) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 Jesuit Mission -0.11 -0.13 -0.04** -0.06*** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03** 0.03** 
 
(0.18) (0.22) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 Full Set of Control Variables yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
Reduced Set of Control 
Variables 
 
yes   yes   yes   yes   yes 
   
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 Observations 107,743 107,743 107,227 107,227 107,227 107,227 107,227 107,227 107,229 107,229 
R-squared 0.16 0.09 0.16 0.10 0.15 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.23 0.21 
Robust se clustered at municipality level in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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I propose the following First Stage regressions: 
 
(16) Mendicant missioni =  
γ0 + γ1 Mendicant areai + γ2 Jesuit areai 
+ γ3 rainfall/average tempi  + γ4 altitudei + γ5 latitude/longitudei + γ6 river/lakei  
+ γ7 distance to capitali  + γ8 distance to seai  + γ9 distance to USAi  
+ γ10 pre-colonial settlementsi  + γ 11 conquest delay m + εi  
 
(17) Jesuit missioni =  
δ0 + δ1 Mendicant areai + δ2 Jesuit areai  
+ δ3 rainfall/average tempi  + δ4 altitudei + δ5 latitude/longitudei + δ6 river/lakei  
+ δ7  distance to capitali  + δ8 distance to seai  + δ9 distance to USAi  
+ δ10 pre-colonial settlementsi + δ11 conquest delaym + εi  
 
 
Table 45 First Stages Regressions 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Mendicant Mission Jesuit Mission 
      
Mendicant Area 0.05*** 0.01*** 
 
(0.01) (0.00) 
   Jesuit Area -0.04*** 0.02*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) 
   Geographic Controls yes yes 
Climate yes yes 
Location yes yes 
Pre-Conquest Controls yes yes 
   Observations 107,743 107,743 
R-squared 0.04 0.06 
Robust se clustered at municipality level in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The First Stages regressions show a positive and highly significant coefficient of each 
instrument for its respective endogenous variable. Additionally, the instrumental 
variable Jesuit Area is negative and highly significant for the endogenous variable 
Mendicant Mission. The instrumental variable Mendicant Area is positive and 
significant for the endogenous variable Jesuit Mission. The size of the coefficient, 
however, is only half of the coefficient of Jesuit Area in the same regression. As I 
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instrument with two instruments for two endogenous variables, I do not use the usual F-
test to test for weak instruments. Instead I use a test proposed by Stock and Yogo 
(2005) based on the Cragg-Donald Eigenvalue statistic. The value of the Cragg-Donald 
minimum eigenvalue lies at 127.98, well above the critical value of 7.03. Weak 
instruments should not bias the results. 
Table 46 reports IV regression results. They confirm the patterns of the OLS results. In 
localities with Mendicant missions, educational attainment is higher and a higher share 
of the population is Catholic. The Mendicant coefficient on employment is negative but 
it remains insignificant. For Jesuit missions, the coefficients on educational outcomes 
are negative and mostly insignificant except for Higher Education. The Jesuit 
coefficient on the share of Catholics is larger than the Mendicant coefficient but 
remains insignificant. The same results pattern emerges from OLS regressions with and 
without municipality fixed effects and IV estimation. 
A striking feature of the results is that the estimated effect of missionary orders is 
substantially larger in the IV specification compared to the OLS specification. It is 
important to understand why this could be the case. Possible explanations include the 
presence of measurement error in the endogenous variables and that the Local Average 
Treatment Effects (LATE) does not equal the Average Treatment Effect. Measurement 
error in the endogenous variables biases results towards zero in the OLS specification. 
If the instrumental variables are not affected by measurement error and are uncorrelated 
with the residuals of the endogenous variables, then using IV estimation will produce 
unbiased results. If the variables on the locations of mission stations suffer from 
measurement error, then OLS results will be biased towards zero. If the instrumental 
variables are truly exogenous they will produce unbiased results that are not biased 
towards zero and hence produce larger estimates. A second explanation refers to the 
concept of the  Following Imbens and Angrist (1993), I interpret IV estimates Local 
Average Treatment Effects (LATE), the effect of the treatment on those that would not 
have received treatment in the absence of the instrument. In the present case, this 
implies that the IV specification estimates the effect of missions on those localities that 
would not have had a mission if they had not been located within the mission areas 
defined above. It is thinkable that when missions were erected in remote and 
insignificant places, these were chosen because of their location, to a lesser extent 
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because of their characteristics. The increase in probability of becoming a mission site 
by being located within a mission area might have been much higher for remote, 
insignificant places compared to larger settlements that might still have attracted 
missionaries by their socio-economic characteristics. If this is the case then the IV 
specification captures primarily the effect of missions on remote places, and to a lesser 
extent the effect of missions on relatively large places. It is thinkable that, in the case of 
smaller localities, missions might have had a particular strong effect because the 
probability of obtaining alternative educational institutions in the absence of missions 
might have been especially low. Hence, exploring heterogeneity in the effect of 
missions on outcome variables depending on localities’ initial characteristics could be 
an interesting direction for future research. One explanation for the discrepancy 
between IV and OLS estimates is a potential discrepancy between the Average 
Treatment Effect (ATE) estimated by standard OLS regression and the Local Average 
Treatment Effects (LATE) estimated by IV regression.  The LATE is defined as the 
effect of the treatment on those that would not have received treatment in the absence 
of the instrument (Imbens and Angrist, 1993). In the present case, this implies that the 
IV specification estimates the effect of missions on those localities that would not have 
had a mission if they had not been located within the mission area “triangles”. It is 
thinkable that when missions were erected in remote and insignificant places, these 
were chosen because of their location, to a lesser extent because of their characteristics. 
The increase in probability of becoming a mission site by being located within a 
mission area might have been much higher for remote, insignificant places compared to 
larger settlements that might still have attracted missionaries by their socio-economic 
characteristics. If this is the case then the IV specification captures primarily the effect 
of missions on remote places, and to a lesser extent the effect of missions on relatively 
large places. It is thinkable that, in the case of smaller localities, missions might have 
had a particular strong effect because the probability of obtaining alternative 
educational institutions in the absence of missions might have been especially low. 
Hence, exploring heterogeneity in the effect of missions on outcome variables 
depending on localities’ initial characteristics would be an interesting direction for 
future research. 
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Table 46 Instrumental Variable Regression Results 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (6) 
VARIABLES 
Years of 
Schooling Literacy 
Secondary 
Education 
Higher 
Education Catholic 
            
Mendicant 
Mission 5.05*** 0.40*** 0.41*** 0.04** 0.40*** 
 
(1.14) (0.12) (0.10) (0.02) (0.12) 
      Jesuit Mission -5.62 -1.17 -0.46 -0.24** 0.97 
 
(7.06) (0.79) (0.61) (0.12) (0.79) 
      Geographic 
Controls yes yes yes yes yes 
Climate yes yes yes yes yes 
Location yes yes yes yes yes 
Pre-Conquest 
Controls 
yes yes yes yes yes 
      Observations 107,743 107,227 107,227 107,227 107,229 
Robust se clustered at municipality level in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The validity of these results depends on the assumption that the orders’ early directions 
have only affected the outcome variables through their impact on the orders’ settlement 
patterns. An important concern is that early directions of orders were not random but 
driven by factors that are themselves related to long term development outcomes. 
Orders might have systematically chosen directions that allowed them to claim territory 
with particularly advantageous conditions. Alternatively, orders might have deliberately 
gone to “more remote locations, where the word of God otherwise would not have 
reached,” (Nunn, 2012: 2). If the missionaries’ first concern was to establish easily 
accessible and maintainable missions we would expect to see that missionaries first 
established missions around Mexico City, within the former Aztec empire. It was the 
most advantageous area at the time. Unlike the rest of Mexican territory, it was already 
under Spanish control, politically stable and the Aztec empire boasted the highest pre-
colonial living standards of Mexico. If missionaries had set up missions in this area 
until the whole population there was exposed to missions this would be evidence for 
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missionaries systematically choosing certain areas to secure particularly advantageous 
conditions. It would have led to an upward bias in the results we have seen.  
Alternatively, the settlement patterns might have been driven by ambition to spread the 
Christian faith to “where the word of God otherwise would not have reached” (Nunn, 
2012: 2). This attitude has been attested by Bolton (1917): “From the standpoint of the 
Church, and as viewed by [the missionaries] themselves, their principal work was to 
spread the Faith, first, last, and always”.  
In addition, the simple living conditions of the native population evoked in the 
Mendicant orders the dream of creating the perfect Christian egalitarian community 
among the natives of Mexico. “After [...] three hundred years of frustration in Europe, 
the Indians presented them with the unique opportunity of applying on a large scale the 
doctrine of evangelical poverty” (Phelan, 1970: 49). From their point of view, the 
native societies of the more remote areas of America had not yet been exposed to the 
evil influence of money, greed and corruption but lived in simplicity and poverty, 
values advocated by Mendicant orders throughout the world. In the creation of such a 
society, however, the contact to corrupt and greedy Spanish colonisers would have been 
disruptive. This incited missionaries to seek undivided control over the natives in 
remote areas (Phelan, 1970: 46).   
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Figure 13 First 10 Missions and State of Conquest 
 
  
 157 
 
The Spanish Crown further encouraged the missionaries’ push towards the yet unsettled 
regions because “missions were a cost-effective form of colonization: in exchange for a 
small annual stipend [...] missionaries ran the evangelization and assimilation programs 
that pacified many frontier Indian groups and contributed to the economic development 
of frontier regions,“ (Langer et al., 1995). Missions “[...] were characteristically and 
designedly frontier institutions and [...] pioneer agencies [...]. They served not alone to 
Christianize the frontier, but also to aid in extending, holding, and civilizing it,” 
(Bolton, 1917: 47).  As a result, “missions played a critical role in the colonization of 
frontier areas, which in many cases held little or no economic attraction for settlers,” 
(Langer et al., 1995). If settlement patterns of religious orders were primarily driven by 
these considerations we would expect to see missions spreading quickly to the 
periphery of Spanish control.  
My data sets allows us to see whether the missionary orders pushed towards the 
unknown territories beyond Spanish control or rather set up missions in the heartland of 
Spanish control. The map below shows the location of the 10 first mission stations of 
each order and the state of Spanish conquest at the time when these missions were 
established. All orders had missions in the centre but then left the centre for more 
remote areas. All orders touched on areas that were not yet under Spanish control. 
Mission historian Robert Ricard classifies such missions as “mission of penetration 
[situated in] zones of difficult relief, unpleasant climate, not yet pacified, or on the 
border of unsubjugated territories,” (Ricard, 1966: 78). 
While missionaries did not avoid central Mexico the map shows us that the locations of 
early missions reflect the missionaries’ push to remote areas, be it to spread God’s word 
everywhere, to create communities in remote areas according to their own values, or 
because of encouragement by the Spanish Crown to establish missions as frontier 
institutions. This evidence makes it likely that the direction of the earliest missions was 
not chosen strategically to assure the easiest possible conditions. As the territory lying 
ahead of the missions was not yet under Spanish control its development trajectory 
under Spanish control was still unknown. If the direction of the early missions were 
chosen irrespective of the development potential of the territory ahead than, the results 
show the causal effect of missionaries rather than of other variables omitted from the 
equation.  
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3.6.1. Pseudo-Overidentification Tests 
Finally, I conduct a pseudo-overidentification test as an indicator of the validity of the 
instruments. The test consists of regressing the outcome variables of interest on both 
the instruments (here: Mendicant area and Jesuit area) as well as the endogenous 
variables (here: Mendicant mission and Jesuit mission) as well as control variables. The 
basic idea behind the test is that the instrumental variables should not have explanatory 
power beyond the explanatory power of the endogenous variables. Hence, we would 
expect that the coefficient of the instrumental variables in this equation is insignificant 
and substantially smaller in size compared to the endogenous variables. To conduct the 
test, I estimate the following regression for each of the outcome variables: 
 
(18) Outcome Variablei =  
γ0 + γ1 Mendicant missions + γ2 Mendicant areai + γ3 Jesuit missioni + γ4 Jesuit 
areai 
+ γ5 rainfall/average tempi  + γ6 altitudei + γ7 latitude/longitudei + γ8 river/lakei  
+ γ9 distance to capitali  + γ10 distance to seai  + γ11 distance to USAi  
+ γ12 pre-colonial settlementsi  + γ 13 conquest delay m + εi  
 
Table 47 reports results. For each outcome variable – except in column 4 – the 
coefficient size of the instrumental variable Mendicant area is significant. The sizes of 
the coefficients are substantially smaller in most specifications compared to the 
coefficients on the endogenous variable Mendicant mission except in column 5. The 
coefficient size of the instrumental variable Jesuit area is substantially smaller 
compared to the coefficients on the endogenous variable Jesuit mission. They are not 
significant. 
What do these results tell us about the validity of the instruments? Following the 
interpretation of the test, the significance of the instrumental variable Mendicant area is 
a concern, while the relatively small coefficient sizes of the instrumental variables in 
these specifications shows that the explanatory power of the instrumental variable over 
and above the endogenous variables is limited.  
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Table 47 Pseudo-Overidentification Tests  
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES 
Years of 
Schooling Literacy 
Secondary 
Education 
Higher 
Education Catholic 
            
Mendicant Mission 0.68*** 0.03*** 0.07*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 
 
(0.05) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
      Mendicant Area 0.24*** 0.01* 0.02*** 0.00 0.03*** 
 
(0.06) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
      
      Jesuit Mission -0.17 -0.04** -0.01 0.00 0.03** 
 
(0.16) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
      Jesuit Area 0.09 -0.00 0.01 -0.00 0.02 
 
(0.11) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
      Geographic Controls yes yes yes yes yes 
Climate yes yes yes yes yes 
Location yes yes yes yes yes 
Pre-Conquest 
Controls yes yes yes yes yes 
      Observations 104,950 104,437 104,437 104,437 104,439 
R-Squared 0.15 0.16 0.13 0.04 0.23 
Robust se clustered at municipality level in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
 
3.7. Conclusion 
As in the previous two chapters, the interest of this chapter lies in examining the long-
term effects of a historical event while also contributing to our knowledge on a 
theoretical question with implications for today. In this chapter, I examine the long-
term economic effects the important missionary efforts of Catholic Missionaries in 
colonial Mexico while also contributing to our knowledge on the persistent effect of the 
transmission of values and the provision of educational institutions by missionaries. 
 160 
 
Seminal papers in this field of research that use econometric methods to estimate the 
long-term effects of missionaries have been Woodberry (2004) and Nunn (2010, 2012). 
Their results indicate significant and long-term effects of missionary orders, especially 
on educational and cultural outcome variables.  
The present piece of research is similar to these recent studies in the use of econometric 
methods. Quantitative data on missions located over a large territory have been 
collected and econometric methods have been applied to estimate the effects of 
missionaries. It also extends the scope of this literature in several ways. First, it extends 
the geographical scope of the existing research on missionaries. Previous papers have 
focused on the role of missionaries in colonial Africa (Woodberry, 2004; Nunn, 2010, 
2012). Since it is the aim of this literature to improve our understanding of the effects 
of missionaries as part of the colonisation process the role of missionaries in colonial 
Latin America should not remain unexamined as it has been one of the most important 
missionary undertakings in history. The fact that until today the majority of the 
population in Latin American countries is Catholic bears witness to the importance of 
the penetration of Latin America by missionaries.  
Second, this chapter refines the perspective on missionaries and how they can be 
usefully defined. Previous research has identified missionaries as Protestant or Catholic 
missionaries (e.g. Nunn, 2012), but this is a simplified view of the structures of the 
Protestant and Roman Catholic Church. Both churches are characterised by a multitude 
of sub-groups, e.g. in the form of different religious orders, that – while remaining 
firmly anchored in their respective church – differ in their specific values that motivate 
many of their actions. In this chapter, I recognize this heterogeneity within the Roman 
Catholic Church and use it for the purpose of the analysis. One important motivation of 
studying the effect of missionaries is their role in transmitting values. By estimating the 
effects of missionaries by order, and not by church (e.g. Catholic vs. Protestant), I can 
exploit interesting variation in missionary values to show that different orders that 
adhered to different values had also different long-term effects.  
Finally, it is the first study to propose an instrumental variable strategy to address the 
notorious identification problem that stems from the endogenous locations of mission 
stations. Previous papers have acknowledged the identification problem addressed it by 
including an array of control variables. I also follow this strategy and carefully control 
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for relevant control variables. In addition, I estimate the effects of missionaries using 
instrumental variable estimation. The richness of the collected data on historical 
mission stations – in particular information on each mission’s starting year – allow me 
to trace the spread of mission across Mexico and to identify the importance of early 
missionary directions for the final distribution of mission stations. I exploit this source 
of exogeneity in the final distribution of mission stations. That results remain robust 
using IV estimation corroborates previous results on the effect of missionary orders for 
educational and cultural outcomes. 
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